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Are transport markets and associated costs important for international trade? To the present day
there is a sparse and fragmented literature pointing towards an armative answer. This Thesis
reinforces such opinion by accounting for transport markets in general equilibrium models of
trade, and providing empirical evidence on the impact of determinants that explain casual trade-
and-transport related phenomena. The outcomes of the Thesis promote policy and/or investment
activism in developing countries, due to the gains from trade lost to excessive transport costs.
Two particular observations are investigated:
i) When and why should a transport hub emerge? Using a simple trade model of monopolistic
competition with representative rms incorporating network theory, the determinants governing
optimal network formation become the level of transport costs, increasing returns in transporta-
tion and centrality. Empirical deduction supports that exports increase more on average if a
shipping route passing through a hub is selected relative to a direct route, following a reduction
in variable trade costs. Thus geographically disadvantaged countries that absorb high transport
costs can ameliorate these by trading via a hub.
ii) Are taris and shipping prices complementary? By not assuming this interaction, standard
trade models of representative and heterogeneous rms are unable to identify by decompos-
ing the direct and indirect -that is, via adjustments in transport technology- eects of trade
liberalisation, resulting in observing large elasticities of import demand. Invoking a model of
monopolistic competition with heterogeneous rms that trade using transport services operating
under increasing returns, it is the presence of the latter that amplies the response of trade
volumes to tari declines. Yet transportation may also dampen such responses, for the shipping
price is a function of the factory price of the good and a markup. The empirical experiments
provide support to such propositions.
The last chapter is distinct and deliberates on the importance of modeling nancial networks
that represent real world transaction systems relative to abstract articial topologies. It is found
that the international network of nancial exposures exhibits characteristics that are congruent
with robust-yet-fragile networks. Employing a common model of contagion illustrates how the
robust-yet-fragile network structure absorbs defaults by peripheral countries however becomes
susceptible to default cascades when combinations of peripheral countries or a nancial centre
collapse.
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xixChapter 1
Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the implications of modelling approaches to trans-
port costs in the context of international trade and development. An extensive survey
of the theoretical and empirical literature is undertaken and stylised facts about trans-
portation and transport costs are exhibited. The purpose of such a chapter is to signify
the aim of the doctoral thesis and to identify its position in the international trade and
economic development literatures. The contents are organised mainly on the time di-
mension. Section 1.1 documents the evolution of the trade literature incorporating an ad
valorem transport cost, or \iceberg" cost as it is customary known, and deliberates on
empirical ndings. Section 1.2 discusses the studies challenging the iceberg cost assump-
tion by introducing alternative functional forms with corroborating evidence. Section
1.2.1 illustrates the transport sector and its market structure; the evolution of transport
costs over time; and their relative importance with regard to trade costs for economic
development. The chapter concludes by delivering the aim and position of this doctoral
thesis in the extant literature.
1.1 A history of the iceberg cost of international trade
The fundamental modelling tool of trade costs in international trade is referred to as the
\iceberg" cost. This term was rst introduced in the works of Samuelson (1952, 1954)
in order to study how the terms of trade alter when there occurs a unilateral transfer
payment in the presence of transport costs rather than assuming a transport-free world.
The cost was introduced as a payment measured in units of the traded good where \to
carry each good across the ocean you must pay some of the good itself. Rather than set up
elaborate models of a merchant marine, invisible items, etc., we can achieve our purpose
by assuming that just as only a fraction of ice exported reaches its destination as unmelted
ice...". By using this construct Samuelson is able to prove that a unilateral payment to
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a recipient country shifts the terms of trade in favour of the paying country rather than
the opposite case, which holds when transport costs are assumed non-existent.1
The combination of iceberg costs and the model of trade with homogeneous rms -that
is, rms which are characterised by the same marginal cost and thus output- engaging
in monopolistic competition pioneered by Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979)
shaped much of the trade literature that came to be known as the \unfortunate phrase
of New Trade Theory" (Krugman 2009). At its heart, the literature explained how tech-
nologically identical countries specialise in producing dierent products, giving rise to
trade as consumers sought variety. The intensity of transport costs and factor mobility
subsequently led to models of \New Economic Geography", where a trade o between
transport costs and the level of xed costs associated with manufacturing production
would determine concentration of production in a particular location, endogenising mar-
ket size: If economies of scale are large in the presence of low iceberg costs, agglomeration
eects are created, provided production inputs are mobile across locations. The loca-
tional choice is arbitrary and can arise as a function of initial conditions or historical
incidence.
More specically, Krugman (1980) showed that in the presence of iceberg transport costs
and factor immobility, the larger of two trading countries will have, ceteris paribus, the
higher wage. Firms will specialise in the production of a set of varieties for which
the domestic market is large, giving rise to the home market eect: Locations with a
relatively larger home market have more than proportionately larger relative number
of rms. Therefore exports of a particular class of goods occur as an outcome of rm
specialisation stemming from the size of the home market.2
In Krugman (1991) the assumption of factor immobility is relaxed and factors are al-
lowed to migrate to where their real return is highest. The level of iceberg costs and
the strength of scale eects determine the distribution of economic activity that can
form a core-periphery economy. The location of manufacturing production arises where
relative demand for goods is high due to minimal transport costs. Peripheral locations
are facilitated by the central manufacturing agglomerates. Demand for manufactured
goods itself originates from the mobile agricultural and manufacturing production fac-
tors, hence the market will become larger where manufacturing production occurs. This
gives rise to a circular causality however, since concentration of manufacturing produc-
tion occurs where the market is large. The result is that historical incidence and initial
conditions will be playing a fundamental role for determining the geographical location
of the core and the periphery.
1A similar approach of measuring transport costs involved the consumption of grain by horses that
transported the commodity. This setting was adopted by Von Th unen in 1826 and so it can be considered
as a predecessor of the iceberg cost. See Chapter 4 of Fujita, Krugman & Venables (1999) for details.
2For an extension incorporating production of intermediate goods see Helpman & Krugman (1987).Chapter 1 Introduction 3
The level of transport costs also determines the hub eect. In a three country world
involving one asymmetry, concentration of production will take place in a location with
better transport access than the other two in the presence of scale eects in manufac-
turing. The hub area then becomes self sustaining, a large home market coupled with
supply of inputs which can be further reinforced if transport is perceived as an activity
subject to increasing returns (Krugman 1993).
In terms of economic development, Krugman & Venables (1995a) add intermediate goods
and yield an interaction with labour migration that leads to manufacturing agglomer-
ation with rms becoming interlinked. Globalisation is shown to lead to uneven de-
velopment since for a given trade liberating level of transport costs, manufacturing
concentration oers a large market of intermediate goods, inducing their production. A
greater variety of intermediate goods translates into lower costs of production for nal
goods leading to further concentration of manufacturing and so on. As transport costs
decrease further, the world is organised into a core-periphery system where the return to
factors is enhanced in the core by virtue of higher labour demand, causing a divergence
in real wages to the expense of the periphery. In an empirical setting that entails a
structural model of monopolistic competition incorporating iceberg costs, Redding &
Venables (2004) show that the eects of economic geography, namely measures of do-
mestic and foreign market access, depend crucially on the level of internal and external
transport cost variation.
In the context of intermediate goods and iceberg costs, yet without assuming scale eects,
Rossi-Hansberg (2005) studies the spatial distribution of production.3 Specialisation
is a product of the level of transport costs with complete specialisation occurring in
a transport-free world as each country would trade the good solely produced in its
boundary. As iceberg costs decrease, the gains from concentrating production in a
location become smaller than the costs of shipping nal and intermediate goods along
an ordered line. An additional result is that the impact of border eects on the pattern
of specialisation is further amplied in the presence of iceberg costs.
In parallel to the development of \New Economic Geography" in the mid-90's, an in-
creasing body of empirical evidence utilising rm data consistently showed substantial
heterogeneity in productivity even within narrowly dened industries. Exporting within
a sector is a relatively rare activity, associated only with the most productive rms and
is non-random suggesting a self selection into exports.4 Trade liberalisation was respon-
sible for generating reallocations of resources within narrowly dened industries raising
3The implication of the iceberg cost in a spatial setting of trade is also discussed in Krugman &
Venables (1995b), Fujita & Mori (1996), Fujita, Krugman & Venables (1999).
4Examples of such studies are Bernard, Jensen & Lawrence (1995), Roberts & Tybout (1997),
Clerides, Lach & Tybout (1998), Bernard & Jensen (1999). The exhaustive list of empirical evidence is
presented in Redding (2010) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding & Schott (2012).4 Chapter 1 Introduction
average industry productivity as less productive rms are forced to exit production al-
together.5 Hence a theoretical \update" was required in order to explain the above
empirical ndings as the assumption of rm homogeneity became insucient. Melitz
(2003) introduces rm heterogeneity in productivity to the model of monopolistic com-
petition. The useful iceberg cost serves as the parameter which, together with the level
of xed costs, determines selection into exports and the reallocation of resources across
rms within an industry.
The introduction of rm heterogeneity constituted a point of departure from \New
Trade Theory" and two streams of theoretical settings emerged that helped explain the
aforementioned observed empirical irregularities associated with homogeneous rms.6 In
Eaton & Kortum (2002), geographic barriers, heterogeneity in technology rather than
productivity with rms producing homogeneous goods, led to specialisation in a multi-
country Ricardian setting with the probability of shipping a good to a specic country
being hindered by the iceberg cost. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen & Kortum (2003) utilise
Ricardian dierences in technological eciency across rms and countries. Exporters
and non-exporters of the same industry are separated by the iceberg cost as a criterion
and rms engage in Bertrand, as opposed to monopolistic, competition. The distribution
of markups is obtained within a country and then rms will select a markup that is
proportional to their eciency draw. The iceberg cost acts as a trade barrier rather
than simply a transport cost. Low trade barriers translate into higher markups on
average, implying export participation for the most ecient rms only.
Remaining on the issue of endogenous selection of markups, Melitz & Ottaviano (2008)
use a linear demand system in a monopolistic competition setting with heterogeneity in
productivity instead. Market size and trade exposure aects the toughness of competi-
tion leading to the selection of a markup. Exposure to trade forces the least productive
rms to exit due to the presence of the iceberg cost, the level of xed costs and increased
product market competition. Aggregate productivity increases for the set of exporters
and they charge lower markups the larger is the market they self select into.
Thomas Chaney extends the model of Melitz to provide an explanation for the determi-
nant of self selection into exports7 and of the export volume of each incumbent exporter.8
The elasticity of substitution aects these two margins in the opposite way making new
exporters, with lower productivity on average, more sensitive to the iceberg cost when
competition is low. Incumbent exporters only increase their exports moderately and
hence the market share for the set of new exporters is larger; the reverse holds true as
5Empirical evidence is presented in Roberts & Tybout (1991), Pavcnik (2002), Bernard, Jensen &
Schott (2006) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding & Schott (2007).
6See Eaton, Kortum & Kramarz (2011) for unifying theory of the Ricardian and the monopolistic
competition strands.
7The level of exports resulting from rms self selecting into exports is known as the extensive margin.
8Also referred to as the intensive margin.Chapter 1 Introduction 5
the elasticity of substitution gradually increases. The extensive margin always domi-
nates the intensive since the elasticity of substitution has no eect on the elasticity of
trade ows with respect to the variable trade cost, namely the iceberg cost, and thus
the prediction of the Krugman model of trade is overturned. The empirical counterpart
to Chaney (2008) is Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein (2008) who are able to estimate the
levels of the intensive and extensive margins and conrm the existence of a bias in the
gravity equation that did not account for the extensive margin.9
In Eaton, Kortum & Kramarz (2011) it is mentioned that market size may be correlated
with rm entry yet they observe many small exporters in each origin. But this is incon-
sistent with the ability of only the most productive rms being able to pay the homoge-
neous xed cost toward export participation. Arkolakis (2010) provides an appropriate
explanation by introducing marketing costs. Exporting rms incur the marginal cost
to reach a single consumer and an increasing marginal penetration cost to access addi-
tional consumers. Marketing may operate under increasing returns with respect to the
destination market, is probabilistically observed by a consumer and is produced under
Cobb Douglas bundles of labour from the origin and the destination. Heterogeneous
rms can then derive the optimal market penetration decision that is decreasing in the
iceberg cost and increasing in productivity. Focusing on the iceberg formulation, two
implications arise in equilibrium. After trade liberalisation, the largest rms in a market
grow at a positive rate. Small rms with low trade volumes grow with a higher rate
when iceberg costs fall after their marginal cost to access additional consumers is found
to increase slowly.10
In a specialised literature that was rst developed in 1979 by James Anderson, lin-
ear expenditure models and trade separability are utilised in order to derive a gravity
equation in general equilibrium. Traded goods and their varieties are aggregated to
the country level due to the structure of similar traded goods on aggregate, identical
constant elasticity of substitution preferences and a symmetric vector of trade costs,
modelled by the iceberg cost. In an extension by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), the
rst instance of a decomposition of the bilateral iceberg formulation into three groups
by using the aggregate price of a good at the origin and destination is made: A group
of exclusively bilateral trade costs, a group of trade costs aecting exclusively the origin
and one that aects exclusively the destination. Three implications stem from such a
decomposition. First, trade barriers are shown to reduce (size adjusted) trade between
large countries more than between small countries. Second, that trade barrier reduc-
tions raise (size adjusted) trade within small countries more than within large countries.
Thirdly, trade barrier reductions more than proportionately raise the ratio of (size ad-
justed) trade within a country rather than across countries if this country is smaller
relative to its bilateral partner. Empirically their formulation corrects for the bias and
9Crozet & Koenig (2010) also provide an empirical validation of the Chaney model of trade.
10A dynamic setting of this model is presented in Arkolakis (2011).6 Chapter 1 Introduction
identication issues that were observed with traditional gravity equations that lacked
a theoretical foundation. This is proved by an application toward solving the border
puzzle of trade.11;12
A common theme among all the above studies is that the iceberg cost has received little
or no attention with regards to its validity and functional form.13 Whilst the evolution
of trade theory necessitated the alteration of production technologies, a change from
competitive markets toward imperfect competition and heterogeneity in productivity,
the iceberg at its core has remained unchanged for the last 60 years. One could argue
that trade costs are small and so do not necessitate complicated modelling techniques
that would abstain from the main element of study. Yet trade costs are not uniform and
are large as Anderson & van Wincoop (2004) state. Based on US data14 they are able to
infer that \representative" trade costs for industrialized countries is in the region of 170
per cent (tax equivalent). 21 per cent of this gure is allocated to transport and transit
related costs, 44 per cent are attributed to border-related trade barriers, and 55 per
cent concern retail and wholesale distribution costs. The opinion expressed throughout
this thesis is that the modelling simplicity of the iceberg transport cost should not be
taken lightheartedly. This review now extends to cover the studies that challenge the
functional form of the iceberg cost, presents facts regarding the size and type of transport
and trade costs, and surveys the methodologies that adopt alternative functional forms
to capture the stylised facts about transportation and its costs.
1.2 The functional form of the iceberg cost and transport
costs
The destination price of a good or C.I.F.15 price encompasses in ad valorem terms the
set of all trade costs between origin and destination. These costs are a multiple of the
11The nding by McCallum (1995) where trade between Canadian provinces is 2,200% times the trade
between US states and Canadian provinces, when distance and province/state size are controlled for.
12For an extension incorporating the incidence paid by producers and consumers see Anderson &
Yotov (2010). For an exhaustive treatise of trade costs and empirical applications see Anderson & van
Wincoop (2004) and Anderson (2010).
13The following note by David Hummels provides scepticism on the functional form of the iceberg
cost: Transportation Costs and Adjustments to Trade.
14They are not clear however as to the source of the data.
15C.I.F., \Cost, Insurance and Freight" henceforth cif is the INCOTERMS rule wherein \the seller
delivers the goods on board the vessel or procures the goods already so delivered. The risk of loss of or
damage to the goods passes when the goods are on board the vessel. The seller must contract for and
pay the costs and freight necessary to bring the goods to the named port of destination. The seller also
contracts for insurance cover against the buyers risk of loss of or damage to the goods during the carriage.
The buyer should note that under cif the seller is required to obtain insurance only on minimum cover.
Should the buyer wish to have more insurance protection, it will need either to agree as much expressly
with the seller or to make its own extra insurance arrangements." (Source: INCOTERMS 2010)Chapter 1 Introduction 7
factory price or F.O.B.16 price of the commodity that is traded (Feenstra 2004) and
are commonly perceived in the literature as loglinear (Anderson & van Wincoop 2004).
Since the iceberg cost is an ad valorem measure, the elements of the set enter also in
ad valorem terms. These elements can be geographical and cultural dierences and
transport costs that are uncorrelated with each other.17 Hence one can summarise in
ad valorem terms all nite trade barriers between an origin i and a destination j that
are incorporated in the iceberg cost as
~ ij = border
1
ij  language
2
ij  cultural anity
3
ij  transport costs
5
ij  ::: )
~ ij =
N Y
n=1

tn
ij
n
where ~ ij is at least unity, as the most common approach to modelling the iceberg is to
assume that a quantity of goods greater than unity must be shipped in order for one
unit to arrive at the destination.18 Consider now the element of transportation. Due to
lack of appropriate functional form for the transport sector19 in the international trade
literature, the barrier posed by transport costs is normally approximated by the distance
between origin and destination (Disdier & Head 2008) and thus is uncorrelated with all
other trade costs. By assuming this proxy one is abstaining from the many implications
of the organisation and market structure of the transport sector.20
If transportation is perceived as a produced service then transport costs should be
regarded as an additive component of the cif price of the good and not therefore as an
iceberg component: According to Irarrazabal, Moxnes & Opromolla (2014) the shipping
price comprises of a constant charge per product unit transported and a percentage
charge that is associated with insurance.21 We can thus write the cif price for one unit
of a particular traded commodity as
p
cif
ij = p
fob
ii ij + fij
where the iceberg component ij > 1 does not incorporate transport costs fij since
they are decomposed into the per unit element. The iceberg assumption fails when one
16F.O.B., \Free On Board" henceforth fob is the INCOTERMS rule wherein \the seller delivers the
goods on board the vessel nominated by the buyer at the named port of shipment or procures the goods
already so delivered. The risk of loss of or damage to the goods passes when the goods are on board the
vessel, and the buyer bears all costs from that moment onwards." (Source: INCOTERMS 2010)
17For an exception to the rule see Djankov, Freund & Pham (2010) for the time to export barrier
of trade requiring instrumentation to account for the endogeneity between high export volumes within
countries that could improve or deteriorate trade faciliation and export times.
18See for example Melitz (2003).
19See Lugovskyy & Skiba (2010) and Lugovskyy & Skiba (2011) for a validation of this statement.
20The next section and Hummels (2007) present an overview of the transport sector.
21Irarrazabal, Moxnes & Opromolla (2014) consider estimating the complete set of additive trade
costs such as distribution costs, transport costs and non-ad valorem duties. For example 18.9% of
United States imports that correspond to 3.4% of non-agricultural goods are subject to non-ad valorem
duties which are purely additive trade costs.8 Chapter 1 Introduction
attempts to measure the ad valorem change in prices: Taking the ratio of prices we
obtain
p
cif
ij
p
fob
ii
= ij +
fij
p
fob
ii
:
If the shipping price is perceived as a constant percentage cij of the fob price, then the
ad valorem percentage change would become
p
cif
ij
p
fob
ii
= ij + cij which can be perceived
simply as an additive scaling constant to the iceberg component (see Hummels & Skiba
(2004)). This constant will tend to inhibit trade more if it is a large fraction of the cif
price, implying the fob price of the commodity is relatively low, rather than if it only
comprised a small fraction of the total value of the commodity. However it is a common
presumption that the value of commodities may be associated with the cost of handling
or the insurance component or the presence of a transport markup making the shipping
price a function of the fob price. Given that transport rms operate using a known
and characterised cost function, the optimal transport price will be a function of the
marginal cost of transport, mcij.22 Denoting fij = mcij 
h
p
fob
ii
i
, the cif to fob price
ratio of the good will become
p
cif
ij
p
fob
ii
= ij + mcij 
h
p
fob
ii
i 1
where if  6= 1 then the fob price will play an important role in the determination of the
cif prices. If  = 0 then the expression is an additive scaling constant to the iceberg
cost as previously. Hummels & Skiba (2004) nd that the elasticity  is signicantly
dierent from unity at around 0:6, which results in conrmation of the Alchian and
Allen hypothesis and a rejection of the iceberg component at least for transport costs.23
Irarrazabal, Moxnes & Opromolla (2014) nd estimated values of fij to be 14% relative
to the median price times the iceberg cost, hence the additive component becomes quan-
titatively important. Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009) employ additive transport
costs to conrm that market power in shipping explains the variation of shipping prices
across destinations and goods. It is concluded that by simply using distance as a proxy
for transport costs in a pure iceberg setting omits a quantitatively important compo-
nent of transportation that is correlated with the factory price of the good, warranting
a re-evaluation of the iceberg component and the implications for trade in general. This
operation however may result in loss of the functional simplicity of the iceberg assump-
tion and yield a number of potential modelling and identication issues that will be
addressed toward the end of this section.
22See Limao & Venables (2001), Clark, Dollar & Micco (2004), Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009)
for the determinants of transport prices.
23The Alchian and Allen hypothesis states that any external costs increase the relative consumption
of the higher valued commodity if these costs are an additive or per unit component of the nal price of
the good. If value is correlated with quality (as Hummels & Skiba (2004) show) then the Alchian Allen
eect leads to increased trade of the relatively higher quality commodities.Chapter 1 Introduction 9
Figure 1.1: Iceberg costs and augmented iceberg costs, source: Lugovskyy &
Skiba (2010).
In the most recent cases in the extant literature, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2010) and Lugov-
skyy & Skiba (2011) introduce an augmented iceberg component in order to preserve
the simplicity of the iceberg assumption in their theoretical model. The element of trade
costs associated with transportation within a sector, has both ad valorem aij and specic
sij components. Not considering the presence of any other trade costs bij, they assume
a competitive market for transport. The shipping price then becomes
fij; = 1 + aij + sij=pij;
where the specic component, is dependent on the factory price of a commodity indexed
by . Measured in units of the good, fij;   1 is the amount of commodity  that is
required by each transporter to carry one unit of commodity  from origin to destination.
As shown in Figure 1.1 reproduced from Lugovskyy & Skiba (2010), the left panel shows
the iceberg cost that is a constant proportion of the factory price of the good. On the
other hand the right panel shows the augmented iceberg cost where the same dollar
value of transportation aij + sij=pij; is expressed in ad valorem terms fij;   1 relative
to the factory price of the good.
By conducting this operation the authors can reconcile the functional form of additive
trade costs with the analytical simplicity of the iceberg cost. In this regard they yield
an analytical general equilibrium solution where the quality of a commodity decreases in
the degree of \ad valorem-ness" of the transport cost which is unique for each destination
and quality level and as previously mentioned depends crucially on the factory price of
the good.10 Chapter 1 Introduction
1.2.1 Loss of tractability and identication issues
The iceberg assumption has the power to explain a range of trade phenomena by merely
introducing frictions in a manner similar to ad valorem taris with no other particularly
interesting interactions.24 In homogeneous rm models of trade with assumed constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences, the elasticity of trade ows with respect to
the complete set of iceberg costs ~ ij, typically enters with magnitude 1 , where  > 1
is the elasticity of substitution. It is increasing, in absolute value, the more homogeneous
the good becomes (i.e. when  is high). In heterogeneous rm models of trade with
CES preferences, the elasticity depends on the degree of rm heterogeneity  of a sector
which stems from the export participation decision of rms. Since each specic trade cost
element enters with its own elasticity n identication issues are minimal in these two
classes of models. Estimated coecients can be analysed to determine the magnitude
of  and/or  and n.
When transport costs are approximated by distance such that fij = d
d
ij , most researchers
nd an estimated coecient  1 (Chaney 2013a). Hummels (2001) decomposes the
estimated coecient and nds a value for d in the region of 0.3 and  is approximately
3.3. Chaney (2005) nds for a low band of the elasticity of substitution values of 
averaging 2.13 and d being 0.11 at its mean value. For a high band of the elasticity
of substitution the values of  are 16.33 and d = 0:62 on average. Crozet & Koenig
(2010) when taking into consideration the degree of rm heterogeneity nd an average
value of  equal to 8.20 with average d = 0:17 and complementarity would ensure that
the average  for a sector is 10:76. In Limao & Venables (2001) the corresponding value
for d is 0.21.
In studies where there is a per unit component in transportation incorporated in the
presence of an iceberg cost, tractability becomes more dicult. The elasticity of exports
with respect to the destination price pij now becomes 1    and the impact of ij and
the additive component fij cannot be observed in their levels. This occurs because
the (absolute value of the) elasticity of exports with respect to the transport price fij
becomes fij = pij 
fij
piibij+fij, a variable scaling of the elasticity of import demand
that depends on i) the level of the transport price (and hence the marginal cost of
transport), ii) the iceberg trade cost vector bij and iii) the factory price of the good pii.
The existence of additive trade costs acts as a dampening parameter to the elasticity
of import demand. Introducing a simple example, if pij = (   1) = 5 then there
is a 5 per cent decrease in exports following a 1 per cent increase in the destination
price pij. The presence of the additive component ensures a dampening eect, since
the term is less than one, that would depend on the level of the additive component.
If
fij
piibij+fij = 0:5 then the percentage decrease in trade resulting from a one per cent
24See note by David Hummels: Transportation Costs and Adjustments to Trade for a validation
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increase in transport prices is halved to 5  0:5 = 2:5. As the transport price rises
the dampening eect becomes less severe and in the limit it approaches pij. On the
other hand, when transport prices are a small percentage of the destination price, then
changes in the former have relatively inelastic eects on exports. Yet how is possible to
distinguish whether changes in trade ows occur through a change in iceberg or additive
components of the destination price?
Hummels & Skiba (2004) identify the variation attributed to transportation by express-
ing factory prices per destination relative to the sectoral mean. The same applies for
transport costs fij. In this respect the aforementioned elasticity d becomes approxi-
mately 0.255. And subsequently the factory price elasticity with respect to transport
costs becomes 0.82. Their study implies that variation in shipping prices aects the fob
price of the good leading then to \shipping the good apples out", a colloquial term for
the Alchian and Allen hypothesis.
Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009) take into consideration commodity prices that
include a tari. Their aim is to identify if the eect of a change on the optimal markup
set by transporters depends on the price of the traded good. They uncover a positive
correlation between taris and optimal markups by observing the eect of a tari increase
on the commodity's transport price. The additive element associated with the transport
price becomes a lower percentage of the destination price because of a tari increase and
this subsequently increases the optimal markup set by the transport rm. The positive
correlation between taris and shipping prices does not occur from the variation in
the marginal cost of shipping but from the systematic relationship between taris and
optimal markups. Using a two step methodology to compute the variable elasticity that
is attributed to the additive pricing regime they nd that d = 0:23 on average. While
distance may be explaining a portion of the variation in destination shipping prices and
hence cif prices, the variation in the shipping price is also positively correlated with
factory prices: High priced goods have shipping prices that are 18-21% higher than
lower priced goods.
In Irarrazabal, Moxnes & Opromolla (2014) changes in the elasticity of quantity de-
manded with respect to the producer price are considered. They propose that an in-
crease in additive trade costs leads to a lower elasticity of the quantity demanded that
is increasing in the producer price. Thus low priced rm products face larger declines
in demand following increases in additive trade costs as opposed to high priced rm
products even within narrowly dened sector-destinations as they empirically conrm.
Aggregating across sectors and destinations the authors nd that additive trade costs
relative to the median factory price times the iceberg cost are 14 per cent. 95 and 88 per
cent of the destination and product xed eects that comprise the additive trade costs
for each product-destination are signicantly dierent from zero, giving rise to the quan-
titative importance of additive costs compared to an iceberg setting only. The welfare
implications are also altered since multiplicative trade costs aect relative consumption12 Chapter 1 Introduction
patterns between the imported and domestic good while additive trade costs aect rela-
tive consumption across imported goods. Imposing an equal yield tari revenue that can
be collected either by imposing a multiplicative tari or an additive tari, they report a
50 per cent higher decline in welfare for the additive tari relative to the complement.
Lastly, for the two studies25 containing the augmented formulation of the iceberg cost,
the ad valorem equivalent of the additive share of the transport price is approximated by
taking the ratio of product specic eects to distance. They document that components
of the costs of transport not related to distance play an increased role in the variation
of prices of goods in the presence of long distances rather than short.
1.3 Stylised facts about the transport sector and transport
costs
The works presented in the previous section assume a particular market structure for
transportation under the modelling requirement of additive costs. The only exception is
Hummels & Skiba (2004) where they just assume a charge that is positively correlated
with the factory price of the good whilst perfect competition is assumed in Lugovskyy &
Skiba (2010), Lugovskyy & Skiba (2011) and Irarrazabal, Moxnes & Opromolla (2014)
and an oligopoly in Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009). This section asks whether
such assumptions are justied by conducting an overview of the transport sector's or-
ganisation. It is concluded that within each mode of freight transport there exist a
number of dierentiated markets and so a particular selection of market based on the
modal choice becomes a necessity. When considering a market for transportation irre-
spective of its mode, a suitable candidate becomes monopolistic competition. Lastly,
the implications of the transport sector and transport costs for economic development
are portrayed.
Transport is one the most pervasive activities in societies and economies, existing as
the means for the re-distribution and provision of goods for consumption between spa-
tially dierentiated places.26 Through the transport sector goods and services acquire
an added value: A commodity or a service may be of low marginal utility at the source of
production and via transit to a destination where its marginal utility is higher it is per-
ceived more valuable. The transit is undertaken by transport systems characterised by
three ingredients, these being the mode of transfer27, infrastructure and load, operating
in three types of geographically categorised areas as summarised in Table 1.1.28
25Lugovskyy & Skiba (2010) and Lugovskyy & Skiba (2011).
26See Hoyle & Knowles (1998) and Blauwens, De Baere & Van de Voorde (2006) for a validation of
this statement.
27For variations of the Eaton & Kortum (2002) model of trade incorporating a substitution between
modes of transport using an iceberg cost see Lux (2011) and Harrigan (2010).
28See also (Blauwens et al. 2006, p. 21, 23; Stopford 2009, p. 50) for this categorisation.Chapter 1 Introduction 13
Table 1.1: Modes of commodity transportation
Area Mode Infrastructure
Inter-regional Sea Ships
Air Planes
Pipe Fuel pipelines
Short-sea Inland waterways Ships, ferries, barges
Land Road Trucks
Rail Trains
Pipeline Fuel pipelines
Source: Combination of Stopford (2009, p. 50), Blauwens, De Baere & Van
de Voorde (2006, p. 28), Mallard & Glaister (2008, p. 24).
In turn goods can be classied as being valuable and non-valuable, perishable and fragile.
Non-valuable goods are normally transported in bulk and in large parcels using any of the
above modes and taking advantage of economies of scale. When considering a perishable
good the opposite occurs: The need to have the good delivered prior to its deterioration
will involve smaller parcels, more sophisticated travel and usually a higher unit transport
cost (Blauwens et al. 2006, p. 29; Stopford 2009, p. 55). The use of more than one
transport mode for a ow of any classied parcel of goods from origin to destination is
thus dened as intermodal transportation (Hoyle & Knowles 1998, p. 263).
The transport sector can be split into separate industries for each mode (Blauwens, De
Baere & Van de Voorde 2006, p. 336) such as the shipping industry, the rail industry
etc., which comprise rms that supply transport services specic to a modal choice
responding to demand by shippers for transport of goods based on (Cole 2005, p. 9):
i. the physical characteristics of the goods,
ii. the price of transport,
iii. the relative prices charged by dierent modes or dierent operators,
iv. the speed and quality of the service.
Within each transport mode that is henceforth dened as an industry, the oered trans-
port services can also be further dierentiated based on the physical characteristics of the
commodities carried. For example the shipping industry provides three distinct means
of transport service: Bulk transport, specialised generalised cargo transport and liner
transport accommodating carriage of respectively dry/liquid bulk parcels (coal, crude
oil); specialised parcels (cars, forestry products); general cargo parcels (loose cargo,
containers, pallets) (Stopford 2009, pp. 61-64).
It becomes then apparent that instead of having one transport market for the whole of
the transport sector, shippers are confronted by highly segmented markets each having
their own particular characteristics. Using data from Transport Statistics Great Britain
(2010), commodities transported by modal choice display, via Table 1.2, the existence14 Chapter 1 Introduction
of segregated markets based on the mode of transport. Specically, petroleum and coal
products in Great Britain can be transported by Road, Rail, Waterway or Pipeline
depending on the characteristics of each product.
Table 1.2: Domestic freight transport by mode 1999-
2009, in percentages
Commodity/Mode 1999 2002 2005 2009
Petroleum products
Road 7.50 7.54 8.50 9.09
Rail 2.25 1.74 1.85 2.65
Water 72.86 74.93 72.95 68.94
Pipeline 17.39 15.80 16.69 19.32
Coal and Coke
Road 29.33 20.0 14.71 13.33
Rail 64.0 76.0 81.37 82.67
Water 6.67 4.00 3.92 4.00
Pipeline { { { {
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain, 2010 (latest available).
The most suitable transport industry for domestic carriage of petroleum products for
the United Kingdom is shipping, otherwise pipeline transportation may be preferred
by shippers. For coal and coke products trains seem to be the usual modal choice
followed by trucks. Fluctuations in the quantities carried by mode can either be a
source of market uctuations or a degree of substitution between modal choice. These
measurements can be precise enough depending on the physical characteristics of the
cargo. Yet when parcels become smaller and the unit value of the commodity increases,
the picture becomes more blurry. The type and characteristics of each commodity
are grouped under a generalised category such as containerised cargo, palletized cargo,
loose cargo, refrigerated cargo, which can consist of a variety of goods transported by
a common for all, transport unit (Stopford 2009, pp. 65, 67-68). Conrming this
statement, when observing freight volumes carried domestically by air for the UK the
identity of the cargo is omitted and only the quantity is reported: 49, 54, 67, and 42
thousand tonnes for the respective years of Table 1.2 (Transport Statistics Great Britain,
2010).
Focusing on one mode, this being international maritime transport, the volume of trade
carried by dierentiated transport types within this mode are:
The dominance of transportation of energy products comprising commodities such as
petroleum, coal etc., is pronounced. Another observation is that the traded commodities
can be carried either in bulk cargo parcels, specialised parcels, and general cargo parcels
by transport services specic to the commodities' characteristics leaving little room for
substitution between carriers (Stopford 2009, pp. 61-64).Chapter 1 Introduction 15
Table 1.3: World seaborne trade by commodity
groups, in percentages
Commodity 1995 2000 2005 2006
Energy 41.79 40.72 39.23 38.62
Metals 16.84 14.68 15.35 15.73
Agriculture 11.20 9.91 8.41 8.13
Containerised 7.39 9.60 12.34 13.06
Other 22.78 5 25.09 24.47
Source: (Stopford 2009, p.57).
1.3.1 Scale economies in transportation
Clark, Dollar & Micco (2004) characterise international maritime transport as a classic
example of an industry subjected to scale eects. Scale eects do not only stem from
the size of the vessel but also from the building materials29 and port infrastructure. At
the vessel level they are related to ship size and trade volumes, with the largest ships
deployed on the most voluminous trade routes and vice versa as one observes in Table
1.4.
In accordance to the table, Clark, Dollar & Micco (2004), after accounting for endogene-
ity, nd a negative elasticity of freight rates with respect to the quantity transported
suggesting the presence of economies of scale; the same nding is conrmed in Hummels
& Skiba (2004) who report \moderate" scale eects. The advent of containerisation
assisted in expanding scale eects in maritime transportation contributing to and ben-
eting from the growth of world trade (see for example Figure 1.2). Hummels (2007)
reports that the innovation of containerisation resulted in cost reductions at the port
level such as port labour costs and the rental rate on unused capital attributed to waiting
times.
Cost reductions are further observed on the sea leg of the journey where larger ves-
sel size accounts for a reduction in the price per tonne-mile. Yet with scale eects,
come necessarily large xed capital costs which have prevented the widespread adoption
of containerisation especially in developing countries. Containerisation was rst intro-
duced in the 1960's in capital intensive developed countries. Trade routes amongst such
countries are usually denser. In labour intensive economies, which can be associated
as being developing, the capital cost for port infrastructure is relatively higher and the
benets of containerisation were slow to emerge (Levinson 2008, Bernhofen, El-Sahli
& Kneller 2013). Hummels (2007) concludes that containerisation has signicantly re-
duced maritime transport costs yet this eect might not be immediately apparent due to
relative increases in other input factors such as rising fuel costs and increased markups.
29See Kalouptsidi (2011) for a dynamic model of industrial organisation involving shipbuilding.16 Chapter 1 Introduction
Yet it is the very introduction of containerisation that spurred globalisation according
to Bernhofen, El-Sahli & Kneller (2013). They report a 700 per cent cumulative aver-
age treatment eect over a 20 year period from the adoption of the container among
developed trading countries, with this estimate reduced to just above a third of its value
when restricting the sample to the complement case. The positive eects of container-
isation are much larger than those of free trade agreements which have a cumulative
average treatment eect of 45 per cent and the General Agreement on Taris and Trade
membership standing at 285 per cent.Chapter 1 Introduction 17
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Figure 1.2: Japanese exports to the US 1991-2007, source: OECD, Maritime
Transport Costs Database (2010)
Breakdown by type of goods Breakdown by transport mode
With regards to scale eects in port infrastructure, Clark, Dollar & Micco (2004) nd
negative coecients for the elasticity of transport costs with respect to port eciency.
They report an increase in containerised maritime shipping costs that is equivalent to
an additional 5,000 km to the destination for a decrease in port eciency from the
75th to the 25th percentile. In Limao & Venables (2001) the same reduction in port
infrastructure accounts for an increase in transport costs that is equivalent to an extra
3,466 km to the destination.30
According to Hummels (2007), 99% of the world's trade by weight is carried by sea.
The combination of scale economies in maritime transport and in port infrastructure
made possible by the advent of containerisation induced the creation of hub and spoke
congurations whereby export distribution is primarily dened by the cost saving size
of the vessel and not necessarily via the closest distance. Hence, larger ships operate
amongst the denser trade routes, whilst smaller ships deliver the quantity demanded
to and from the major intersection ports. This organisation of trade distribution is
a simple form of a network. In line with Hummels (2007), Hendricks, Piccione & Tan
(1995) are of the opinion that ingredients such as exercise of market power together with
the freedom of setting prices and routes, leads also airlines to set their optimal network
formation, one that minimises total transport costs constrained by import demand.
The hub ports that emerged as a product of containerisation were not necessarily associ-
ated with facilitating supply of exports to cater for domestic import demand, but rather
could be outcomes of geographical advantage and concentration of production that fa-
cilitate transit towards a nal destination (Krugman 1993). Hence historical incidence,
30Levinson (2008) mentions that the expansion of port and ship capacity was driven by the same
determinant: The demand for lower cost per container. He also mentions, based on World Bank gures,
that if Peru had port management as eective as Australia's, foreign trade -subject to unconstrained
demand- could increase by 25 per cent. The determinants of port infrastructure are discussed in Clark,
Dollar & Micco (2004) and Abe & Wilson (2008). For the role of infrastructure in export facilitation
see Djankov, Freund & Pham (2010), and Behar & Venables (2010).Chapter 1 Introduction 19
Table 1.5: The world's largest con-
tainer ports, by container throughput
Port 1990 2008
Singapore 5.21 29.91
Shanghai 0.5 27.99
Hong Kong 5.1 24.49
Shenzen 0 21.41
Busan 2.3 13.45
Dubai 1.1 11.82
Rotterdam 3.7 10.8
Qindgao 0.1 10.32
Hamburg 2 9.73
Kaohsiung 3.5 9.67
Antwerp 1.6 8.66
Port Klang 0.5 7.97
Los Angeles 2.6 7.85
Long Beach 1.6 6.48
Tanjung Pelepas 0 5.6
New York 1.9 5.26
Source: Levinson (2008) which has been aug-
mented to include the latest gures based on the
UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, 2011.
Numbers are in Millions of Twenty Equivalent
Units (TEU).
interregional trade and globalisation all play a role in the development of these forma-
tions leading to hub ports achieving \massive" sizes as suggested in Levinson (2008).
Table 1.5 presents the major containerised ports of the world arranged by the number
of containers handled in the last year of measurement. An interesting nding is that the
total number of containers handled by these ports alone in 1991 is approximately equal
to the global containerised trade volume, whilst for 2008 it is 54 per cent higher than
the volume of global containerised trade standing at 137 million TEU's. This converts
to about 1.3 billion tonnes of traded goods which is nearly 25 per cent of the world's
non-liquid traded goods. Assuming that the weight/TEU ratio remains constant then
total throughput of these ports alone can be calculated to 35 per cent of the global trade
in dry goods.
The general consensus in the aforementioned literature is that technological innovation
reduces transport costs or creates positive externalities such as intermodal transporta-
tion, yet what are the impacts on the growth of world trade? The principle study
answering this question is Baier & Bergstrand (2001) who, for the post second world
war period, attribute the 148 per cent growth to three factors, income growth (explain-
ing 68 per cent of the growth), trade liberalisation (38 per cent) and transport costs (8
per cent). In an important paper explaining the implications of adverse transport costs20 Chapter 1 Introduction
for developing countries, Radelet & Sachs (1998) state that if transport costs double,
annual growth is reduced by about 0.5 per cent per annum.
1.3.2 How responsive is demand for transport
Various modes of transport may comprise mode-specic rms that trade in segmented
markets and responding to mode-specic demand (Mallard & Glaister 2008, p. 69). A
survey of studies on demand for transport elasticities at the aggregate level across modes
(with elasticities available also at a more disaggregated level within modes), reveals
that demand for transport services is inelastic (Oum, Waters & Song 1990, p.ii).31 All
modes except airlines, the costliest modal choice per transport unit, display inelastic
demand due to the fact that transportation is perceived as a derived demand (Oum,
Waters & Song 1990, p. 13). As to the degree of substitution between modal choice
for a selected sample in time it appears that road and rail transport as well as road
and inland waterways are complement services whilst rail and inland waterways are
substitute services (Mallard & Glaister 2008, p. 59).
Table 1.6: Elasticity of demand for trans-
port, commodities
Mode Range Mean
Rail 0.40 - 1.20 0.80
Road 0.70 - 1.10 0.90
Air 0.80 - 1.60 1.2
Inland Waterway 0.74 - 0.75 -
Sea 0.11 - 0.46 0.28
Source: Oum, Waters & Song (1990).
Table 1.7: Cross elasticity of demand for
transport, commodities
Mode Range Mean
Rail-Road -0.10 to +0.14 +0.02
Road-Rail -0.88 to +0.13 -0.375
Rail-Waterway -0.15 to +0.20 +0.025
Waterway-Rail -0.61 to +0.86 +0.125
Road-Waterway -0.23 to +0.03 -0.1
Waterway-Road -0.12 to +0.13 +0.05
Note: Aggregate gures for Canada are for selected years
between 1950-1974. Source: Oum, Waters & Song (1990).
31The authors suggest caution to the gures representing inland waterway and ocean transport due
to insucient studies.Chapter 1 Introduction 21
1.3.3 Market structures for transport modes
A key nding of this analysis is the inability to group the various transport modes
under one market. Each transport mode and dierentiated transport means under a
specic mode, may have a distinct market with its own characteristics. Taking into
account European countries across modes, it is observed that air transport within coun-
tries is characterised by perfect competition, with exceptions for some countries where
monopolies and oligopolies are present. Concerning inland navigation, competition is
also observed with the same applying for short sea shipping and some small cases of
monopoly and monopolistic competition. Lastly road transport almost entirely operates
under perfect competition in the E.U. (Blauwens, De Baere & Van de Voorde 2006, pp.
336-341).
By taking a global cross section of a specic mode, this being maritime transport,
dierentiated products are traded in segregated markets: Concerning bulk cargoes char-
acterised by homogeneity, rms compete and are price takers (Mallard & Glaister 2008,
p. 102), while the more heterogeneous a good becomes, a dierentiated shipping service
is required for its transportation and in this case rms appear to be exercising some
magnitude of market power (Mallard & Glaister 2008, p. 97; Hummels et al. 2009, p.
50).
This may not be applicable for rail transportation where dierentiated services may not
be possible as goods are more homogeneous and the large infrastructure costs require
monopolistic entities with some exceptions where competition is present (for example
the UK) (Oum, Dodgson, Hensher, Morisson, Nash, Small & Waters 1997).
The existence of dierent modes of transport for carriage of goods requires the transport
market to be segmented into mode-specic markets and a shipper may combine any
mode of transport based on the degree of complementarity for the transport of her
goods from origin to destination resulting in intermodal transportation. Thus goods
can, at dierent parts of the journey, be carried by a monopolist or be transported by a
carrier who competes for supply of her services (Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba 2009).
The transport service is also characterised by dierentiated transport modes and in
certain occasions further product dierentiation within each mode (Stopford 2009, p.
50, 53). The existence of a degree of substitution between modes and within modes
followed by the dominance of competitive markets for the majority of transport services
in a number of countries observed in this analysis, leads to the following proposition
concerning a generalised way of modelling transportation services in international trade
models:
That transport services are dierentiated products produced by rms engaged in mo-
nopolistic competition. The existence of barriers to entry such as large capital costs
required to set up a transport network for some industries, the presence of a multitude22 Chapter 1 Introduction
of transport rms (Mallard & Glaister 2008, p. 96-97), the exercise of market power
in particular dierentiated modes or the free entry and exit of rms in modes such as
road transport, are characteristics of monopolistic competition. In addition, the exis-
tence of multimodal transport, straddling the dierent market structures to facilitate
the carriage of a good from origin to destination links modes and dierent markets.
Thus at the aggregate level only, this study concludes that when there is a requirement
of modelling a transport sector in an international trade framework, that monopolistic
competition as the market structure for this sector should be adopted. When a specic
mode of transport is considered, more consideration is required regarding the market
structure in which mode-specic rms operate.
1.3.4 Transport costs and economic development
On establishing the importance of transport costs for economic development, the role of
transportation and its costs are highlighted in the context of the following characteristics:
distance and remoteness, landlocked-ness, infrastructure and import/export facilitation.
A number of developing countries are plagued by distance and remoteness, an inevitable
factor that inhibits income growth (Redding & Venables 2004): For example, an addi-
tional 1000 km of land transport appears to increase the cost by 1,380 US dollars whilst
the sea equivalent is 190. Being a landlocked country increases transport costs by nearly
twice compared to non-landlocked countries when multimodal transport applies (Limao
& Venables 2001). Yet for lightweight goods per value, direct air transport is a viable
cheaper option for these countries as Radelet & Sachs (1998) suggest.
Lack of funds and of attention deteriorates transport modes as well as infrastructure
rendering them technologically outdated in developing counties (Amjadi, Reinke & Yeats
1996) and preventing such countries from participating in global production networks:
A doubling in the deterioration of infrastructure results in a 32 per cent increase in
transport costs which accounts for half the transport cost penalty that Sub-Saharan
African economies are bearing. This eect causes a reduction in trade by 145 per cent
according to Limao & Venables (2001). In Grigoriou (2007) who considers Central Asian
economies, an improvement in infrastructure from the median to the 25th percentile can
increase exports and imports by 6.5 per cent and 8.6 per cent respectively by virtue of
lower transport costs.
The impact is extended also with respect to border costs and intra-country transport
costs: As shown in Table 1.8 and Figures 1.3 and 1.4, when compared to the developed
world, developing countries require 30 days and 1,200 US dollars more in intra-country
transport costs, handling and documentation procedures to export a standardised cargo
of goods. In order to import the same cargo, 38 days and an additional 1,600 US dollars
are needed compared developed countries. Coupled with observing a wide dispersion ofChapter 1 Introduction 23
Table 1.8: Time and costs to import and export
Ten Developing Countries Ten Developed Countries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Export Time (Days) 39.00 24.50 8.70 1.64
Export Cost (USD) 2,240.30 1,484.00 1,014.20 279.43
Import Time (Days) 44.60 28.95 9.00 2.36
Import Cost (USD) 2,605.50 1,764.82 1,085.20 317.52
Source: World Bank, Doing Business Data (2010).
the aforementioned factors' costs in developing compared to developed countries, it is
inferred that border costs, intra-country transportation and red tape also aect the cost
of transport as Behar & Venables (2010) conrms. The level of these costs can even
rival that of the actual transport cost as Radelet & Sachs (1998), Amjadi, Reinke &
Yeats (1996) report: While clearance of a 20 foot standardised container in two studied
countries was roughly 1,000 US dollars, the corresponding sea freight for Europe was
1,400 US Dollars.
Figure 1.3: Exporting time and
costs
Figure 1.4: Importing time and
costs
Lastly, the importance of transport costs for developing counties is also established by the
fact that they have to absorb these costs so as to be in the position to penetrate foreign
markets according to Amjadi, Reinke & Yeats (1996). The absorption hence prevents
export-led development, reducing wages and inducing a welfare impact. Prevention of
market access for developing countries translates to losses from trade due to their lack
of proximity of about 68% lower per capita GDP on average for the sample in Redding
& Venables (2004).
Since developing countries are usually geographically disadvantaged, transportation is
one of the media through which this adversity appears, consequently increasing costs.32
And as these costs, when taking Africa as an example, are far higher than taris based
on the argument by Amjadi, Reinke & Yeats (1996) it becomes apparent that transport
32See MacKellar, Worgotter & Worz (2000) for a validation of this statement.24 Chapter 1 Introduction
costs represent an important factor inhibiting economic development due to the decel-
eration of incentives for export-oriented investment: A signicant amount of foreign
exchange earnings is lost to transportation rather than investment.
1.4 Conclusion: The relative position of this thesis in the
literature
This introduction attempted to briey present the studies containing theoretical appli-
cations of the iceberg cost of international trade and discussing the implications of such
approaches.
Being the principal modelling tool of trade and/or transport costs in trade models and
given the technological advances in transportation discussed in the previous sections,
the main criticism is the lack of functional form for this simple tool. Across time and
models it is invoked as a mere parameter to explain a plethora of trade related facts while
the majority of the initial assumptions of trade models have experienced considerable
evolution. Then, as Arkolakis et al. (2012) show under certain conditions, these models
are led to similar welfare predictions pointing towards small gains from trade, which are
governed by the share of income expenditure on domestic goods and the elasticity of
imports with respect to trade costs. By allowing for functional forms of transport costs
in trade models that capture some of the stylised facts discussed herein, the welfare
predictions change. In the last 10 years, empirical studies with theoretical foundations
such as Hummels & Skiba (2004), Hummels (2007), Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba
(2009), Lugovskyy & Skiba (2010), Lugovskyy & Skiba (2011) and Irarrazabal, Moxnes
& Opromolla (2014) have been challenging successfully that these ad valorem transport
and trade costs are only the \tip of the iceberg": Trade costs modelled in the additive
fashion reject the sole imposition of iceberg trade costs warranting a re-evaluation of
their functionality and explanatory power in the associated literature. Yet these studies,
with the exception of the second half of Irarrazabal, Moxnes & Opromolla (2014), who
suggest that gains from trade are in fact larger than the standard trade models predict
as the additive component is quantitatively important and omitted, are detached from
the general equilibrium models of trade and form a separate strand of literature (Lux
2011).
This strand is based loosely on simple assumptions on the structure of the transport
sector by consulting relevant transport industries' pricing behaviour or if not, mentioning
this as a hurdle. In fact the lack of studies on the organisation of the transport sector and
transport markets in international trade makes dicult the safe adoption of assumptions
concerning the market structure or transport cost functions in a model of trade.
Taking into consideration the arguments laid within, the aim of this thesis is to bring to-
gether the strand of the literature incorporating a number of assumptions and functionalChapter 1 Introduction 25
forms concerning transport and trade costs with general equilibrium models of trade. By
focusing on the particular characteristics of the transport sector, namely network struc-
tures, increasing returns to scale and correlation between transport costs and fob prices,
the task is to examine the general equilibrium implications of such characteristics either
by utilising homogeneous or heterogeneous rm settings as shown in Figure 1.5. The
thesis complements the theoretical results with appropriate empirical corroborations or
rejections of stated hypotheses. The outcomes of the thesis are directed toward devel-
oping nations after taking into consideration the substantial trade and welfare reducing
impacts of the determinants of transport costs and transport infrastructure analysed in
this chapter.
Figure 1.5: Positioning of the thesis in the literature
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Endogenous Hub Formations in
International Trade
Hub locations such as Singapore have a ubiquitous role in facilitating international trade
ows. Yet the reasons when and why should a transport hub emerge remain largely un-
examined. Developing herein a simple trade model of monopolistic competition with
representative rms incorporating network theory, the determinants governing the opti-
mal network formation become the level of transport costs, increasing returns in trans-
portation and centrality. Empirical evidence further suggests a 0.39% average increase
in exports if a shipping route passing through a hub is selected relative to a direct route,
following a 1% reduction in distance. Thus geographically disadvantaged countries that
absorb high transport costs can ameliorate these by trading via a hub.
2.1 Introduction
Today 99% of the world's trade by weight and 90% of the volume of world trade is
carried by sea (Hummels 2007, OECD 2008). Since the 1950's, contributing to the
expansion of trade and globalisation lie technological advances in shipbuilding and port
infrastructure that paved the way for greater scale economies in the carriage of goods,
the reduction of labour and by correlation port capital costs, and most importantly the
advents of containerisation and intermodal transportation (Hummels 2007, Levinson
2008, Rodrigue 2010, Rua 2012).
As a corollary these advances induced the creation of hub and spoke transport networks.
Trade route distribution under such congurations is primarily characterised by the cost
saving size of the vessel and not necessarily by the shortest distance, which aects trad-
ing volumes themselves. Hence larger ships operate amongst denser trade routes, whilst
smaller ships deliver the quantity demanded to and from the major intersection ports
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for further transportation to the nal destination (Krugman 1993, Hummels, Lugovskyy
& Skiba 2009). Within this network, the emergence of particular hubs around the world
such as Singapore and Rotterdam that facilitate transit toward the nal destination
either in the hinterland or to another port is the outcome of historical incidence, interre-
gional trade, geographical advantage and concentration of production (Krugman 1993,
Levinson 2008).
The contribution of this paper is to explain when and why will trading via a hub for-
mation prevail and to yield empirical evidence of a hub port's ameliorating impact on
trade ows. To this end, I employ the standard trade model with representative rms  a
la Krugman, whose connectivity with the nal destination is assessed through costs and
benets using the symmetric connections network model of Jackson & Wolinsky (1996).
It is found that when transport costs to a particular destination are high, rms instead
of lowering their output or exiting this market, can choose to trade via a central hub
provided there is a cost saving incentive - a benet- of connecting indirectly to their
trading partner, with the opposite holding true. I prove that the parsimonious model
analysed herein is qualitatively equivalent to an alternative model of trade incorporating
a transport sector operating under increasing returns, with the assumption that xed
costs associated with transportation can vary across destinations, thus reconciling the
model(s) with the aforementioned stylised facts.
Using maritime transport routes the signicant impact of hub ports at three levels of
aggregation of export ows is conrmed empirically. This is achieved by comparing
two alternative distance variables, one being the great circle capital distance, namely
direct capital distance and the other being the distance between capitals after taking
into consideration the sea leg of the route, namely indirect capital distance. For the
latter I assign an indicator variable that serves to detect if a route passes through an
exogenously dened hub port or not. Interacting the binary variable with indirect capital
distance, it is found that the marginal eect of trading via a hub becomes signicantly
less in absolute value than the marginal eect of trading directly between capitals using
the rst measure of distance. This reects a discount in the cost of transport due to
the interaction. It is deduced that trading via a hub can have ameliorating eects as I
document a 0.39% average increase in 2 digit level exports if a route passing through a
hub is selected relative to a direct route, following a 1% reduction in distance.
Yet the hub binary variable acts also as a proxy for endogenous route selection and hence
there is correlation with the independent variable. The endogeneity is addressed by un-
dertaking a manual two stage least squares estimation instrumenting the endogenous in-
teraction term with a constructed instrument stemming from the rst stage (Wooldridge
2002, Ch. 18). The results are conrmed although I cannot rule out mispecication in
the 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Surprisingly the question of when and why will a transport hub emerge has been widely
ignored in the international trade literature. A plausible reason is the insucient at-
tention paid to the structure of the transport industry (Krugman 1993) combined with
the lack of data on trade routes and transport costs. As a proposed explanation of
hub formations, Krugman (1993) puts forward that production of commodities will be
concentrated in a location from which all arrivals and departures have the lowest trans-
port costs. The interaction between increasing returns to scale in manufacturing and
transport costs thus leads to the emergence of a hub region. Hendricks, Piccione &
Tan (1995), Starr & Stinchcombe (1992) and Oum, Zhang & Zhang (1995) propose that
economies of density play a role as costs per passenger on an airline route decline with
the number of passengers travelling on that route. Hub networks have higher trac
densities than larger networks with direct connections. The distance travelled is longer,
but if economies of density are suciently large, the total costs of satisfying demands
may be lower in hub and spoke networks than direct connections. Economies of density
arise because of spreading xed costs over a larger volume of passengers or declining
marginal costs.
In comparison to the Krugman (1993) model of trade, locational advantage and the level
of transport costs are the only determinants after controlling for country size in this
model. Whilst concentration of production jointly with centrality may be of importance
under air transport, the same need not apply for maritime transport. Some of the less
developed regions of the world, such Panama or Port Said, obtain hub status conditional
only on locational advantage. Concentration of production may then take place but is
not a condition precedent. Further, it is not possible to develop a testable prediction
for the existence of hub formations using Krugman's model of trade.
The implications of this study are directed towards developing countries as incumbent
exporters have to absorb higher transport costs so as to be in the position to penetrate
markets abroad. This situation prevents export-led development, reducing workers'
wages and inducing a welfare impact (Amjadi, Reinke & Yeats 1996). Higher transport
costs are attributed to geographical disadvantage and lack of proximity. Prevention of
market access for developing nations translates to losses from trade of about 68% lower
GDP per capita on average (Redding & Venables 2004). Therefore improvement of own
and transit country infrastructure together with hub formations could make possible the
amelioration of excessive transport costs (Limao & Venables 2001).
The paper contributes to a very scarce literature on the topic by perturbing the iceberg
assumption in a trade model in order to account for eects arising from the structure
of the transport industry. The importance of transport costs and specically maritime
transport costs has been documented in Hummels (2007) and Hummels, Lugovskyy &
Skiba (2009). The prevalence of additive trade costs in addition to iceberg costs is
highlighted in Irarrazabal, Moxnes & Opromolla (2014) and Hummels & Skiba (2004).
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& Tan (1995), Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009) and Rodrigue (2010) whilst the
impacts of, and substitutability between, transport modes on trade ows are presented
in Lux (2011). Lastly, merging the network literature with international trade is a
promising avenue for research: Chaney (2013b) illustrates that network formation can
explain the heterogeneous ability of individual rms to access foreign markets for which
productivity dierences constitute only a fraction of this ability. In this important
contribution to the literature, the (stable) spatial distribution of rm sales is the outcome
of successful acquisitions of contacts arising from rms' remote and local searches. Hub
formation in such a setting, while not explicitly discussed in Chaney (2013b), arises
through random locational convergence of history dependent rm search paths, which
is strictly reinforced over time in the absence of aggregate shocks. In my setting, hub
formation is not based on historical dependence, but may create thereafter historical
dependence, since the formation is governed by the routing choice of the transport
sector based on geographical and infrastructural barriers.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2.1 provides the basic
notions of economic and social networks that will be used in the model of section 2.2.2.
The equilibrium is discussed in section 2.2.3 and the equilibrium empirical prediction
for the existence of hub formations is described in section 2.3. The results are presented
in the subsequent sections followed by concluding remarks.
2.2 Theoretical framework
2.2.1 Setup of the network
Consider a set of countries K = f1;2;:::;kg which engage or not in international trade
through manufacturing rms. Countries can be directly connected or directly linked,
if they have a direct trading relationship using no other intermediary country. Thus, a
network G is dened as a list of pairs of countries fi;jg that are directly linked to each
other through a rm's trading decision. Each link can be represented as a graph g 2 G.
The existence of a direct link between countries i, j will be denoted as gij = 1, and
gij = 0 will represent that there is no direct link.
Each link is associated with costs and benets. These aect rms that choose to enter
the export market in each particular country. If a direct link is formed by a rm then
it must incur a cost c. There is a benet 0    1 associated with proximity or
distance between i and j in the sense that the rm will prefer to trade to closer trading
partners rather than more distant ones. The rm has the additional option to form an
indirect link. Implicitly, there must already exist a direct link to another country for
the indirect link to be feasible. The indirect link is formed without cost and receives
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j. This construction allows a rm in country i entering the export market to take into
consideration their preference for trading to a close partner  and associated cost c. It
can also consider whether to connect directly to the destination country and incur this
cost. Or alternatively, it can consider connecting indirectly. In the latter case it avoids
the cost but receives a discounted benet as the proximity decreases. The dierence
between the benet of forming a link and the cost of a type of link is thus dened as:
vij = tij   cijjij2G (2.1)
By convention we have gii = 0 ) cii = 0 since gii = 0 is not a link in the network
G and country i remains autarkic. Further, tij = 0 if there is no path that connects
directly or indirectly countries i and j. An exposition of this construct is as follows.
For N = 3 symmetrically placed countries assume that countries 1 and 2 are at the
edges and 3 is in the middle. There can be two types of available networks. One
network formation is direct links between all participants. Then the network is dened
as G = f12;21;13;31;23;32g. The second formation is an indirect link between 1 and 2
and direct links from and to country 3, such that G = f13;31;23;32g. The net benet
term between countries 1 and 2 becomes for the case of direct links v12 =    c = v21.
For the case of an indirect link between 1 and 2 we have: v12 = 2  0 = v21. The latter
indirect link implies the existence of two direct links forming this particular connection:
The link between 1 and 3 and the link between 3 and 2.
Countries are also characterised by their participation share in the network depending
on the types of links they form. The network participation share will be perceived as the
xed cost associated with the network. While the participation share is not employed in
the theoretical model, it will assist in the gravity equation specication and the parallel
model of Appendix A.2 in lieu of the unobservable benet of forming an indirect link.
Denote the set of country i's direct connections in a network as Ni(G) = fi 6= jjgij = 1g.
The cardinality of this set is ni(G). The size of the network is n(G) =
PN
i ni(G). The
participation share of i in the network is simply Fi =
ni(G)
n(G) . To provide an example,
consider the direct links network for the 3 countries. Country 1's set of direct connections
is N1 = f12;13g and the cardinality of the set is n1 = 2. The total number of direct
connections is 6, and country 1's xed costs associated with the network are F1 = 1=3.
Equivalently for the case of indirect links between 1 and 2 we have F1 = 1=4, since
country 3 in the middle is burdened by the additional share F3 = 1=2.
For the remainder of this paper, countries are symmetrically spaced: ij = ji therefore
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2.2.2 Setup of the trade model
Symmetric countries produce goods using only labour. Country n has a population Ln
and two sectors. One sector is responsible for the production of a single homogeneous
good that can be traded freely. This good is the numeraire. The other sector produces
a continuum of dierentiated varieties of a good that can be traded at a cost. Each
specic variety is produced by a single monopolist. In both sectors rms can freely enter
or exit production. The population works in the sectors, moves freely across sectors but
not across countries and consumes goods. Each consumer is endowed with one unit of
labour.
Demand | A representative consumer receives utility U from consuming q0 units
of the numeraire and q units of the dierentiated variety ! which may be produced
domestically or may be imported. Her preferences are given by a C.E.S. utility function
over the continuum of dierentiated varieties !:
U = q
1 
0
Z
!2

qij(!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between pairs of varieties and 
 is the mass
of available goods. Maximising utility subject to exhausting her labour income share,
the representative consumer in country j has demand for dierentiated goods:
qij =
Ljp 
ij
PN
j;i=1
R

 p1 
ij (!)d!
where the denominator represents an aggregate price if the set of dierentiated goods
was consumed as an aggregate good.
Production and Trade Costs | Good 0 is the numeraire homogeneous good. One
unit of labour produces w and the price of the numeraire is normalised to 1, so that the
wage is equal to the price of the good. In this respect the wage is set equal to 1 across
countries due to free trade, and across the two sectors within each country.
One rm can produce one variety of the dierentiated good. Labour costs for dier-
entiated goods are split between a marginal and a xed cost and thus the sector is
characterised by increasing returns. The marginal cost consists of a constant parameter
 > 0 representing aggregate productivity and a variable trade cost. The variable trade
cost is the net benet term that stems from forming a link to another country. For
domestic consumption the net benet becomes by construction equal to the value of
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To produce and sell a variety ! either domestically or abroad, the rm in country i
employs Labour input:
L(q) = 
qij
vij
+ Fi = 
qij
tij   cijjij2G
+ Fi
As such, if a direct link ij is formed the rm receives a benet  in the sense that @
@ > 0.
In addition it incurs a transport cost c as @
@c < 0. In case of an indirect link, the rm
receives a decayed benet tij;tji > 1 and incurs no cost at all.
The rm solves its maximisation problem constrained by the quantity demanded. It sets
its optimal price equal to a constant markup over the unit cost pij = 
 1

vij. Positive
prots incentivise rms to enter the sector exhausting the prot margin. At zero prots,
each rm produces output Qi 
Pk
i;j=1 qij=vij = Fi
 (   1).
Over all varieties ! produced in each country, the total labour input must equal the
labour share in the increasing returns sector:
R
!2
 Lq;i(!)d! = Li. Since each rm
produces one variety, the number of rms becomes nite and equal to ni =
Li
Fi. Con-
sequently the aggregate price index can be characterised as
PN
j;i=1
R

 p1 
ij (!)d! =
PN
j;i=1 nip1 
ij .
2.2.3 Equilibria and comparative static experiments
In this section equilibria for alternative network formations, symmetric geographical
placement of countries, optimal prices given trade costs and traded quantities are char-
acterised. The network-specic notions of stability and eciency for each formation are
dened and proved in Appendix A.1.
Two Country Equilibrium | The equilibrium is characterised by the zero prot
condition across two countries due to free entry and exit of rms within each country.
The net benet term associated with the two countries becomes v12 =    c = v21
because of symmetry of the two direct links g12 and g21. Then it must be that prots
are 1 = 2 = 0. Given that xed costs of production are equal and countries dier only
in their size, the zero prot condition can be written compactly as:
2 X
1;j=1
q1j(p1j  

v1j
) =
2 X
2;j=1
q2j(p2j  

v2j
) ) Q1 = Q2
Domestic prices are equal across countries as  is a common constant. Prices abroad
dier only by the net benet term which is symmetric. By expanding the price indices
in country 1 and 2 given domestic prices and prices abroad, in equilibrium the home
market eect is yielded:
n1
n2
=
L1
L2   (   c) 1
1   L1
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Introducing a network leaves things unchanged in the standard model of trade with two
countries. Yet a notable remark is that the decision to export entails an additional
inherent condition for the rm. Provided the cost of transport will never exceed the
benet and as long as prots cover the xed costs, the rm will always be favourable
towards establishing a link.
The link is benecial for society as utility increased due to the greater number of varieties
available to consumers. Clearly there is autarky when c >  and the benet is greater
the more proximal countries 1 and 2 are. Thus in equilibrium if the relative size of
country 1 increases there is a more than proportional increase in the relative number
of domestic rms given the net benet of forming a direct link. The condition holds as
long as (   c) 1 < L1
L2 < (   c)1  and n1 and n2 are non-zero.
Three Country Equilibrium | Similarly to Krugman (1993), the three country
example entails a strong simplifying assumption that will enable construction of the
equilibrium: That is all countries have the same size L1 = L2 = L3  L so that the
number of rms is also equalised: n1 = n2 = n3  n. Essentially the home market eect
between any two trading partners in a three country world is normalised to 1.
The impact of the network structure becomes apparent when a rm has to consider
whether it will form a direct link or an indirect link to a trading partner. In order to
form an indirect link it must have implicitly formed a direct link with another partner.
Exploiting the symmetry assumption any decision that a rm in country 1 may make is
an equivalent decision for a rm in the complement countries. Therefore I focus on the
decision of a rm in country 1 that has the option to trade directly with country 2 or
indirectly with country 2 via country 3.
Similarly as in the two country case, the equilibrium with three countries is characterised
by the zero prot condition 1 = 2 = 3 = 0 irrespective of the types of links formed
and written as:
3 X
1;j=1
q1j
v1j
=
3 X
2;j=1
q2j
v2j
=
3 X
3;j=1
q3j
v3j
) Q1 = Q2 = Q3
While this expression may not be of particular interest, it is employed to infer selection
from two available network formations. This will occur through the dierences across
the price indices when alternate formations occur. Consider rst the case of a network
consisting only of direct links.
Direct Links Network | The net benet term becomes vij =    c for all pairs in
the network. The zero prot condition and the assumption of no home market eect
equalises production output across countries. The price index that any country faces is
an aggregate measure of domestic prices and imported prices given the types of linksChapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade 35
established. For country 2 for example it can be expressed as:
P2 = n


   1

1   
1 + 2(   c) 1
Indirect Links Network | In the case of indirect links between countries 1 and 2 and
direct links with country 3, the same equilibrium condition must hold, Q1 = Q2 = Q3.
The price index with one indirect connection and one direct is written:
P2 = n


   1

1   
1 + (   c) 1 + (2) 1
where the term 2 indicates the benet from having a hub location intervening between
countries 1 and 2. The two equilibria will be identical by the zero prot condition and
the assumption of no home market eect if there are unique values of benet  and cost c
such that the two price indices are equalised across the two networks. This single point
accommodates indierence between network formations; otherwise a specic network
formation would prevail and the zero prot condition would be violated for one or both
of the two network formations as will be shown below. Equalising the two price indices
across formations, there is a unique pair of transport cost c and benet  that admits
the equilibrium condition:
   c = 2
This unique cost level eliminates any benet from choosing one particular formation
such that the rm becomes indierent between network formations.
It may also be the case that for a given value of benet  the values of transport costs
admit an equilibrium where only direct or indirect links are formed. Consider a set of
transport costs ranked in ascending order, C = f:::; c;:::;^ c;:::g and c 2 C. Suppose
that a permanently high cost shock, c, is introduced between country 1 and 2. The two
countries could continue trading directly. The prots for a rm in country 1 trading
with 2 and 3 are (notation D denotes a direct links network):
D
1 = q11(p11   ) + qD
12(pD
12  

   c
) + qD
13(pD
13  

   c
)
Whilst the prots for the same rm if it chose to trade indirectly with country 2 using
country 3 as a hub (notation I denotes a network with one indirect link) become:
I
1 = q11(p11   ) + qI
12(pI
12  

2) + qI
13(pI
13  

   c
)
The decision of the rm to change network formation arises by minimising losses given
a constant benet  and a variable cost c. The indirect network formation will prevail if
the cost from forming a direct link is very high. Then the rm may decide to sever the
direct link and begin trading indirectly. In this way it has the option to remain in the
market otherwise see its pro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condition to 0 = I
1 > D
1 determines when the indirect links network formation prevail.
Solving the inequality yields the simple relationship    c < 2. Then denote as c =  c
the inmum of high transport costs such that the inequality holds and the equilibrium
condition is satised,  c = inffc 2 C :    c < 2g and 0 = I
1( c): The equilibrium
network will be the indirect network. Given a high transport cost  c or above (as long
as the cost is not high enough to induce autarky), it is more sensible for the rm to
choose a hub network formation with the equilibrium holding only when c =  c. The hub
formation thus minimises each country's exposure to transport costs.
Alternatively, when there is a permanently low transport cost c <  c, the direct network
formation will prevail and a rm will suer losses if it is trading indirectly. Setting the
equilibrium condition to 0 = D
1 > I
1 determines when will the direct links network
formation emerge. As expected, it gives the simple solution    c > 2 implying c <  c.
The equilibrium 0 = D
1 will be satised when c = . When connectivity costs are low
it becomes benecial to form all direct links. The cost of adding a link is less than the
benet the rm gains from shortening the link of length two (2) into a link of length
one.
When the transport cost is extremely high, none of these formations should prevail
and countries become autarkic. The autarkic equilibrium requires that rm prots are
negative for both formations simultaneously. If costs are such that c > +2 then indirect
trading is prevented and because c >  direct trading is prevented. For the equilibrium
to be autarky for all partners, due to symmetry, it must be that simultaneously both
of the above statements are true. This holds when c obtains the threshold value ^ c or
higher, where ^ c = inffc 2 C : c >  + 2
2 g.
These conditions coincide with Proposition 1 of Jackson & Wolinsky (1996). I summarise
them as follows:
For unique values of c in the set C and holding constant the benet term , the net-
work formation decisions for a representative rm in the symmetric trade model with
increasing returns are:
i. A direct links formation when 0  c <  c where the equilibrium holds if  = c.
ii. A hub formation when  c  c < ^ c where the equilibrium holds if c =  c for a given
 < c.
iii. Autarky if ^ c  c for a given  < c and there exists a range of autarkic equilibria.
iv. Indierence between direct or hub formations if  =  c.
v. Indierence between autarky and a hub formation if  c = ^ c.
vi. Indierence between autarky and any network formation if  =  c = ^ c.Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade 37
These formations are uniquely ecient in the sense that each case is a prevailing case
and no other network can accommodate higher prots. If costs are forbidding it does not
make sense for a rm (or for a consumer at the receiving end) to proceed with trading
(consuming) a specic variety. The empty network, or autarky is the only ecient
outcome of the three country problem. If costs are high but less than the autarkic level
for a given level of  < c, the only ecient network is the hub network. Autarky would
have lower utility levels and direct links would give lower prots for the rm and lower
consumption. For suciently low transport costs, the cost of adding an extra link is
less than the rm's gain from replacing an indirect link to a direct link. And so it will
always prefer to have a direct link at these costs. The same applies for the consumer.
The hub network is stable for cost values consistent with the range  2  c: country 3
being in the center, becomes worse o if a link is severed since utility for consumers there
decreases. A rm in country 1 similarly is adversely aected by this choice. The indirect
link is severed and the varieties traded decrease. Prots for the rm decrease. Therefore
a rm will never choose to sever the link with country 3. Suppose also that a rm in
country 1 forms a direct link at this cost level with country 2 instead of the indirect
link via country 3. Prots from this conguration become less and thus the rm will
never choose to do so. If it actually did, a rm in country 2 would have to sever another
direct link with country 3 due to the high cost of maintenance. Thus the hub formation
is pairwise stable but not necessarily unique as it can also rotate between countries. For
lower transport costs all direct connections are pairwise stable as no country would be
willing to sever a link. Therefore any two countries which are not directly connected
benet from forming a link.1
This approach develops a very simple economic concept. Contrary to the Krugman
(1993) three country trade model, countries which are not necessarily beneted from
concentration of production, possibly created by historical incidence, can yield hub net-
work formations as well. This arises by incidence merely of geographical placement and
as a form of hedging. In the Krugman model of trade with three countries, the equilib-
rium arises by postulating concentration of production and a defecting rm to survey
other countries' production possibilities. Instead, herein one can simply postulate an
excessively large transport cost and start to decrease it. At some autarkic liberating
level, where for expositional clarity the benet  is such that there is no indierence be-
tween formations nor it is too low to admit autarky, the prot of a rm producing only
domestic goods can be increased. This happens because there is a benet from entering
the export market. The rm decides to export, due to the positive prot margin. But
it also decides the formation that minimises exposure to the exceedingly high costs it
faces. The network formation will be a hub conguration with indirect links and the
number of rms enter the market driving prots to zero at a unique level c =  c for a
given  < c. Each rm's labour input would need to be increased since
@L(q)
@c > 0 and
1See also Jackson (2003) for the intuition behind the denitions of eciency and stability.38 Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade
subsequently the number of rms or varieties would need to be decreased compared to a
case when c <  c holding  constant ( @n
@L(q) < 0). If it happened to be that costs are lower,
and specically when  = c, each rm's labour input L(q) would be decreased freeing
up units of labour. Due to the full employment condition, the available labour input
translates into an increase in the number of rms or traded varieties. More rms enter-
ing the sector decrease prots to zero at the unique level  = c, yielding an equilibrium
where trading only occurs directly between countries.2
2.3 Empirical strategy and endogeneity
Stemming from the theoretical model, this section derives the empirically testable ex-
pression for aggregate trade in the manufacturing sector of a country with representative
rms. However, in place of iceberg transport costs, the net benet term embedding net-
work structure is introduced. The presence of the net benet term implies the existence
of a trade o: a shorter distance to the destination dictates a lower cost and higher
benet whilst indirect trades are associated with evermore discounted benets at no
additional costs.
An empirical problem arises however as the benet from forming a link is unmeasurable
and does not reect a realistic representation of a transport cost. In order to yield a
testable prediction, the aforementioned trade o is modelled as an endogenous routing
decision that is common for all rms across sectors as exports are observed at higher
aggregation levels in the data. This decision can either be made by manufacturing rms
themselves or a transport rm which posts the optimal shipping price that rms take
as given. It will be expositorily easier to test the predictions of the model by employing
the latter line of argument.
The decision for a rm to trade via a hub is the result of transport costs being suf-
ciently less to and from the hub versus the alternative decision to trade directly to
the destination (Krugman 1993). The derivation of lower total transport costs depends
on the form of the cost function of a transport rm which is assumed to incorporate
the network structure and exhibits increasing returns to scale. If exports using a hub
network prevail, xed costs of transport are reduced because the network participation
share for a trading partner is decreased. But distance, representing the marginal cost
of transport, increases. This setting will be preferred against a network formation with
direct links holding constant export volumes. Otherwise the opposite should hold: For
direct links distance is less but xed costs are higher and the overall costs for trans-
porting the same export volume would be lower. I claim and prove in Appendix A.2
2See also Krugman (1979) for similar comparative static experiments.Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade 39
that such a trade o is an outcome of increasing returns to scale in the transport sec-
tor. This alternative setting conrms qualitatively, yet in a more cumbersome way, the
parsimonious theoretical exposition presented in the previous section.
For a particular sector, the equilibrium expression for the gravity equation is dened as
the value of exports from i to j of all rms belonging in this sector. It is equivalent to
xij = nipijqij or,
xij = LijLj
v 1
ij
j
1
Fi
; where j =
N X
j;l=1
nlv 1
lj (2.2)
and j is an aggregate index of network costs in j, derived from the price index. Fi
represents country i's network participation share which I assume to be positively cor-
related with xed costs. Since it is not possible to measure the net benet from forming
a link, I decompose the problem into two parts. First, the transport cost proxy is re-
placed with the distance between i and j assuming that transport costs are of the form
cij = d

ij  exp(0) (see for example Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009)). Second, for
every network formation there are xed costs correlated with the network structure and
burden all rms uniformly in a specic country.
Hence the gravity equation of exports between two countries involving also a hub will
incorporate an increase in distance. It will also involve a reduction in xed costs by
lowering country i0s network participation share which acts as a benet of forming this
particular indirect link. But if there is no hub involved, the gravity equation is just
the standard outcome of the trade model with representative rms and xed costs are
proportional to forming and maintaining direct links to all partners.
Suppose that the hub country/region is k. Country i trades with j via k. Denote xI
ij as
the aggregate exports using indirect links, or the hub k. If k is not involved, aggregate
exports using direct links are denoted xD
ij . Writing equation (2.2) in logarithmic form,
sectoral export volumes for direct and indirect trading become respectively:
lnxD
ij = 0 + 1 lnLi + 2 ln(Lj)   3(   1)lndij   4 lnFD
i   ln(j) (2.3)
and,
lnxI
ij = 0 + 1 lnLi + 2 ln(Lj)   ~ 3(   1)ln(dik + dkj)   ~ 4 lnFI
i   ln(j) (2.4)
We can control for country size and the impact of relative prices, herein the aggregate
network cost indices j, by using country xed eects as in Chaney (2005). This opera-
tion however will absorb the variation of country specic xed costs crucially rendering
4 and ~ 4 useless in explaining any cost saving benets of trading via the hub. Yet un-
der such a specication we can conduct consistent and ecient estimation of the partial
eects of the remainder regressors (Greene 2008). Interacting the distance variable in40 Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade
(2.4) with a binary variable indicating the presence of a hub, provides an alternative way
of observing impacts stemming from the presence of hubs in a route. If there is a hub
involved between two countries trading, it must imply that transport costs were very
high thus preventing direct connections with the opposite holding true holding export
volumes constant. Equations (2.3) and (2.4) thus obtain their testable form as follows:
ln

xs
ij
D = A
0s
ij + X
0
ijB1   3(   1)lndij + s
ij (2.5)
ln

xs
ij
I = A
0s
ij + X
0
ij ~ B1   ln(dik + dkj)

~ 3(   1) + ~ Hubij

+ s
ij (2.6)
Where prime denotes transpose, As
ij is a vector comprising a constant, a set of country
and sector dummies, Xij is a vector of trade barriers between countries i and j other
than distance and s
ij, s
ij are both orthogonal to the independent variables and normally
distributed. I assume that the shocks aect trade ows within each country pair and so
all observations are clustered at this level.
Clearly the two testable equations are not comparable as the level of export volumes that
depend on the routing decision are dierent. But as the sectoral export volumes to a
destination that are observed in the data are the maximum of the two equations, ln xs
ij =
maxfln
h
xs
ij
iI
;ln
h
xs
ij
iD
g, a comparison across equations is enabled by employing the
common dependent variable. This crucially allows for testing whether the two partial
eects of distance are signicantly dierent from each other.
While it is not immediately apparent how the coecient of indirect distance should
behave relative to the direct distance counterpart, we anticipate the interaction to have
a consistent ameliorating eect on the negative impact of the former variable. The aim
therefore is to test whether the overall marginal eect of trading via a hub becomes
signicantly less in absolute value than the marginal eect of trading directly reecting
a discount in the cost of transport due to the interaction. With this strategy in mind,
the dataset is introduced followed by a discussion on the expected magnitudes of the
consistent estimators of 3 and ~ 3.
2.4 Construction of the dataset
The dataset is constructed by merging data from various available sources. Exports from
2003 to 2007 are obtained through the World Bank WITS interface and the classication
levels are 1, 2 and 6 digit HS 1988/1992 for all possible trading partners. These obser-
vations are matched with corresponding data on ad-valorem maritime transport costs
of the same classication level and year. Observations for maritime transport costs as
well as the mode of transport are available under subscription to the OECD Maritime
Transport Costs Database.3 The justication for selecting maritime transport costs is
3HS1 aggregated values are own constructs.Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade 41
twofold. First, 99% of the world's trade by weight (Hummels 2007), and 90% of the
volume of world trade is transported by sea (OECD 2008). Second, with the existence
of hub and spoke networks induced by the advent of containerisation it is not strict to
assume that the observed price of shipping services, i.e. transport costs, is a function of
the network organisation of the transport sector.4 By conducting this operation some of
the global export volume that has been transported by sea and therefore by some form
of network can be captured.
All observations not having matching exports and transport costs are removed. Each
surviving trade partnership is assigned nominal GDP values, two measures of distance,
border and language characteristics. GDP values are obtained through the World Bank
Databank. Information on capital distances, contiguity and common language come
from the CEPII GeoDist dataset compiled by Mayer & Zignago (2011).
In addition to capital distance, I construct a measure of indirect distance. For a subset
of trading partners I measure the distance from the capital of the exporter to the closest
major exporting port. The exporting port is located within the country of export and for
the cases of landlocked countries the closest major foreign port is chosen, through which
it may proceed to export. Then trading partner port distances are measured using the
US National Imagery and Mapping Agency Distances Between Ports publication as well
as the online resource Port World Distance Calculator. For each particular partnership,
listed in Table A.12 of the Appendix, the main country ports of origin and destination
are assessed using throughput volumes and the shortest shipping route is calculated. If
the shipping route requires passage through any of the below exogenously imposed hub
areas, the route is assigned an indicator value equal to one or otherwise zero. No such
distinction is made for direct capital distance. These areas are the Panama Canal, the
port of Gibraltar, Port Said, Singapore, Cape Town, Istanbul, Paranagua and the port
of Arica. Finally the distance from the major importing port to the capital is measured.
To provide an example of this construction, the direct capital distance between Beijing
and Brasilia is 16,948 km. Indirectly, the distance from Beijing to Shanghai is 1,267 km,
and from Shanghai to Singapore 3,934 km, where the indicator is assigned a value of 1.
Then add the distance from Singapore to Rio (16,366 km) and Rio to Brasilia (1,160
km). The observation for indirect distance nally becomes 22,727 km.
The data come with a weakness in the sense that transport costs for individual EU 15
countries are not observed. For this reason, and when otherwise not available, all other
units are aggregated to provide approximations at the 15 country level. The capital
distance of the EU 15 region with the rest of the world is then measured from Brussels
and its main export/import port becomes Rotterdam. Estimations will be conducted
with and without the presence of the EU 15 region and its biggest trading partner, the
United States, in order to provide an additional level of robustness.
4For a treatise on the evolution of containerisation see Rua (2012).42 Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade
Table 2.1: Direct and indirect ows
Hub=0 Hub=1 Total
Flows 41,182 32,055 73,237
Flows(%) 0.56 0.44 1
Figure 2.1: Distribution of distances and hubs (2 digit level)
2.4.1 Description of the data and discussion
At the 2 digit aggregation level, 44% of the sampled trade ows involve passage through
one of the above dened hub areas while for the complement the route does not involve
a hub as shown in Table 2.1.
The distribution of direct and indirect distances is presented in Figure 2.1 where a sys-
tematic bias over longer distances is clearly observed. This will determine the expected
magnitudes of the two distance coecients. In addition, hubs appear to be positively
correlated with distance.
An accounting exercise for obtaining the distribution of trade ows that utilise one or
more hub locations is undertaken in Table 2.2. At the 2 digit level, 15,425 ows or 48%
of the total ows that use a hub reach the destination after passing through one hub
area. The remainder 16,630 ows use an additional hub after which 68% reaches the
destination. Finally the residual 32% reaches the destination after using a third hub.5
5The following example presents a typical ow: For exports of `Edible vegetables...' from India to
Peru, goods leave the capital and are directed to Mumbai. The shortest shipping route requires passage
through the Suez canal, Gibraltar and the Panama canal, until it reaches the port of Callao. Then the
distance between Callao and Lima is added where it is assumed that the capital is the nal destination.
Because of the presence of the Suez Canal, Gibraltar and the Panama Canal an indicator variable is
assigned the value of 1. If these areas were not present in the sea leg of the journey, then the indicator
would take the value of zero.Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade 43
Table 2.2: Number of hubs required for ows to reach the destination (2 digit
level)
Hub Location
CHL EGY EU 15 PAN SGP TUR ZAF Pass- Reach
through destination
1st Hub Flows 257 5,663 13,289 3,280 7,112 670 1,784 32,055 15,425
Flows (/100) 0.01 0.18 0.41 0.10 0.22 0.02 0.06 1 0.48
2nd Hub Flows 0 8,323 3,509 1,156 300 0 3,342 16,630 10,787
Flows (/100) 0 0.26 0.11 0.04 0.01 0 0.10 1 0.65
3rd Hub Flows 0 0 2,666 457 2,720 0 0 5,843
Flows (/100) 0 0 0.08 0.01 0.08 0 0 1
Table 2.3: Ranking of hub areas by
passage count, levels and percentages
(2 digit level)
Hub Rankings
EU 15 - Gibraltar 19,649 0.357
EGY - Port Said 14,171 0.258
SGP - Singapore 10,256 0.186
ZAF - Cape Town 5,128 0.093
PAN - Panama Canal 4,893 0.089
TUR - Istanbul 670 0.012
CHL - Arica 257 0.005
Total 55,024 1
Table 2.3 shows at the 2 digit level, the frequency of passage through a particular hub
and is the sum of the elements in each column of Table 2.2.
Addressing the systemic bias observed in Figure 2.1 which was associated with longer
trades as validated in Table 2.2, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 exhibit how the dierence between
two distance observations is unaected by changes in indirect distance, but decreases in
direct distance. The implication is that direct distance observations approach in magni-
tude their indirect distance counterparts only over larger distances in the sample. Thus
by overlapping the two distributions of distance, it seems that the right tail of the dis-
tribution of direct distance approximates that of indirect distance and as a consequence,
the variance of direct distance must be larger.
Such a nding leads to the conjecture that the coecient of indirect distance could
possibly be weakly larger in absolute value than the coecient of direct distance and
the dierence between the coecients of the two distance variables could be statistically
signicant. This fact is conrmed initially in Figure 2.4. Adding the marginal eect
of the interaction of indirect distance with a hub allows to recover which route has less
impact on the same export volumes. This is obtained by testing which marginal eect
is lower in absolute value and whether this dierence is statistically signicant. Figure
2.4 concludes the section by preliminarily indicating that the interaction term induces
the overall reduction of the indirect distance eect compared to that of direct distance.44 Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade
Figure 2.2: Distance dierential as function of indirect distance.
Figure 2.3: Distance dierential as function of direct distance.
2.5 Estimation results
The analysis commences with a comparison between the distance coecients ^ 3 and ^ ~ 3
at the total trade (1 digit), 2 digit and 6 digit levels and the outcomes of testing for
their signicant dierence in magnitudes. It is achieved by estimating equation (2.5)
alternately by including either the direct or indirect distance variables.
Table 2.4 lists the related coecients for six dierent estimations depending on the level
of robustness. Columns (1), (3) and (5) do not incorporate country and sector xed
eects while the complement columns do.6 All estimations include however year xed
6Note that at the 1 digit level no sector xed eects are employed.Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade 45
Figure 2.4: Fitted values of exports, marginal eects of distance variables and
the interaction of hub indicator with indirect distance (2 digit level)
eects except for the 6 digit estimations, where only a cross section for 2006 is considered.
Columns (1) and (2) exhibit outcomes following the estimation of coecients in the raw
sample after removing outliers. The results in columns (3) and (4) are characterised
by increased robustness after having removed 2 studentised residuals. Columns (5) and
(6) display results that were estimated, in addition to having 2 studentised residuals
removed, after excluding the EU 15 and United States from the sample. The tables
containing the full estimation results are relegated to Appendix A.3.
Across aggregation levels, it is found that the impact of the two distance variables on
exports is indistinguishable as the p-values are greater than the 5% critical level. Con-
rming the intuition discussed in the previous section, it is also noted that the coecients
of indirect distance are weakly larger in absolute value yet this is not consistently ob-
servable. Lastly the coecients for direct distance all fall within the range of surveyed
estimates in the literature (Disdier & Head 2008, Overman, Redding & Venables 2001).
While we cannot classify the indirect distance counterparts, their indistinguishable im-
pact and their levels suggest that they do not diverge from the acceptable ranges.
Table 2.5 exhibits the outcomes of Equations (2.5) and (2.6). The respective robustness
levels and inclusions of xed eects that were outlined in Table 2.4 are preserved. The
individual tables containing the regression results are listed in Appendix A.4. First I in-
voke a set of F-test results from the Appendix whereby the null hypothesis that the joint
impact of the coecient of indirect distance and the interaction is zero is rejected con-
sistently across estimations and aggregation levels at the 1% and once at the 5% critical
levels. Second, we observe that the coecient of the interaction is not always statisti-
cally signicant when not controlling for country and sectoral heterogeneity. Therefore
inference cannot be deduced in these cases.46 Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade
T
a
b
l
e
2
.
4
:
C
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
s
o
f
d
i
r
e
c
t
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
v
e
r
s
u
s
c
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
s
o
f
i
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
,
m
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
s
a
n
d
t
-
t
e
s
t
s
.
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
T
o
t
a
l
T
r
a
d
e
^

3
D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
-
0
.
7
8
3
*
*
*
-
1
.
3
3
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
7
2
3
*
*
*
-
1
.
2
9
5
*
*
*
-
1
.
0
9
1
*
*
*
-
1
.
4
0
2
*
*
*
^
~

3
I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
-
1
.
0
3
6
*
*
*
-
1
.
3
2
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
7
9
6
*
*
*
-
1
.
3
1
2
*
*
*
-
1
.
3
0
4
*
*
*
-
1
.
4
7
3
*
*
*
^

3
D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
=
^
~

3
I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
)
0
.
3
4
0
.
9
6
0
.
7
5
0
.
9
3
0
.
3
4
0
.
6
5
H
S
2
l
e
v
e
l
^

3
D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
-
0
.
8
2
2
*
*
*
-
1
.
3
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
5
6
*
*
*
-
1
.
2
9
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
9
7
3
*
*
*
-
1
.
4
8
1
*
*
*
^
~

3
I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
-
0
.
9
6
5
*
*
*
-
1
.
5
3
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
9
9
1
*
*
*
-
1
.
5
0
2
*
*
*
-
1
.
1
4
4
*
*
*
-
1
.
5
2
0
*
*
*
^

3
D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
=
^
~

3
I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
)
0
.
4
2
0
.
2
4
*
*
0
.
3
6
0
.
1
7
0
.
3
7
0
.
7
9
H
S
6
l
e
v
e
l
^

3
D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
-
0
.
4
3
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
9
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
3
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
6
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
9
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
1
6
*
*
*
^
~

3
I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
-
0
.
5
1
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
6
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
0
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
4
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
6
5
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
7
5
9
*
*
*
^

3
D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
=
^
~

3
I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
)
0
.
5
3
0
.
8
6
0
.
5
8
0
.
9
2
0
.
6
5
0
.
5
9
R
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
c
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
s
o
f
d
i
r
e
c
t
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
a
n
d
i
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
;
(
2
)
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
n
o
n
-
r
o
b
u
s
t
s
a
m
p
l
e
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
3
)
;
(
4
)
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
2
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
i
s
e
d
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
s
r
e
m
o
v
e
d
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
5
)
;
(
6
)
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
2
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
i
s
e
d
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
s
r
e
m
o
v
e
d
a
f
t
e
r
e
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
U
S
a
n
d
t
h
e
E
U
1
5
.Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade 47
T
a
b
l
e
2
.
5
:
C
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
s
o
f
d
i
r
e
c
t
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
v
e
r
s
u
s
c
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
s
o
f
i
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
p
l
u
s
t
h
e
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
t
e
r
m
a
n
d
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
t
e
s
t
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
T
o
t
a
l
T
r
a
d
e
^

D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
-
0
.
7
8
3
*
*
*
-
1
.
3
3
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
7
2
3
*
*
*
-
1
.
2
9
5
*
*
*
-
1
.
0
9
1
*
*
*
-
1
.
4
0
2
*
*
*

^

I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
+
^

I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n

-
0
.
3
8
2
*
-
0
.
5
1
2
*
*
-
0
.
3
3
6
-
0
.
6
6
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
6
0
1
*
*
-
1
.
0
1
2
*
*
^

D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
=

^

I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
+
^

I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n

(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
)
0
.
3
5
0
.
0
1
0
.
3
0
0
.
0
3
0
.
2
1
0
.
1
4
H
S
2
l
e
v
e
l
^

D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
-
0
.
8
2
2
*
*
*
-
1
.
3
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
5
6
*
*
*
-
1
.
2
9
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
9
7
3
*
*
*
-
1
.
4
8
1
*
*
*

^

I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
+
^

I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n

-
0
.
4
5
3
*
-
0
.
8
6
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
5
7
*
-
0
.
9
1
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
3
7
-
1
.
1
3
6
*
*
*
^

D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
=

^

I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
+
^

I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n

(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
)
0
.
2
2
0
.
0
3
0
.
2
4
0
.
0
6
0
.
6
0
0
.
0
4
H
S
6
l
e
v
e
l
^

D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
-
0
.
4
3
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
9
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
3
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
6
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
9
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
1
6
*
*
*

^

I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
+
^

I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n

-
0
.
6
7
-
0
.
4
3
2
*
*
-
0
.
6
3
9
-
0
.
4
9
2
*
*
-
0
.
3
8
1
-
0
.
5
1
1
*
*
*
^

D
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
=

^

I
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
+
^

I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n

(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
)
0
.
2
2
0
.
0
5
0
.
2
7
0
.
0
6
0
.
3
0
0
.
0
1
R
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
c
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
s
o
f
d
i
r
e
c
t
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
a
n
d
i
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
p
l
u
s
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
h
u
b
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
;
(
2
)
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
n
o
n
-
r
o
b
u
s
t
s
a
m
p
l
e
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
3
)
;
(
4
)
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
w
i
t
h
2
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
i
s
e
d
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
s
r
e
m
o
v
e
d
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
5
)
;
(
6
)
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
w
i
t
h
2
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
i
s
e
d
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
s
r
e
m
o
v
e
d
a
n
d
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
t
h
e
U
S
a
n
d
t
h
e
E
U
1
5
a
r
e
a
.48 Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade
When incorporating country and sector xed eects (the latter does not apply for the
1 digit level) however I nd that the joint impact of indirect distance and its interac-
tion with the hub indicator is signicantly dierent and lower from the impact of direct
distance. The hub indicator appears to be dampening the impact of indirect distance
making it signicantly less than the impact of direct distance in most experiments at
the various aggregation levels. Specically at the total trade level, trading via a hub
has signicant cost saving benets relative to trading directly in two out of three spec-
ications involving country dummies. While the last column shows that the benet
is not signicantly dierent from trading without a hub, note that at this aggregation
level once removing the two largest partners the sample size decreases substantially and
therefore inference could be aected.
To illustrate the potency of these results consider the 2 digit level outcomes in column
(4) of Tables 2.4 and 2.5. In the rst instance it is found that a 1% increase in direct
distance reduces export ows by about 1.3%. When trading indirectly (without assuming
any presence of a hub) the impact on exports is magnied standing at 1.5%, however
this dierence is not statistically signicant. It is understood also that the dierence
between magnitudes is the result of the variance of the direct distance variable being
larger than that of indirect distance as discussed in the previous section. Including the
interaction with a hub indicator, we now observe that the overall negative impact of
indirect distance has reduced to 0.91% for every 1% increase. Compared to the impact
of trading directly, it is deduced that trading by a hub can have ameliorating eects as
there is a 0.38% saving in distance costs.
Generalising the outcome, at the 2 digit level in columns (2), (4) and (6) one observes
that trading via a hub is benecial for trading partners because relative to trading
directly, there is a 0.39% increase in exports on average if an indirect route is selected,
following a 1% reduction in distance. This dierence is statistically signicant at the
5% and 10% levels. At the 1 and 6 digit levels the average dierential stands at 0.61%
and 0.38% respectively showing a consistent positive impact of the hub indicator when
interacted with distance.
The results further indicate that the performance and signs of the principal variables
as shown in the Appendix, are those expected and in accordance to the empirical trade
literature (see for example Limao & Venables (2001)). Yet the identication of the sign
and magnitude of the hub indicator when interacted with distance is unresolved. A pos-
sible explanation for this outcome is that the hub indicator is correlated positively with
distance and by extrapolation negatively correlated with size adjusted exports. Yet the
negative correlation weakens over larger distances and turns positive possibly captur-
ing the high volume of trade between the East Asian countries with the Western world.
These trades occur exclusively via a hub such as Singapore or the Suez Canal. Therefore
it is deduced that the interaction seems to be picking up the variation associated withChapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade 49
longer trades and higher volumes while this cannot be identied using the traditional
distance estimates.
The section concludes by conrming the existence of ameliorating benets arising from
trading via a hub location. Whilst the reasoning for utilising a hub lies not in the
explanatory power provided by the hub indicator variable itself, this acts only as a
proxy capturing lower bilateral network costs, we are able to recover a positive impact
on trade ows. The hub indicator variable employed in the analysis so far was assumed
to be uncorrelated with the error term and serves to reduce the omitted variable bias
by acting as an element of the vector of trade barriers. Yet because it is a proxy for
endogenous route selection one cannot rule out correlation with the independent variable.
This issue is addressed by performing a manual two stage least squares estimation based
on Chapter 18 of Wooldridge (2002) and the note by the same author available at the
address contained in the footnote.7
The rst stage entails performing a reduced form probit regression for the hub binary
variable using indirect distance, the vector of trade barriers Xij, and the absolute value
of the time dierence between origin and destination acting as exogenous variables.
Obtaining the predicted probabilities I form an instrument that is the interaction of
the predicted probabilities with indirect distance. In the second stage I perform an
instrumental variables regression by instrumenting the endogenous interaction term with
the constructed instrument. While the results could be produced for the 1 and 2 digit
levels, software limitations due to the large number of xed eects did not allow the
estimation at the 6 digit level. The outcomes of the second stage together with the
respective p-values of the Hausman test are contained in Appendix A.5.
The results are summarised in Table 2.6. The null of exogeneity is rejected in 11 out
of 12 experiments at the 5% critical level and the impact of indirect distance with
its interaction is always signicantly less in absolute value compared to that of direct
distance. Noting that the results, however encouraging, indicate also overall impacts
that are positive, it is deduced that I cannot rule out mispecication of the rst or
second stage of the estimation process that I can attribute to the lack of a functional
form for a binary hub indicator. In addition, this process cannot be generalised as the
hub indicator acted as a proxy for reductions in network costs by positing the trade o
between increases in marginal costs of transport versus reductions in xed costs that
are correlated with the country's location in the network. This identication problem
and derivation of a functional form for establishing when a particular location becomes
a hub are left for future work.
7http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2011-03/msg00188.html50 Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade
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2.6 Conclusion
I study the reasons for formation and the impacts of transport hub networks in inter-
national trade by merging the symmetric connections model of Jackson & Wolinsky
(1996) in a trade model of monopolistic competition with representative rms. Under
the assumption of symmetric geographical placement of countries, respective domestic
rms commence exporting and choose the trading network formation that is minimising
their exposure to transport costs. When transport costs are extremely high countries
remain closed. Upon their gradual reduction, rms commence exporting and create hub
networks that are associated with higher levels of costs and then direct connections.
The equilibrium is attained given a xed benet value for which a unique transport cost
leads to satisfaction of the zero prot condition.
Empirically the existence of hub formations in maritime transportation {responsible for
carrying the vast majority of traded goods{ is conrmed, as rms in a sector choose the
formation that maximises the volume of output to the destination. This is observed after
interacting the distance of a trade route between capitals with a binary variable that
indicates whether the route passes through a hub and comparing the overall marginal
eect to that arising by using great circle capital distances: I document a 0.39% increase
in exports on average if a route passing through a hub is selected relative to a direct
route, following a 1% reduction in distance. Trading via a hub is found to be preferable
over longer distances where the interaction term ameliorates the impact of the distance
barrier. The results are also conrmed when the endogeneity of the indicator variable
is accounted for.
Using an auxiliary model, hub formations are the outcome of economies of scale in
transportation due to a trade o between increasing marginal and decreasing xed costs.
Transport costs on high-volume trading routes tend to be low (assuming that transport
markups are not variable as in the case of Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009)). This
does not aect much the productivity or number of rms. Transport costs on low-volume
trading routes are higher and distance here plays a crucial role. This should aect the
productivity and number of exporting rms more severely. Additional factors could be
directional imbalances penalising countries which cannot provide return cargoes, costs
for importing and exporting commodities and exercise of market power (Hummels 2007).
I conclude that geographically disadvantaged countries absorbing high transport costs
can achieve a more benecial trading position by utilising a transportation hub. The link
with at least one proximal geographically advantaged partner improves market access,
ameliorates exposures to these costs and leads to improvements in own and transit
infrastructure.52 Chapter 2 Endogenous Hub Formations in International Trade
Avenues for future research in this area are the modelling of economies of density in
transportation embedded in a trade model, deriving a functional form for the hub in-
dicator and analysing the heterogeneity in xed costs associated with infrastructure for
which information is not presently available.Chapter 3
Firm Heterogeneity and
Asymmetric Trade with a
Transport Sector - Implications of
Trade Liberalisation
This chapter has been co-authored with Dr. Hector F. Calvo Pardo, Reader in Eco-
nomics, Economics Division, University of Southampton, Higheld, Southampton, SO17
1BJ, United Kingdom. Email: H.F.Calvo-Pardo@soton.ac.uk
We incorporate an international transport sector operating under increasing returns to
scale into the standard Chaney-Melitz set-up model of rm heterogeneity, to understand
the composition and contribution of the main drivers of observed growth in trade volumes
(Baier & Bergstrand 2001, Yi 2003, Ruhl 2008). We show that tari and transport cost
reductions are complementary, and hence that the large estimates of price elasticities of
import demand observed following liberating events can only be attributed in part to
tari reductions. By omitting trade policy induced adjustments in transport technology,
the empirical researcher nds that tari reductions appear too small to explain observed
changes in trade growth.
Exploiting 2006 cross-sectional data from the OECD Maritime Transport Costs Database
for 9 exporters and 36 importers at the HS6 level of disaggregation, we nd that a 1
per cent increase in the quantity transported (i) reduces the ad-valorem shipping price
by 4 per cent, conditional on distance and fob prices; (ii) increasing the probability to
export by 4 per thousand percentage points, holding taris at their means, providing
empirical support for the main mechanism. Finally, the normative implications are also
novel: (i) the response of trade volumes to tari cuts is amplied at both margins; (ii)
the reallocation gains (and redistributional impact) identied in the literature on rm
heterogeneity are magnied, and (iii) the extent and strength of such eects are related
to the scope of the international transport network and mode of transport.
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3.1 Introduction
Transport costs are comparable in size to taris, exhibiting large variation across prod-
ucts, jointly altering the patterns of and gains from trade (Hummels 2001, Hummels,
Lugovskyy & Skiba 2009). Over the past fty years, taris have decreased by about 11
per cent principally in manufactured goods (Yi 2003), raising the relative importance of
transport costs as a trade barrier. Yet changes in transport costs over the same period
are more complex to analyse. The remarkable technological advances that took place in
ocean transport {responsible for carrying 99% of the world's trade by weight and 90% of
the volume of world trade{ in the form of containerisation, infrastructure development,
minimisation of time spent loading and unloading at ports, have resulted in moderate
if any shipping price reductions. These arise mainly through scale eects but have been
overshadowed by inelastic transport supply, increases in input factors and market power
(Hummels 2007, OECD 2008, Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba 2009, Stopford 2009).1
Hence the prominent explanations for the unprecedented growth in manufacturing ex-
port shares and become income growth and tari reductions (Baier & Bergstrand 2001,
Yi 2003). Indeed the latter is supported in empirical work by large values of the price
elasticity of import demand, ranging from about 4 to 15, that account for growth in
trade volumes from observed reductions in taris (Ruhl 2008).
Yet could there be a complementarity between taris and shipping prices? Is some of
the variance in trade growth explained by shipping prices that have been aected by
increased range and volume of transported goods as a result of trade liberating policies,
all else constant? This paper puts forward that presence of scale economies in trans-
portation may amplify the response of trade volumes to tari declines but transportation
may also dampen such responses by charging a shipping fee that is a function of the
factory price of the good and a markup. The net eect is found to be positive, thus
reconciling the theory with the aforementioned facts.
Consequently gains, losses and distributional impacts from trade liberalisation associated
with i) an increased range of intra-industry traded goods, ii) productivity and eciency
gains/losses stemming from allocation of resources, iii) increases in scale and innovations
for competing in larger markets (Winters 2004, Melitz & Treer 2012, Melitz & Redding
2012) are magnied in the theoretical exposition of this study.
1Bernhofen, El-Sahli & Kneller (2013) provide evidence on the quantitative importance of techno-
logical innovation in transportation for trade growth. The diusion of containerisation led to a 700
and 281 per cent cumulative average treatment eect in North-North trade and non North-North trade
respectively compared to the equivalent eects for (non-) GATT membership standing at 285 and 55
per cent and (non-) FTA membership 45 and -92 per cent respectively. Hummels et al. (2009) report
that alignment with the minimum markups in containerised shipping would decrease the freight by 34.6
per cent for the United States and 45.4 per cent for Latin America, while Bernhofen, El-Sahli & Kneller
(2013) do not control for market power in containerised shipping. Thus the statement of Hummels
(2007) that "dramatic [shipping] price declines are not in evidence" pertains toward gains stemming
from intermodal transportation as the aforementioned authors point.Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation 55
Yet the open question remains as to the composition and the contribution of the principal
components spurring trade growth in manufacturing, since it is inferred that transport
technology, which is normally perceived as uninteresting in theoretical and empirical
work,2 proves to be, in fact, very interesting: The large estimates of the elasticity of
substitution following trade liberalisation events, could then be attributed partly to the
liberating event itself and partly to adjustments in transport technology. By omitting
trade policy induced adjustments in transport technology, the empirical researcher nds
that tari reductions may appear too small to explain observed changes in trade growth.
This paper contributes by modelling transport technology in the Chaney (2008) model of
trade, and by presenting quantitative evidence pertaining to the signicance of the pro-
posed equilibrium elasticity of aggregate exports with respect to trade costs. Transport
rms operate under increasing returns to scale. Marginal costs of transport comprise dis-
tance to the destination and an estimable degree of inuence of exported commodities'
factory prices as in Hummels & Skiba (2004).
Transport rms myopically observe a sector's factory prices and quantities of goods,
allocating equal freight rates for a range of traded commodities similar in their charac-
teristics (Lugovskyy & Skiba 2010, 2011). In this context, a tari reduction results in
intensive and extensive margin3 export increases as the standard model predicts, and
the sector's aggregate factory price as a corollary goes up. The market value of the
shipping price is lowered, per unit costs decrease and transportation is perceived to be
less costly, yet this is dampened by the weight transport rms place on the price of the
good when deriving their optimal shipping price, reecting packaging/insurance costs.
Lower shipping prices promote another round of margin export increases, magnifying the
respective elasticities. Since taris and shipping prices co-move, their impacts appear to
be always comparable. The relative importance of trade costs thus decreases over time
but there is variation within the vector of trade costs due to the friction caused by the
contribution of factory prices to the marginal cost of transport.
The empirical experiments herein provide support to such propositions. Four estimable
equations assist in testing the null hypothesis that the equilibrium elasticity of aggregate
exports with respect to trade costs is unimportant. The rst, following Hummels &
Skiba (2004), yields that the weight placed on the factory prices of goods by transport
rms is signicant, of the order of 0.7. The quantity transported has a negative impact
on shipping prices indicating scale eects are prominent, but their benecial impact is
dampened by the weight placed on the factory prices of goods. The second, based on
Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein (2008) concludes that jointly taris and shipping prices
aect the extensive margin. The third step is reminiscent of Crozet & Koenig (2010)
as the equilibrium elasticity of exports with respect to trade costs is calculated for each
2See for example Transportation Costs and Adjustments to Trade by David Hummels who
expresses scepticism on the functional form of the iceberg cost and the use of proxies for transport costs
such as distance.
3Dened as the level of exports of incumbent and new exporters respectively.56 Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation
disaggregated sector. The distributions of elasticities exhibit negative rst and third
moments. Fourthly, using the methodology in Chaney (2005), the null hypothesis that
the trade cost specic elasticities do not interact with variable trade costs is partly
rejected.
Inference is made regarding three general points: Transportation technology adjustments
do indeed play a role in shaping trade ows as not only distance but factory prices of
goods and the quantity transported aect shipping prices, necessitating a structural form
for shipping prices (Lugovskyy & Skiba 2011). Second, tari reductions and shipping
prices jointly aect the range of traded goods. A decrease in taris within a sector in
the past, unequivocally raises the quantity transported in subsequent periods, altering
shipping prices through the feedback relationship. The probability to export increases,
aecting aggregate prices of traded goods, the quantity transported and so on. Third,
the procedure implies that the high coecients following trade liberating events could be
observed because transport costs remain un-modelled yielding an issue of identication
and specication.
As part of the trade costs' literature, this simple, albeit restrictive, model adds to the
plethora of important outcomes that re-evaluate the seemingly innocuous iceberg cost
assumption in international trade. The monicker iceberg costs can be dened as the
nite set of variable trade barriers between two countries each entering independently,
with its own elasticity and loglinearly (Feenstra 2004, Anderson & van Wincoop 2004).
The element of the set associated with transport costs is represented by some measure
of distance to the destination (Disdier & Head 2008).
Hummels (2007), Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009), Lugovskyy & Skiba (2011),
Clark, Dollar & Micco (2004) argue successfully that transport costs are not all about
distance to the destination. Transportation is an industry itself characterised by increas-
ing returns, xed costs correlated with infrastructure and variable costs that depend on
distance, productivity and the physical characteristics of transported goods. Scale ef-
fects are not only made possible by virtue of ship size, with larger ships deployed on
voluminous routes and vice versa, but also arise in shipbuilding and port infrastructure
along with a wealth of other interactions.4
Concomitantly not all trade costs can be classied as iceberg costs. Irarrazabal, Moxnes
& Opromolla (2014) nd that the additive element of trade costs is quantitatively impor-
tant: Relative to the median price of a commodity times the iceberg cost, the additive
4Kalouptsidi (2011) nds investment volatility and shipping market entry is increasing as shipbuilding
times decrease and eets tend to be larger in absence of any shipbuilding time. Rua (2012) extends the
Melitz (2003) model of trade to include transport technologies: she explains that containerized trade is
diused slowly and linearly, depending on xed costs correlated with transport infrastructure, the spread
speed of container leasing, network size, usage, income and neighbour eects. Adoption of container port
infrastructure followed an S-shaped curve over the last half century determined by institutional barriers,
country size and future expectations of containerised ows. Krautheim (2012) shows that informational
spillovers lead to xed costs reductions amplifying the eect of variable trade costs on trade 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component is on average 14 per cent which is unaccounted for in pure iceberg cost
empirical frameworks. Additive transport costs are positively correlated with factory
prices causing the trade share of high quality goods to increase: The conrmation of the
Alchian and Allen hypothesis5 by Hummels & Skiba (2004) provides further proof on
the omission of information that the iceberg formulation can entail. Since demand for
transportation is a derived demand, Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009) show that ad-
ditive transport costs and subsequent price correlation leads to increases in the markup
of transport rms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the eco-
nomic environment in which manufacturing and transport rms exist. In section 3.3 the
equilibrium conditions are outlined followed by a discussion regarding the qualitative
properties of the model and comparative static experiments. Sections 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 are
concerned with the empirical application for testing the predictions of the model. The
last section concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
There are N countries in a global economy. Country n produces goods using labour ^ Ln
sourced from the population Ln. Identical agents in n consume H + 1 goods produced
domestically or abroad by H sectors and sector 0. Each sector h 2 H of country n is
identied by the output of a single good h and consists of a mass of rms. Each rm
produces a single variety of the h good which is indexed by the rm's unique productivity
level . Sector 0 produces a homogeneous good labelled 0 and acts as the numeraire.
Each country n has a transport sector T comprising rms that produce dierentiated
transport modes and have identical productivity. These modes ship quantities of the
h good from country n to another country by pooling together domestically produced
varieties. T operates using labour ^ LT
n, thus ^ Ln + ^ LT
n = Ln.
 Preferences
A consumer, endowed with one unit of labour, working in the h 2 H, 0 or T sectors,
is characterised by constant elasticity of substitution preferences. She exhausts all her
income on consuming q0 units of the numeraire and qh() units of variety  produced
in sector h. Her preferences are dened over the set of all available varieties of a sector,
h, receiving utility U:
5The Alchian and Allen hypothesis states that any external costs increase the relative consumption
of the higher valued commodity if these costs are additive to the good's nal price. If value is correlated
with quality (as Hummels & Skiba (2004) show) then the Alchian Allen eect leads to increased trade
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U  q
0
0
H Y
h=1
Z
2h
qh()
h 1
h d
 h
h 1h
; with 0 +
H X
h=1
h = 1;
Where h > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of a sector h.
 Production in sector 0
Good 0 is traded at no cost and produced under constant returns. One unit of labour
produces wn and the good's price is normalised to 1, so that the wage is equal to the
price of the good. In this respect the wage is set equal to 1 across countries and across
H sectors within each country n. As H and 0 are segmented from the T sector, a strong
assumption is that workers in T are rewarded exogenously the normalised wage so that
the incentive to relocate to another sector of the domestic economy does not arise.
 Trade Barriers
Each variety h is subject to costly trade. For one unit of a variety to be transported
from country i to country j, a fraction ij is used up such that 1=ij units of variety 
arrive.
This iceberg cost comprises of two types of trade barriers: bij > 1 encompasses all
elements of a nite set of trade barriers that exist between i and j except for the element
associated with transportation. fij is the iceberg shipping price paid to a transport rm
of country n's transport sector T in order to transport y units of variety  from i to j.
The shipping price takes a functional form adapted from Lugovskyy & Skiba (2010) and
Lugovskyy & Skiba (2011). We will assume that it is calculated in monetary terms (at
the market price of the good shipped) and is the same across varieties of a sector, denoted
as ^ fh. For example, producers of tennis shoes or basketball shoes pay the freight in units
of those goods, fij(), yet the dollar value of the shipping price is the same across shoe
types, ^ fijh.
We will also assume that shipping prices are likely to be positively correlated with the
factory prices of varieties based on the compelling supporting evidence provided by Hum-
mels & Skiba (2004), Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009), Lugovskyy & Skiba (2011)
and Irarrazabal, Moxnes & Opromolla (2014). Since the market value of the shipping
price is the same across all varieties of the sector, it is natural to set a dependence
between the shipping price and the average price of a sector's varieties { the aggregate
factory price of the h good {.
This implies a myopic observation by the transport rm of a variety's actual factory
price and the variety itself. The price aggregation and pooling of varieties is derived
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receives a sealed consignment of goods to be shipped along with a pro forma invoice
stating the fob price of the good and the declaration of goods. The transport rm's
appointed individual then proceeds to complete the bill of lading using a STC (said to
contain) and/or a STW (said to weigh) condition so that its liability is limited only to
the number and/or weight of items but not the contents (the actual variety itself).
Second, modes of transport such as containerised transportation are able to ship a
multitude of goods produced by rms within (tennis shoes, basketball shoes, etc.) and
across sectors (refrigerated milk, shoes) by virtue of homogeneous cargo space (Stopford
2009, Levinson 2008).
The shipping price observed by rms producing the dierentiated varieties of good h is:
(fij   1)(Efpiih()g) = ^ fijh
Where fij is the iceberg reward to transport rms and ^ fijh is the market value of the
shipping price. Efpiih()g is the average factory price of varieties in sector h or the
aggregate price of good h. Solving for fijh yields:
fijh = ^ fijh (Efpiih()g)
 1 + 1 (3.1)
The transport sector is monopolistically competitive and the cost function of a repre-
sentative rm is:
cT
h(q) = yhqijh()dij(Efpiih()g)h + FT
Where 0 < h < 1 is a percentage inuence of the log domestic average price of good
h on the log shipping price of good h which will be tested empirically for its statistical
signicance, dij > 1 is the variable cost associated with distance to the destination, FT
is the xed cost associated with transport infrastructure. yh are the units of the good
shipped by a single transport rm which will be derived in equilibrium. The sector is
characterised by increasing returns to scale as the unit cost of shipping a good decreases
when traded volumes increase (see for example Hummels & Skiba (2004)).
 Firm heterogeneity and production
Firms producing dierentiated varieties are governed by the same technology within
and across countries. Within each country and sector, they only dier in their level of
productivity  measured in labour units which is allocated after a random draw from
a Pareto distribution with shape parameter h. Productivity is distributed within an
interval [1;+1) according to:
P(~ h < ) = Gh() = 1    h; with density dGh() = gh()d  h h 1d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The parameter h > h   1, h > 2, is an inverse measure of heterogeneity within a
sector. The higher the value of h the more output is characterised as being produced
by small less productive rms and vice versa.
Varieties are produced after rms in country i pay a variable cost 1= and a destination
specic xed cost FM
ij that allows them to export to a destination other than country i.
Taking into consideration the destination specic trade cost ij, the cost function of a
particular rm in sector h is dened as:
cM
ijh(q) =
ijh

q + FM
ijh
This implies self-selection as exporting rms will be amongst the most productive. This
however is not attributed to exporting itself, but to the fact that such rms are able to
cover export market entry costs (Bernard, Jensen, Redding & Schott 2012). Lastly, the
total mass of exporting rms in country i is proportional to its size, Li.
 Timing and Strategies
Consumers play rst and yield their demand for an imported variety taking the desti-
nation prices of rms as given. Transport rms follow by posting their shipping price
schedules to destination j based on the observed quantity demanded and the expectation
of a particular variety's factory price. Firms draw a unit of labour with productivity
, set prices based on their productivity level and subsequently select the number of
destinations to sell their output to. The equilibrium is characterised by:
 A set of exporting rms identied by productivity levels that enable them to cover
the xed cost in order to export.
 A set of quantities and prices for each variety  of sector h in each destination
such that the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied at a unique
destination price.
3.2.1 Demand for dierentiated goods
A consumer solves her maximisation problem by yielding her demand for variety  of
good h:
qijh() = hLjP 1
jh pijh() h
Where Pjh is the aggregate price of the good at the destination. Firms associated with a
low productivity draw will not be able to cover the xed costs of exporting, given the set
of trade barriers and subsequently produce only domestically. We will not be monitoring
such rms directly. If  is the productivity of the threshold rm that breaks even for aChapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation 61
given level of xed costs FM
ijh and variable trade costs ij, then the price index is dened
as:
Pjh
h 1 =
2
6
4
N X
k=1
Lk
1 Z

kj
pkjh()1 hdGh()
3
7
5
 1
3.2.2 The price setting behaviour of transport rms
Transport rms derive their prot maximising price in monetary terms subject to the
quantity demanded at destination j. Shipping a sector specic amount y of the quantity
demanded q costs to heterogeneous rms:
^ fijh =
h
h   1
dij (Efpiih()g)
h
Since the markup
h
h 1 is constant and greater than unity, it must be that ^ fijh > 1.
With slight abuse of notation, the exogenous +1 term in equation (3.1) which is imposed
to ensure that
pij
pii = ij > 1, can be absorbed so that the iceberg reward to transport
rms fh is equal to the real price of shipping good h:
fijh =
^ fijh
Efpiih()g

h
h   1
dij (Efpiih()g)
h 1 > 1 (3.2)
With Efpiih()g =
1 R

ijh
piih()dGh() being the average factory price of varieties in
sector h, which will be dened by the number of rms that are more productive than
the threshold rm with productivity . Additionally, the lower bound of h is set to
h
h+1.6 Hence ijh  bij  fijh > 1.7
3.2.3 The price setting behaviour of heterogeneous rms
Firms in i are constrained by the quantity demanded at destination j which is a function
of the trade barriers b and the shipping price f. After drawing productivity  they set
their price as a constant markup of price over the marginal cost:
pijh() =
h
h   1
ijh

After obtaining the partial equilibrium results, one can now proceed to characterise the
general equilibrium of this global economy.
6This ensures that a positive elasticity never materialises.
7Since there are no domestic trade costs the convention 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3.3 Equilibrium export participation and exports
3.3.1 Productivity threshold and the shipping price
Only the subset of the most productive rms are able to overcome the country j-specic
xed cost barrier. The productivity of the threshold rm of sector h8 which is charac-
terised by variable prots accrued from exporting to j that are exactly osetting the
xed costs of export participation is:

ij =
 
FM
ij
 1
 1

PjL
1
 1
j
 1
bijdij 
 
Ef 1g
 1 1 (3.3)
where 1 a constant.9
At the same time the productivity threshold  becomes known, the price of shipping
good h to country j is obtained:
fij =


   1

dij
 

ij
 (+1)( 1)


 + 1
 1
(3.4)
The shipping price has propagating eects on the productivity threshold since it is a
function of 
ij itself if

+1 <  < 1.
3.3.2 Aggregate prices at the destination
By replacing the expected productivity level in the productivity threshold equation (3.3)
the equilibrium price index is obtained. In the process the share of each country's relative
size to the world sk = Lk=L;L =
PN
k=1 Lk is dened, resulting in:
Pj =

Lj
L
 1+(+1)( 1)

(Lj)
  1
 1 j2
where 
 
j =
 
N X
k=1
sk
!1+(+1)( 1)
(bkjdkj)
   
FM
kj
 (

 1 (1+(+1)( 1)))
(3.5)
Where 2 is a constant10 and j represents an aggregate index of country j's remoteness
from the rest of the world.
8Henceforth we drop the subscript h for simplicity.
91 =



 1
 1 

 1
1+
102 =
 ( 1)

1+(+1)( 1)




 1
 1  
1+(+1)( 1)
 

 1
(1+) 

+1
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3.3.3 General equilibrium productivity threshold, exports and aggre-
gate exports
Within a specic sector h of country i, there is a simultaneous solution for the equilibrium
set of exporters, 
j   where 
j = f
ij;:::;1g, and for the export levels of each
incumbent exporter provided their productivity exceeds the threshold:

ij =
 
FM
ij
 1
( 1)(1+(+1)( 1))

Lj
L
  1
 
bijdij
j
 1
1+(+1)( 1)
3 (3.6)
xij(j  
ij) =

Lj
L
  1

 1

bijdij
j
   1
1+(+1)( 1)  
FM
ij
 (+1)( 1)
1+(+1)( 1) 4 (3.7)
where 3 and 4 are constants.11
Aggregating over the level of exports of each incumbent rm will determine the level of
sector h's total exports. Given that the number of rms is proportional to the country
size Li, total exports expressed in fob terms are:
Xij =
1 Z

ij
Lixij()dG() = 
LiLj
L

bijdij
j
 

1+(+1)( 1)  
FM
ij
 


 1
1
1+(+1)( 1) 1

(3.8)
3.3.4 Intensive and extensive margin elasticities
We now assess specically the impact of the transport sector on the intensive (IME) and
extensive (EME) margins of trade, whilst derivation of the elasticities of each margin
are relegated to Appendix B.1.
The aggregate exports' elasticity with respect to variable trade costs bij can be decom-
posed to the intensive and extensive margin elasticities:
bij =  
@Xij
@bij
bij
Xij
=

IMEbij + EMEbij

 Shipping Price Eects
= [(   1) +    (   1)] 
1
1 + ( + 1)(   1)
=  
1
1 + ( + 1)(   1)
(3.9)
The elasticity of substitution  has opposite eects on each margin as it magnies
the impact of variable trade costs on the intensive margin but decreases the impact of
variable trade costs on the extensive margin. Since the elasticity of substitution aects
both margins by the same rate but oppositely, it cancels out. The only determinant
113 =




 ( 1)
 1
 and 4 = 



1   1
 
 ( 1)

  1
 .64 Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation
of the aggregate trade ow elasticity with respect to variable trade costs becomes the
degree rm heterogeneity. In the presence of a good specic, price setting transport
sector, both margins are amplied by the same elasticity 1
1+(+1)( 1). As the term is
greater than one, aggregate exports are more elastic relative to the Chaney (2008) model
of trade12 unless transport rms take into consideration wholly the factory price of the
good.
Concerning the aggregate exports' elasticity with respect to xed costs one obtains:
FM
ij =  
@Xij
@FM
ij
FM
ij
Xij
=
h
IMEFM
ij + EMEFM
ij
i
 Shipping Price Eects
=

 ( + 1)(   1) +

   1
  1


1
1 + ( + 1)(   1)
=

   1

1
1 + ( + 1)(   1)
  1
(3.10)
The elasticity of substitution may have no impact on the intensive margin, but because
of the presence of the transport sector, the intensive margin elasticity is positive: The
more heterogeneous a sector is, given , the less incumbent rms are harmed by a
reduction in xed costs. New participants to trade are more beneted from a reduction
in xed costs if the sector is more homogeneous with the opposite holding true. Lower
values of  decrease the extensive margin elasticity in a similar fashion to the Chaney
(2008) model of trade.
3.3.5 Volume transported by each transporter and number of trans-
porters
By assuming a representative rm framework in the transport sector, the number of
transport rms is decreasing in xed costs and the shipping capacity produced by a
representative rm is increasing in xed costs (Krugman 1979, 1980). Dening the
parameter y as the ratio of total volume shipped to destination j to the total number of
transport rms,
R 1

ijh
qijhdGh()
]rmsijh
 yijh, or the units of good h shipped by each rm, one
can solve for the zero prot condition in the transport sector of country i:
yijh =

Lj
L
 
( 1)

 

dij
j
 ( 1)
1+(+1)( 1)
Ft
ij
 
FM
ij
 
(+1)( 1)( 1)
( 1)(1+(+1)( 1)) b

+(+1)( 1)
1+(+1)( 1)

ij 5
Where 5 is a constant.13
12And always more elastic than the Krugman (1980) model of trade.
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3.3.6 Discussion and comparison with the Chaney (2008) model of
trade
Several remarks are in order. Transport rms are able to lower unit costs the higher
the quantity shipped to the destination. Yet the dependence of the shipping price on
the average factory price of the good, , aects average shipping costs alleviating or
reinforcing benecial cost savings ensuing from economies of scale.
Ceteris paribus, a higher productivity threshold, leads to a higher iceberg reward to
transport rms, as through equation (3.4), fij is increasing in 
ij: Since factory prices
decrease, the shipping price expressed as a percentage of the factory price of the good
increases by a rate of +1. Yet the marginal cost of shipping is a function of the factory
price of the good itself. Hence a higher , reduces the positive correlation between the
productivity threshold; the real shipping price increase is attenuated: Marginal shipping
costs decrease with respect to the productivity threshold  at a rate  ( + 1) and
therefore the shipping price expressed as a percentage of the factory price of the good
increases yet at a lower rate, ( + 1)(1   ).
The implication is that high productivity thresholds lead to lower marginal costs and
average shipping costs, should transport rms take into consideration factory prices.
However at the same time transportation is perceived as being ever more costly as the
share in the delivered price of the good increases concurrently. The quantity transported
overall decreases with some friction and the per unit savings on the route between i and
j are minimised, with the opposite holding true. In the limiting case where  tends to
unity, transport rms absorb fully the factory price of the good and the attenuation is
maximised, leading to the complete absorption of the increase in real shipping prices.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. The particular functional form of the
shipping price imitates the behaviour of an additive formulation of transport costs as
modelled in Hummels & Skiba (2004) and Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009). Unfor-
tunately the adoption of an additive form of shipping costs does not yield a closed form
solution of the model (Irarrazabal, Moxnes & Opromolla 2014). Yet consistent with an
additive formulation one can observe as factory prices of goods decrease (increase), the
relative importance of shipping costs increases (decreases) as it constitutes a greater
(smaller) percentage of the destination price of the good, all else equal.14 A change in
real shipping prices could also be perceived as exogenous adjustments to the markup set
by the transport rm as a consequence of a change in the factory price of the good.15
14The elasticity of the destination price of a good with respect to the shipping price in an additive
formulation of transport costs is the share of the shipping price in the destination price:
@pijfij
@fijpij =
fij
pii()bij+fij .
15Herein all markups are modelled as constant whilst under an additive costs' formulation the markup
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Turning to the equilibrium productivity threshold and export levels of incumbent trans-
porters, there are elastic impacts following changes in trade costs. Compared to the
Chaney (2008) model of trade these elasticities are amplied because trade costs are
partly endogenised. Incumbent producers of varieties are now aected when the thresh-
old changes as the shipping price is distorted, whilst in the original model constant
returns to scale transport technology is assumed.16 Herein, a lowering of the threshold
decreases the market value of shipping prices. Incumbent producers are beneted as
the real price of transport is low and exports increase, decreasing the average average
cost of shipping. If transport rms set prices by invoking the factory price of the good,
marginal costs increase and export levels rise yet at a lesser rate: Scale economies in
transportation are dampened by this last eect.
Jointly changes in the threshold and the level of exports of incumbent transporters
inuence aggregate exports. As in the original version of the model, the extensive margin
elasticity dominates the intensive margin elasticity. Through equation (3.9) a reduction
in a variable trade barrier lowers the threshold and exports of new rms contribute
to aggregate exports by    (   1). This entry of rms subsequently drives down the
shipping price by (+1)( 1) which further decreases the threshold by 1
1+(+1)( 1) > 1,
whilst in the original model no such propagation is materialised. Incumbent exporters
do not aect the real shipping price, yet they are also beneted as they pay less for
transportation. The level of exports increases by (   1) 1
1+(+1)( 1) > 1 per cent. As
the extensive margin dominates, the impact on aggregate exports is governed by the
degree of a sector's heterogeneity and the propagating eects of transportation.
With respect to changes in xed costs of exporting, equation (3.10) describes an am-
plication of the extensive margin elasticity which operates through the same channel
as a change in a variable trade barrier: A decrease in xed costs lowers the threshold
and the set of exporting rms increases. At the intensive margin however, the results
depart from the original version of the model wherein the impact is zero. As xed costs
decrease, real shipping prices decrease beneting incumbent exporters solely through
changes in the shipping price. Once again the extensive margin dominates and the im-
pact on aggregate exports is driven by changes in the set of exporting rms following
adjustments in xed costs of exporting and real shipping prices.
The model is restrictive because i) the transport sector is closed and transport workers
do not have the incentive to move to other sectors and vice versa; ii) all wages are
normalised in the world; iii) the markups of transportation are invariable; iv) there are
no adjustments in transport supply which is highly inelastic due to lengthy shipbuild-
ing times which are not taken into account in this one-period model (see for example
Kalouptsidi (2011)).
16That is, the shipping price is equal to the marginal cost which is the variable trade cost associated
with distance to the destination.Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation 67
These are additional channels of causation that have been shut down in order to highlight
some bare bones characteristics of transportation: That the commercial practice of
homogenised cargo space, the presence of scale economies in transportation and the
pricing behaviour of transport rms all play a role in amplifying the gains, losses and
distributional impacts identied in the literature on rm heterogeneity. By allowing
such causation channels in the model, the number of determinants of shipping prices
increase and interactions with taris become more blurred converging to the stylised
facts discussed in Hummels (2007). This leads to interesting extensions which are the
focus of future work.
The amplication mechanism proposed herein, arising from the functional form of trans-
port costs, contributes to the body of literature that explains the empirically large co-
ecients representing the elasticity of import demand.
Hummels (2001) provides elasticity estimates for 41 two digit SITC goods with an av-
erage elasticity of substitution standing at 9.3. Large estimates are also reported in
Clausing (2001), Head & Mayer (2002), Anderson & van Wincoop (2004) and Romalis
(2007). In Baier & Bergstrand (2001), jointly trade liberalisation episodes and declines
of transport costs explain 34% of the post-war growth in world trade. Yi (2003) mentions
that there is a puzzle when trying to reconcile the constant 2-3% post-war annual trade
growth with only an 11% reduction in trade barriers over the period, a relationship which
is additionally non-linear. Chaney (2005) nds empirical support that the elasticity of
aggregate exports with respect to variable trade barriers is equal to the degree of rm
heterogeneity. In absolute value, this is always larger than the elasticity of aggregate
exports with respect to trade barriers of models with representative rms. In the data
used for this study, the elasticity of substitution estimated for each six digit subheading
averages 3.55 (standard deviation 4.74 and median 2.6 for year 2006) corroborating the
aforementioned ndings.17
The theoretical framework of this study provides a justication for such large estimates
by accounting for adjustments in transport technology. The fact that changes in the
average prices of varieties induce changes in the marginal costs of the transport rm
aects the per unit cost of shipping, all else constant. Because the transport industry,
and predominantly maritime transport which is responsible for the carriage of 99% of
the world's trade by weight and 90% of the volume of world trade, is characterised
by increasing returns (Hummels (2007); OECD (2008)), the growth of the extensive
margin18 over the post-war period (Ruhl 2008) leads to more increased route savings
because of stronger scale eects. These are alleviated however if transport rms take
into consideration the factory prices of goods when formulating their optimal shipping
price. The implication is therefore that tari reductions can set o a string of benecial
17See Appendix B.4 for the procedure yielding a distribution of price elasticities of import demand.
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impacts through the complementarity with transportation explaining thus these large
observed estimates of trade costs, as the following section analyses.
Our paper also illustrates how incorporating a simple structural form for transport costs
can have profound eects on canonical heterogeneous rm trade models. As Costinot
& Rodr guez-Clare (2013) state, the derived gravity equations in the alternative micro-
founded models of trade such as Eaton & Kortum (2002), Anderson & van Wincoop
(2003), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen & Kortum (2003), Chaney (2008) and Eaton, Kortum
& Kramarz (2011) have the same macroeconomic structure and subsequently same pre-
dictions regarding the eects of bilateral costs on bilateral trade ows. By embedding
a structural form for transport costs in these models the microeconomic foundations
are altered, hence an examination of whether the macroeconomic gravity structures
convergence to the same predictions is required.
Indeed Arkolakis, Costinot & Rodriguez-Clare (2012) show that such models share sim-
ilar welfare predictions {provided there are no intermediate traded goods or multiple
sectors{ that are determined by two principal statistics, the share of income expendi-
ture on domestic goods and the elasticity of imports with respect to trade costs. If
however the elasticity of imports with respect to trade costs is distorted by the pres-
ence of a transport sector, as we propose, welfare gains will once again depend on the
specic model's microeconomic foundations and the interaction between manufacturing
and transport rms. In the special case of a Pareto productivity distribution, by in-
voking Proposition 5 of Melitz & Redding (2013) we can state that a tari reduction in
the presence of a transport sector generates higher welfare gains than the heterogeneous
rm model with no transport sector and the homogeneous model consisting of exporting
and non-exporting rms with no transport sector. To achieve the same welfare gains in
all three models requires, respectively, incrementally larger reductions in the heteroge-
neous rm model with no transport sector and the extended homogeneous model with
no transport sector. The case of an extended homogeneous rm model with a transport
sector which is compared to the heterogeneous trade model with a transport sector does
not alter the Proposition: Because in the latter model there are endogenous selection re-
sponses to taris and transport costs which cause changes in the average productivity of
exporting and non-exporting rms, there are higher welfare gains from tari reductions
compared to the former model which has no such margin of adjustment.
3.3.7 The implications of trade liberalisation
This model contains an endogenous relationship of transport costs and goods' prices, yet
all other trade costs contained in the vector bij are considered exogenous. A change in an
element of this vector, for example a tari reduction, aects both trade margins directly
and because of the endogenous relationship there are also indirect eects through the
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Commencing with a 1 per cent reduction in bij, there ensues a 1 per cent reduction in
the productivity threshold 
ij which shifts to b
ij in Figure 3.1. As new rms participate
in exporting, the average factory price of the good increases by +1 per cent. Transport
rms receive the consignments and yield the shipping price based on the number of items
comprising the consignment and/or the weight and its declared value. The set price is a
percentage of the factory price of the average exported variety, thus the market value of
the shipping price is the same across varieties of a sector. Because the sector's aggregate
price increased, the real shipping price across varieties goes down and the productivity
threshold attains the westernmost limit on the horizontal axis of Figure 3.1. However,
the more the transport rm is inuenced by the factory price of the good when deciding
the optimal shipping price, such as additional packaging costs or insurance costs, the
marginal costs of shipping go up by  dampening the overall decline in shipping prices.
Thus the vector of trade costs ij decreases allowing for disproportionately more rms
to commence exporting by virtue of a lower productivity threshold which lies in between
the permissible range of productivities b
ij and 
!

+1
ij of Figure 3.1.
The disproportionately large number of rms that begin to export contribute to total
Figure 3.1: Implications of trade liberalisation
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exports
 ( 1)
1+(+1)( 1) per cent represented by adding segments C and E of the gure.
The value of exports of incumbent rms has increased by  1
1+(+1)( 1) per cent or the
area under B and D. Both elasticities can be decomposed to the direct eect of a 1 per
cent reduction of bij increasing exports by  ( 1) and  1 per cent respectively, and
the reduction in shipping prices which further causes exports to increase by 1
1+(+1)( 1)
per cent. Hence there is a more elastic impact compared to the Chaney (2008) and
Krugman (1980) models of trade. With respect to the latter the only adjustment would
occur through the intensive margin and exports would increase by the shaded area
labelled B. Concerning the former, the total increase in exports after adjustments in
both margins would be represented by the area under C and B.
While an exogenous reduction in the marginal cost of transport has equivalent eects in
magnitude, the channel of causality is altered. Assuming a 1 per cent reduction in dij,
the shipping price is lowered by 1 per cent. The productivity threshold is aected as it
decreases by 1 per cent which in turn further lowers the shipping price by ( +1)(  1)
per cent aecting one nal time the productivity threshold, reducing it by 1
1+(+1)( 1)
per cent.
Incumbent exporters are impacted directly by the 1 per cent decrease in dij, and raise
their exports by   1 per cent. The shipping price adjustment following changes in the
productivity threshold increases additionally exports by 1
1+(+1)( 1) per cent. Jointly
the contribution of the two margins and the domination of the extensive margin leads
to the amplied impact on aggregate exports.
These observations constitute this paper's contribution to the literature explaining the
large empirical estimates of the elasticity of import demand. In addition to the robust
explanations provided by Yi (2003) and Ruhl (2008), we propose that trade liberalisation
events may lead to benecial adjustments in transport technology that spur additional
knock on eects on trade.
The former paper suggests that vertical specialisation can initiate a chain of declines
in costs and prices following an initial tari reduction and goods become gradually
more vertically specialised, reinforcing this eect in a nonlinear fashion. The latter
study proposes that trade liberalisation is a typically permanent change and so are the
corresponding shocks to productivity and demand. Such a change ensures that the
future value of exporting in all states is increased and extensive margin growth is large.
If the contribution of the extensive margin is not controlled for, then trade liberalisation
appears to aect trade ows in a disproportionately large manner.
This paper puts forward that there is a complementarity between tari and transport
costs reductions in the presence of scale economies in transportation. A trade liberating
event prompts extensive margin growth, reducing the per unit cost of shipping. Trans-
port rms post lower shipping prices but if packaging or insurance costs are large this
price may be dampened, depressing the per unit reduction in shipping costs. By notChapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation 71
accounting for this complementarity, the standard trade models of representative and
heterogeneous rms are not able to decompose the overall reduction of the iceberg cost
ij into tari and transport eects, hence the estimated elasticity appears to be large.
The following section presents the supporting evidence for such complementarities. Since
shipping prices exhibit signicant impacts in both margins of trade and  1 is shown to
be quantitatively important, the tari elasticity is also aected because at the aggregate,
the estimated elasticity

1+(+1)( 1) matters for the whole vector of trade costs ij.
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Identication
The empirical strategy is to detect whether tari cuts create disproportionately large
elasticities due to, predominantly, extensive margin growth which induces stronger scale
eects and relatively less costly transport services. To this eect aggregate trade and
transport cost data are employed, classied using the Harmonized Commodity Descrip-
tion and Coding System at the six digit aggregation level.
For expositional convenience a sector h and a particular six digit category of commodities
will be equivalent denitions. Identifying separately the parameters h and h becomes
dicult due to the aggregate nature of the data. It will suce to identify the nega-
tive impact of
h
1+(h+1)(h 1) on aggregate exports, under the null hypothesis that this
elasticity is zero.
This is achieved by undertaking a four step procedure based on Hummels & Skiba
(2004), Lugovskyy & Skiba (2011), Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein (2008), Crozet &
Koenig (2010) and Chaney (2005). The rst step transforms the per unit element of
shipping prices into its ad valorem equivalent in order to infer, on aggregate, if and how
factory prices of the good impact on the latter.
The second step introduces a latent variable that is greater than unity if variable prots,
calculated using the predicted values of ad valorem shipping prices from the previous
step, are greater than xed costs. It permits calculation of the probability of a country's
sector to export to a specic destination, conditional on the observed variables.
Subsequently the predicted probabilities which, under the Pareto distribution assump-
tion, will be distributed with shape parameter , lead to the estimation of the trade cost
specic elasticity

1+(+1)( 1) for each of the h 2 H sectors.
In the last step, the distribution of the trade cost specic elasticities, are tested for
their joint interaction with variable trade costs indicating their (non-)zero impact on
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 Step 1: Transforming per unit to ad valorem shipping prices
The target is to derive expression (3.2), which is the outcome of a transformation from
per unit to ad valorem shipping prices where the elasticity of interest is h   1. Based
on Lugovskyy & Skiba (2011), ad valorem shipping prices will consist of a multiplicative
part and a specic part measured in per unit terms. Due to the aggregation level and
as the theoretical part showed, these shipping prices become sector specic rather than
variety specic. A strong assumption at this point is that all multiplicative parts are an
element of the vector of trade costs bij and do not enter the transformation. Shipping
prices can be expressed as:
piihfA
ijh = piih + sU
ijh
where A and U denote ad valorem and the per unit specic part respectively. Hummels
& Skiba (2004) mention how the per unit element is possibly dependent on prices as well
as a vector X of non price factors comprising the marginal costs of transport. Denoting
the possible dependence on sectoral prices by an elasticity h we can thus rewrite the
above relationship for a specic sector as ~ fijh  fA
ijh   1 = p
h 1
iih  Xijh. If marginal
shipping costs consist only of distance to the destination dij and the volume of goods
transported qijh, the resulting estimable relationship becomes in logarithmic form:
ln ~ fijhm = 0 + (h   1)lnpiih + 1 lndij + 2 lnqijhm + ijhm
where m denotes the mode of transport. The error term ijhm reects unobserved shocks
in transportation, specic to country pairs ij, and within each country pair, modes m
and sectors h. This equation is similar to the one estimated in Hummels & Skiba (2004)
and entails simultaneity between shipping prices, factory prices and traded quantities.
For a particular year, the parameter estimate of  1 is identied when it is derived using
only the variation across sectors and destinations for each exporter. Since the latter form
of variation is constant, there is variation of log factory prices occurring across exporters
within a sector and across sectors within an exporter. Using an exporter xed eect we
are left with variation across sectors for each exporter which is adequate in the data,
with standard deviation averaging about 1.7.
A negative estimate of 2 identies the presence of scale eects in transportation. It is
required that the estimate is derived using variation across importers for each exporter-
sector-mode. For each exporter-sector-mode the larger the quantity shipped to a destina-
tion, the more achievable are scale eects. By taking the mean dierence lnqijhm lnqihm
we can rule out in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Under the same rationale, pairwise specic log distance is dierenced from each ex-
porter's mean: lndij   lndi. The equation obtains its estimable form:
ln ~ fijhm = 0 + (   1)lnpiiht + 1
 
lndij   lndi

+ 2
 
lnqijhm   lnqihm

+
X
i
i +
X
m
m + ijhmt
(3.11)
Where i and m capture the variation arising across exporters and across modes.
After estimating the model the following tests are performed:
 H0 : \    1 =  1: Transport rms do not take into consideration the factory price
of the good, and enjoy full scale eects benets if ^ 2 < 0.
 H0 : \    1 = 0: Transport rms absorb 100% of the price of the good, and destroy
any benecial impacts from scale eects if ^ 2 < 0.
The simultaneity in equation (3.11) is dealt with by using lags of the independent vari-
ables as instruments. Contrary to Hummels & Skiba (2004) we do not use taris as
an instrument, because in the subsequent steps, taris together with predicted shipping
prices cause the probability to export and the level of exports, generating high correla-
tion among the independent variables. The predicted values of shipping prices, denoted
as d ln ~ fijhm, are then incorporated in step 2.
 Step 2: Export participation
Based on Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein (2008), export participation in a specic sector
h can only be inferred if variable prots of the rm, rijh()=, exceed xed costs Fm
ijh.
Dening the latent variable Zij, the ratio of variable prots to xed costs within each
sector is such that:
Zij 
rij()=
Fm
ij
=
Lj [Pj]
 1 
 ( 1)
ij  1  7
Fm
ij
;
where 7 is a constant.19 Firms that are more productive, or the larger the trading
partner, the nominator becomes greater than the denominator and vice versa. Observed
positive exports at the aggregate six digit level have occurred because rms in h are
characterised by Zij > 1.
Ad valorem trade costs ijh consist of the element bijh which will be assumed to be an
ad valorem tari on the exported good, and shipping prices ~ fijhm. The above equation
becomes in logarithmic form:
lnZijh =  (   1)lnbijh   (   1)d ln ~ fijhm +
X
i
i +
X
j
j + ijh;
19 


 1
 ( 1)
1
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where ijh is an iid shock that occurs within country pairs. Denoting this export decision
with a binary indicator Iijh, the logistic equation is:
Pr(Iijh = 1j	)  
0
@ 3(   1)lnbijh   4(   1)d ln ~ fijh +
X
i
i +
X
j
j + ijh
1
A
(3.12)
where 	 denotes the observable variables and () denotes the cumulative logistic dis-
tribution function.
The binary response whether rms in sectors are able to export given a particular level
of (predicted) transport costs and/or tari levels becomes dicult to answer. Transport
costs and/or taris may be large, yet export levels can be nite and large in the data
using this particular aggregation level. Plausible explanations are unobserved trade costs
that are pairwise specic contained in the error term and/or the size of the countries
trading. In fact the sample rarely has a zero value of exports for high nite transport
costs and taris. To censor the sample, we rely on the following assumption: Exports of
a particular sector k from country i to j are considered minimal or zero if shipping prices
and taris exceed the 75th percentile ( 0:08 and  0:14, respectively for year 2006).
Approximately 6.83% of exports across country pairs in the sample fail this threshold.
The average of the pairwise specic share of exports relative to total exports is 0.49%
(standard deviation 5.16), which makes the assumption somewhat innocuous: Sectors
which face generally high trade costs tend to exhibit relatively low trading volumes.
One expects to infer that increases in taris and shipping prices decrease the probability
of exporting. Yet, changes in factory prices that aect shipping prices can also impact
the probability of exporting. This dependence is understood by the predicted values of
shipping prices derived from step 1.
This specication, along with the equivalent specications used in Helpman, Melitz &
Rubinstein (2008) and Crozet & Koenig (2010), are exposed to the incidental parameter
problem20 as documented in Charbonneau (2012) which is caused by the use of multiple
xed eects in non-linear models. In particular, Greene (2002) states that the maximum
likelihood estimator with xed eects is inconsistent, because the asymptotic variance
of the estimator of the main parameters is a function of the small and assumed xed
group size. In addition small sample bias could be present. Since there exists conicting
evidence about the magnitude of the bias for the probit model (Greene 2002) we abstain
from its use. As the group size is not constant in the dataset it invalidates the use of a
conditional logit model that would lessen the problem (Charbonneau 2012). Hence we
employ a simple logit model yet acknowledging the fact that the results may be biased
and inconsistent, given the panel length.21
20For a discussion and proposed solutions of the incidental parameter problem the reader is referred
to Neyman & Scott (1948) and Lancaster (2000).
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 Step 3: Obtaining sectoral elasticities
It will be useful for notational convenience to denote the inverse of productivity as
! = 1
. Similar to Crozet & Koenig (2010), by invoking the denition of the Pareto
distribution and the equilibrium export decision (3.6), the probability of country-sector
ih's rms exporting to country j is:
Pr
 
!ijh < !
ijh

=
(
Lj
L
 1
 
bijhdij
jh
  1
1+(+1)( 1) 
FM
ijh
  1
 1
1
1+(+1)( 1)  3
)
The left hand side of the above relationship can be approximated by the predicted
probabilities of relationship (3.12). Writing the above expression in logarithmic form
and replacing the log predicted probabilities, while controlling for exporter and importer
specic variation for each sector, one obtains:
ln c Pr(Iijh = 1j	) = 0 


1 + ( + 1)(   1)

bijh
lnbijh  


1 + ( + 1)(   1)

dij
lndij
+
X
i
i +
X
j
j + ijh; for each h 2 H
(3.13)
The resulting relationship yields the trade cost specic estimate of

1+(+1)( 1) for a
particular sector. One can use a least squares estimator within each sector at the six
digit level in order to obtain a distribution of the elasticities across sectors for taris
and distance to the destination. A limitation occurs as some sectors contain very few
observations of partners trading and degrees of freedom cannot be obtained. Carrying
out the estimation for each four digit level of aggregation solves this problem, albeit
with some loss of accuracy as the estimate of

1+(+1)( 1) is the same across a number
of sectors under a respective four digit header.
 Step 4: Impacts on aggregate trade
In the nal step we state the null hypothesis of whether the elasticity

1+(+1)( 1) is
zero. With reference to specication in Chaney (2005) and the equilibrium equation of
aggregate trade (3.8) the estimable equation for accommodating this hypothesis is:
lnXijhm = 0 + 5 lnbijh + 6
\ 
h
1 + (h + 1)h

bijh
lnbijh + 7 lndij+
8
\ 
h
1 + (h + 1)h

dij
lndij +
X
i
i +
X
j
j +
X
h
h +
X
m
m + ijhm
(3.14)
where the joint impact of ^ 5, ^ 7 and their respective interactions are tested for their
equality to zero. Based on the aggregate trade equation (3.8) we expect the signs of76 Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation
the interaction terms' coecients to be negative and increasing in  in absolute value.
Should they be signicantly dierent from zero, the null hypothesis is rejected leading
to three conclusions. First that the presence of a transport sector has distorting im-
pacts on aggregate trade ows as shipping rms may take into consideration the factory
price of the good and operate under increasing returns. Second that tari reductions
and shipping prices go hand in hand generating an amplied elasticity of trade costs.
Lastly, this four step procedure taken with a pinch of salt due to the potentially biased
and inconsistent estimates arising in step 2, provides a solution for decomposing the
complementarity between taris and shipping prices, thus explaining the reason for the
observed high estimates of trade cost elasticities present in empirical gravity equations.
3.5 Construction of the Dataset
For the rst step of the empirical procedure the OECD Maritime Transport Costs
Database is utilised which contains information on ad valorem and per unit shipping
prices as well as the quantity transported by various modes of ocean transport. These
are expressed at the HS 1988/1992 6 digit aggregation level for the years 1991-2007.
Factory prices come from the CEPII Trade Prices dataset and are expressed at the HS
1996 revision at the same aggregation level. We proceed to apply the conversion to the
1992 revision for each of the 5,130 categories of goods. The conversion leads to some loss
of information as there are 116 categories of goods at the HS 1992 revision that have
two or more HS 1996 corresponding goods, therefore these commodities will be excluded
from the analysis.
For the second, third and fourth steps, preferential (AHS) simple average taris are used
which are extracted from the WITS TRAINS dataset of the World Bank. Taris are
expressed at the HS 1988/1992 digit level. Exports and traded quantities are obtained
from the UN Comtrade database at the same aggregation level and revision number.
Taris are expressed in ad valorem equivalent terms, exports are expressed in US Dollars
and quantities in kilograms. For geographical trade barriers such as distance to the
destination the CEPII Geodist dataset is invoked.
The datasets cover the period from 1991 to 2007 and we observe nine dierent exporters
trading with thirty six importers, which are detailed in Appendix B.2. A limitation of
the OECD Maritime Transport Costs dataset is that one cannot observe EU 15 countries
separately and it is hence excluded from the estimation procedure. All estimations are
cross-sectional for year 2006.Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation 77
Table 3.1: Impacts on ad valorem shipping prices
(OLS) (IV) (IV)
VARIABLES Ad valorem Ad valorem Ad valorem
shipping prices shipping prices shipping prices
F.O.B. price -0.277*** -0.284*** -0.272***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.011)
Distance 0.091*** 0.105*** 0.11***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.023)
Quantity transported -0.015*** -0.03*** -0.038***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.007)
Fixed Eects
Importer N N N
Exporter Y Y Y
Sector N N N
Mode Y Y Y
Observations 42,374 11,862 4,195
R-squared 0.271 0.268 0.286
Hausman p-value 0 0.01
Hansen p-value 0.13
\    1 =  1 p-value 0 0 0
\    1 = 0 p-value 0 0 0
Cross sectional OLS/IV estimates for year 2006, monetary units are constant U.S. Dollars.
Errors are allowed to be correlated within country pair clusters. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants included but not reported. For
column (2) price and quantity are instrumented by their rst lag respectively. For column
(3) price and quantity are instrumented by their rst and second lags respectively.
3.6 Estimation Results
 Step 1: Transforming per unit to ad valorem shipping prices
Table 3.1 presents the outcomes of estimating equation (3.11). Column (1) contains the
OLS regression estimates and columns (2) and (3) report the IV estimates using one
and two sets of lagged values of factory prices and quantities respectively.
The ndings are in line with those of Hummels & Skiba (2004) whereby the quantity
transported has a negative coecient and distance has a positive coecient in all ex-
periments. Distance has an eect that is similar in magnitude to the extant literature
on transport costs (Clark, Dollar & Micco 2004). The negative coecient of quantity
transported conrms the presence of scale eects in maritime transportation in agree-
ment to Clark, Dollar & Micco (2004) and Martinez-Zarzoso & Suarez-Burguet (2005)
who observe similar ndings. The elasticity of shipping prices with respect to factory
prices is negative in all instances, implying an average value of  equal to 0:722 less than
the unitary elasticity which is signicantly dierent from one or zero.
The positive sign of  was suspect since there is a positive and signicant relationship
between per unit transport costs and factory prices as Hummels & Skiba (2004) which78 Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation
is also veried herein using an alternative specication presented in Appendix B.3 to
document the complementarity between transport costs and taris. Their reported
elasticity, , averages 0:625 for a set of six importers and worldwide exporters.
Such a result conrms that factory prices of goods exhibit a partly positive impact on ad
valorem shipping prices. An increase in the factory price reduces the ad valorem shipping
price since, all else constant,
@fij
@pii
pii
fij =  1 hence the negative signs in columns (1), (2)
and (3). The elasticity should be also unit elastic yet the associated null hypothesis is
rejected: Transport rms incorporate information about factory prices of goods in their
marginal cost, causing a dampening eect which reduces the elasticity in absolute value
terms.
In conjunction with the negative coecient on the quantity transported, it is concluded
that transport rms are enjoying cost saving benets from scale eects yet these benets
are dampened since they also consider factory prices of goods in their cost function.
The implication is, as illustrated in the subsequent steps, that predicted values of ship-
ping prices, which are determined by factory prices, quantities transported and distances
to the destination have quantitatively important inuence on the probability to export
and aggregate exports.
 Step 2: Export participation
How do increased factory prices, scale eects, distance to the destination or taris impact
export participation? In this study, changes in the rst three variables aect shipping
prices and indirectly aect the probability of a sector's exports. Changes in the latter
inuence directly a sector's exports.
An initial glance reveals that a sector's exports from country i to j that faces taris
and shipping prices above the 75th percentile tend to have a very small share (0.49% on
average, standard deviation 5.16) in total sectoral exports from i to j. This is represented
eectively as a decision not to export, given the data weakness that shipping prices are
observed only for nite values of exports at this aggregation level.
The estimates of equation (3.12) are presented in Table 3.2. Each column corresponds to
the predicted values of shipping prices that are derived from the least squares regression
and the instrumental variables regressions with no and one overidentifying restriction of
Table 3.1.
The coecients are all signicant and have the expected signs. A unit decrease in
shipping prices increases the probability of exporting to j by 0.004 on average across
columns, holding the tari variable at its mean. A unit decrease in taris increases the
probability of exporting to j by 0.017 on average across columns, holding shipping prices
at their mean. Although not directly comparable, the estimated coecients have the
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Table 3.2: Export participation
(1) (2) (3)
Logit Logit Logit
Variable Export Export Export
Participation Participation Participation
Shipping price (Predicted) -1.573*** -1.533*** -1.545***
(0.146) (0.14) (0.137)
Tari -5.607*** -5.567*** -5.571***
(0.423) (0.421) (0.421)
Fixed Eects
Importer Y Y Y
Exporter Y Y Y
Sector N N N
Observations 20,223 20,223 20,223
R-Squared 0.416 0.416 0.415
Cross sectional logit estimations for year 2006. Errors are allowed to be correlated within
country pair clusters. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Constants included but not reported. Columns (1)-(3) follow from the respective OLS/IV
estimations presented in Table 3.1.
Rubinstein (2008). They are also lower in absolute value compared to Crozet & Koenig
(2010), who report an average coecient of 1:29, but the variance of the results across
sectors is large. The low marginal eects, yet signicant, could be attributed to the
imposed assumption for censoring the sample and/or the incidental parameter problem
resulting in biased and inconsistent coecients.
Bearing this in mind, it is concluded that increases in factory prices reduce shipping
prices by (   1)% and the probability to export increases following the decline in the
real price of transport. An increase in the quantity shipped induces greater scale eects,
reducing shipping prices and increasing the probability to export. A similar eect is
observed following a reduction in the distance to the destination. The indirect channel
of causation is not possible to be traced when estimating the impact of transport costs
using a distance-based measure as a proxy. The latter would have a direct impact as
taris exhibit in this specication.
The predicted probabilities corresponding to each column will be used as the dependent
variable in step 3, in order to obtain the magnitudes of

1+(+1)( 1) for each six digit
sector within a country pair.
 Step 3: Obtaining sectoral elasticities
Similarly to Crozet & Koenig (2010) the eect of distance and taris on the log prob-
ability to export is estimated utilising the importer-exporter-sector specic predicted
probabilities of the logit estimations. Estimating equation (3.13) for each four digit
sector yields a trade cost specic estimate of

1+(+1)( 1) that is common for each six
digit sector under the four digit heading.80 Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation
The procedure is applied to all variants of the log predicted probability distribution
stemming from the OLS and IV estimations, using a xed set of rules for all four digit
headings: First, regressions that have a p-value of the F-statistic greater than 5% are
removed from the sample as not being able to explain the variability in the data. Coef-
cients which have a p-value of the t-statistic greater than 5% are not considered.
The rst operation disregards 111 out of 358 observations on average across the three
experiments and the second disregards 160 observations. 87 elasticities remain, each
corresponding to a four digit heading. The results, plotted in panels 3.3-3.4 and 3.5-
3.7 indicate that the average elasticity is negative, inelastic and the distribution has
a thick left tail, which seems somewhat to support the theory. These remarks t the
tari elasticities of

1+(+1)( 1) more appropriately compared to the distance elasticities
which have 12 positive observations out of 87 (as opposed to 2 for taris). Plausible
explanations could be evidence of misspecication or measurement error arising from
the aggregation and the previous steps.
In panels 3.3-3.4, the mean of the distance specic distribution of 1
1+(+1)( 1) is -0.045
(standard deviation 0.23) while the corresponding values for the tari specic elasticities
in panels 3.5-3.7 are -0.17 (standard deviation .29).
The approach is reminiscent of Crozet & Koenig (2010) who utilise rm level data in
order to identify  across a set of commodity categories, where the mean value is 10.76
when imposing no assumption on transport technology except that it is constant returns
to scale. While the current procedure is not able to separately identify  and , the
estimated elasticity

1+(+1)( 1) of the two trade costs for each four digit heading could
be tested for their joint impact on trade ows after they are allocated to the respective
six digit sectors.Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation 81
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Figure 3.2: Stemming from OLS es-
timates of Table 3.1
Figure 3.3: Stemming from IV es-
timates with no overidentifying re-
strictions of Table 3.1
Figure 3.4: Stemming from IV esti-
mates with two overidentifying re-
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Figure 3.5: Stemming from OLS es-
timates of Table 3.1
Figure 3.6: Stemming from IV es-
timates with no overidentifying re-
strictions of Table 3.1
Figure 3.7: Stemming from IV esti-
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Table 3.3: Impacts on aggregate trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports
Tari -0.275*** -0.377*** -0.376*** -0.374***
(0.116) (0.126) (0.125) (0.127)
\ h

1+(+1)( 1)
i
bij
 Tari -0.583*** -0.67** -0.731**
(0.240) (0.206) (0.275)
Distance -0.747*** -0.758*** -0.767*** -0.759***
(0.211) (0.216) (0.214) (0.214)
\ h

1+(+1)( 1)
i
dij
 Distance -0.085 -0.127 -0.169
(0.417) (0.510) (0.508)
Fixed Eects
Importer Y Y Y Y
Exporter Y Y Y Y
Sector Y Y Y Y
Observations 5,063 5,063 5,007 5,091
R-Squared 0.526 0.527 0.526 0.53
Ho: 5 = 6 = 0 p-value 0 0 0
Ho: 7 = 8 = 0 p-value 0 0 0
Cross sectional OLS estimations for year 2006, monetary units are current U.S. Dollars.
Standard errors are allowed to be correlated within country pair clusters. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants included but not reported. Columns
(2)-(4) follow from columns (1)-(3) of Table 3.1.
 Step 4: Impacts on aggregate trade
By obtaining the estimated elasticities from the previous section, we can test whether
these have an impact on aggregate trade ows. The theoretical exposition asserts that
if there is any impact, in the sense that    1 is signicant as was conrmed in the
rst step, it should be negative and large. Therefore we expect a negative sign for the
interaction term coecients, however the magnitudes would be of no particular meaning.
In order to obtain a true magnitude of the elasticity, a methodology similar to Helpman,
Melitz & Rubinstein (2008) must be adopted using aggregate trade data. However if this
procedure had been followed we would not have been able to identify the composition
of the estimated elasticity and would be required to comment on the identication via
the elasticity's magnitude.
Instead, by estimating relationship (3.14) which is equivalent to that of Chaney (2005),
we observe if the identied elasticity

1+(+1)( 1) is quantitatively important. This is
done by using an interaction term of the elasticity variables with each trade cost and
then testing for the joint signicance of the interaction coecient with the respective
trade cost coecient.
Table 3.3 illustrates the ndings. In column (1) the impact of taris and distance
on export ows is shown. The elasticities are signicantly negative as economic theory84 Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation
predicts, yet the coecient of distance can be regarded as being relatively low, compared
to the sampled coecients of Disdier & Head (2008).22 In column (2) the interactions
are introduced which originate from column (1) of the rst step. While the theoretical
prediction might be conrmed for taris, the same does not apply for distance as the
interaction coecient is insignicant. The same observation holds for columns (3) and
(4) which consider the interaction variables that originate from the predicted values of
shipping prices net of simultaneity.
The null hypothesis that the elasticity

1+(+1)( 1) = 0 is rejected, which follows from
the outcomes of the joint hypotheses tests ^ 5 = ^ 6 = 0 and ^ 7 = ^ 8 = 0. The theoretical
prediction of the model at least for taris is thus conrmed. As the interaction coecient
of distance is insignicant, the result remains ambiguous for this variable.
Three general conclusions are reached. First, transportation matters: scale eects, dis-
tance, the factory prices of goods all seem to be elements of the marginal cost of shipping
with signicant eects. By using distance as a proxy for transport costs the empirical re-
searcher is ignoring transport technology (Hummels & Skiba 2004) and ensuing indirect
impacts on trade ows through the marginal cost of shipping.
Second, tari reductions and shipping prices jointly impact the range of goods traded.
Tari reductions increase the probability of a sector to commence exporting to a partic-
ular destination. If this event occurred with a time lag or in a previous period, unequiv-
ocally the quantity transported must have increased in subsequent periods. Gradually,
ceteris paribus, shipping prices are reduced (via step 1) increasing the probability to
export. Hence there are indirect eects captured by the specication that conrm a
perennial complementarity between taris and transport prices.
Third, the empirical strategy { albeit leading to results which need to be interpreted
with some caution due to the aggregation level used and the potential biased and in-
consistent estimates { seems to justify the high coecients of trade liberalisation events
or tari reductions when transport costs remain unmodelled. The identication chan-
nel becomes hazy by not incorporating further assumptions about transport technology.
The results presented herein are encouraging yet inconclusive. A validation or rejection
of the ndings could be attained by applying the procedure to a more disaggregated
dataset, ideally at the rm level where the assumption in step 2 would be redundant,
and a xed group size could be more achievable.
22These are displayed in Figure 1 of their study.Chapter 3 Firm Heterogeneity and Transportation 85
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper transport technology is embedded in the Chaney (2008) model of trade.
Transport rms provide services produced under increasing returns to scale, marginal
costs are partly determined by the magnitude of the factory prices of exported commodi-
ties, and transport rms allocate the same freight rate for a range of traded commodities
similar in their characteristics.
Trade liberalisation aects directly both trade margins as the standard model predicts.
Due to the specic transport technology, complementarity with shipping prices arises
creating indirect eects that propagate the impact of trade liberalisation. Extensive
margin growth prompts increases in the quantity transported, lowering per unit ship-
ping costs and the real shipping price. Should marginal costs of transport increase
however because of additional weight placed on the factory price of transported goods,
scale eects are dampened. By not assuming this interaction, standard trade models of
representative and heterogeneous rms are unable to identify and decompose direct and
indirect eects of trade liberalisation, resulting in observing large elasticities of import
demand.
It is conrmed empirically that both freight rates and taris aect exports and the
range of goods traded. An unequivocal rise in the quantity transported following a
tari reduction lowers the freight paid to transport rms, which is indeed stemmed if
the inuence of the factory price on the freight is large. It is inferred that there exists
a perennial complementarity between taris and freight rates, leading to an amplied
equilibrium elasticity of aggregate exports with respect to trade costs which is also
quantitatively important.
The overshooting of tari cuts' responses due to transport technology generate useful
considerations regarding trade policy. Gains from trade following liberalisation such as
extensive margin growth, reallocations of resources and increased eciency of rms, in-
novations for competing in larger markets (Melitz & Treer 2012), could be augmented
through the complementary eects of transport. Gains from trade that are foregone to
high transport costs that are attributed to low scale eects, as is the case of landlocked
countries, or poor infrastructure could be overturned through eective investment poli-
cies and/or reallocation of freed-up administrative resources that have resulted from
liberalisation itself (Limao & Venables 2001, Winters 2004).
Finally it is deduced that the complementarity of tari reductions and transport tech-
nology needs to be viewed as part of a greater set of adjustments explaining trade
growth such as income growth and convergence (Baier & Bergstrand 2001) and vertical
specialisation growth (Yi 2003). It thus still remains unclear what is the contribution
of transport cost reductions and trade liberalisation in explaining economic progress,
paving an avenue for future research.Chapter 4
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We highlight the importance of modeling nancial networks that represent real world
transaction systems relative to abstract articial topologies. In particular, by employing
a variation on so-called \knock-out" experiments, a form of simulation analysis fre-
quently used in the study of various complex networks, we show that the international
nancial network derived from the IMF Coordinated portfolio investment survey (2013)
displays characteristics that are similar to the class of robust-yet-fragile networks: That
is, the CPIS network is robust to random country default but fragile if subjected to a
targeted default of a highly connected country. Our simulations make use of an adapta-
tion of a commonly used model of contagion. Using this model we run a large collection
of default scenarios. The robust-yet-fragile nature of the network is further manifested
in the observation that failure of a peripheral country such as Greece can be absorbed by
the network in the next round under a range of loss rates, but combinations of periph-
eral shocks or default of a nancial centre increases the likelihood of observing cascades.
Over the years 2001{2007, we nd a marked rise in frequency and severity of default cas-
cades in the network followed by a decline over the period 2008{2009. Average contagion
levels in the network remain low over the same period.
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4.1 Introduction
The global nancial crises of the early twenty-rst century have made clear that the
increased interdependencies of national economies as brought about by globalisation and
the liberalisation of capital ows may contribute to the propagation of shocks across
the global nancial system, thereby leading to default cascades, which in turn often
require costly governmental interventions (Battiston, Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald &
Stiglitz 2012, Elliott, Golub & Jackson 2013) for their mitigation. At the heart of
this transmission mechanism lies the little understood causal link between the network
structure of nancial interdependencies, that not only enable risk sharing benets for
agents, but also raise the spectre of systemic risk, the risk that the whole system of
transactions fails (Lorenz, Battiston & Schweitzer 2009, Cabrales, Gottardi & Vega-
Redondo 2013, Caccioli, Farmer, Foti & Rockmore 2013).
Our paper quanties an aspect of this double-edged sword by bringing to bear simulation
tools to a specic network of nation-to-nation nancial relationships, as a means of
articulating the risk of failure of the international nancial system. In this way we add to
the body of work that is highlighting the importance for modeling specic networks that
characterise real world transaction systems relative to abstract articial topologies, when
examining how structural parameters could amplify or impede contagion channels (Nier,
Yang, Yorulmazer & Alentorn 2007, Gai & Kapadia 2010). This kind of work may in turn
suggest that incentives designed to safeguard nancial stability and reduce systemic risk
could be further rened by assimilating the inherent resilience of the underlying network
architecture (Elliott, Golub & Jackson 2013).
In particular, we employ data on nation-to-nation nancial exposures represented by the
IMF Coordinated portfolio investment survey (2013) to construct a network representing
international nancial dependence. We make use of a family of null models (ensembles
of networks that share aggregate various statistics of the given empirical network) to
study the stability of the CPIS network when subjected to shocks, represented by various
forms of default scenarios. Generally, we nd that the CPIS network can be classied as
robust with respect to the default of a random country but fragile in the face of default
of a highly connected country. The consequence is that the spread of losses across the
system following the default of a less connected or peripheral country can be absorbed
by the network in a short time frame, but various combinations of peripheral shocks
or default of a highly connected node { a nancial centre { raises the the likelihood of
observing default cascades of signicant intensity.
The network's robust-yet-fragile behaviour relative to these kinds of shocks is measured
in terms of the degree of degradation in network connectivity after removal of nodes and
is quantied via a network statistic such as the average shortest path length (Albert,Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network 89
Jeong & Barab asi 2000, Foti, Pauls & Rockmore 2013, Caccioli, Farmer, Foti & Rock-
more 2013). While this methodology has been applied in a variety of contexts,1 to our
knowledge it has not been implemented in a nancial system of transactions.
The robust-yet-fragile network characterisation is commonly associated with scale-free
or small world networks (Newman 2000). However, we do not nd the CPIS networks
(over the years 2001{2009) to share these properties, implying that they are part of a
new kind of robust-yet-fragile class.
This result is supported by the outcomes of related studies on empirical nancial net-
works. Boss, Elsinger, Summer & Thurner (2004) provide evidence that the Austrian
interbank market exhibits degree distributions that follow a power law, while Caccioli,
Farmer, Foti & Rockmore (2013) and Soram aki, Bech, Arnold, Glass & Beyeler (2007)
show that for the same network and its US counterpart respectively, these distributions
adhere roughly to power laws only in an interval of asset values. The German interbank
network considered in Craig & von Peter (2010), displays behaviour similar to a scale
free network due to its tiered structure, yet the authors reject the null of a theoretical
representation by a scale free network.
Our ndings are derived by utilising two key dimensions of the data. Based on Elliott,
Golub & Jackson (2013) we adopt the concepts of diversication and integration, per-
taining accordingly to how spread out are the cross-border holdings of each country in
the network and the total value of a country's cross-border holdings of another country's
assets. Controlling for integration levels, diversication is used to deduce the robust-
yet-fragile tendency of the network. Integration is invoked to yield the potential for
contagion given the annual diversication levels in the network.
Shocks to the network are propagated according to a dynamic contagion described in
Furne (2003) and Upper (2007) wherein a threshold on the size of its asset portfolio
and national income is used to assess whether a country's losses from exposure to the set
of defaulted partners can be absorbed. Conducting these experiments for each year in
our data (2001{2009) reveals a rise in fragility across 2001{2007, reected in an increase
in the severity of contagion and ensuing default cascades, followed by a decline in the
next two years. We also nd that average contagion levels in the network are low over
the same period. Such results are attributed to the robust-yet-fragile tendency of the
network implying that the likelihood of contagion is low and is aected by the location
of the shock. As an example, a default by a relatively small and peripheral country like
Greece can be absorbed but a combination of defaults or the failure of a nancial centre
can have widespread impacts for the global economy.
1Prominent examples are the world wide web (Albert, Jeong & Barab asi 2000), food webs (Dunne
2006), international trade (Foti, Pauls & Rockmore 2013), protein (Jeong, Mason, Barab asi & Oltvai
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Although simple, this model of contagion provides some basic insights on the propagation
of shocks arising from network structure that are in line with the most related studies
in this area. In particular, our conclusions are in line with those of Elliott, Golub
& Jackson (2013), where increases in integration are found to increase the probability
and extent of contagion. The more countries are diversied overall, the less likely that
systemic risk is found. It is because of the variation observed in the levels of integration
and diversication in the network, that central countries, which have sucient levels of
both, are resistant to peripheral shocks; yet they are not resistant to a failure of another
core country. We also nd that the probability and extent of contagion in response
to equal-sized shocks in the network varies with the location of the shock due to the
in-degree heterogeneity of the network. This result is substantiated in Gai & Kapadia
(2010) who study the impact of defaults in a dynamic network of interbank claims and
obligations as institutions respond to shocks, spurring direct and indirect channels of
contagion. With regard to the tiered networks2 in Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer & Alentorn
(2007), our analysis also suggests that peripheral shocks generate default cascades of
monotonically decreasing intensity when the degree of centrality increases. Since the
empirical degree distributions we consider do not change over time profoundly in order
to observe changes in centrality, the aforementioned authors' result that shocks in the
centre induce non-monotonic default cascades of increasing and then decreasing intensity
as the degree of centrality increases, cannot be conrmed empirically.
Our empirical study on network topology and contagion contributes to the literature by
enlarging the class of networks describing nancial systems to those exhibiting robust-
yet-fragile tendencies supporting the views expressed in Haldane (2009). Evidence for
such tendencies or the sucient condition of a tiered structure in these systems are
presented in Boss, Elsinger, Summer & Thurner (2004), Upper & Worms (2004), So-
ram aki, Bech, Arnold, Glass & Beyeler (2007), Craig & von Peter (2010), Puhr, Seliger
& Sigmund (2013) and Caccioli, Farmer, Foti & Rockmore (2013) for the banking sys-
tem while Schweitzer, Fagiolo, Sornette, Vega-Redondo, Vespignani & White (2009)
generalise appropriately for economic networks.
The simulations conducted herein solely focus on assessing the impact of topology on
contagion and could be enhanced by the introduction of accounting identities and/or
strategic interactions of agents.3 The potential and severity of contagion could then be
understood via the inuence of structural parameters given the specic topology as in
Furne (2003), Degryse & Nguyen (2004), van Lelyveld & Liedorp (2006), Nier, Yang,
Yorulmazer & Alentorn (2007), Gai & Kapadia (2010), Upper (2011)4, Gouri eroux,
2Networks where links are governed by node size and so rst tier or head institutions are connected
with each other and with second tier institutions but the latter exhibit limited connectivity between
them (Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer & Alentorn 2007).
3It can thus be perceived that systemic risk arises as a negative externality (Lorenz, Battiston &
Schweitzer 2009).
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H eam & Monfort (2012), Battiston, Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald & Stiglitz (2012) and
Georg (2013).
Finally we note that our paper considers network eects and abstains from modelling
network formation. Concerning network formation models in nance and banking, the
literature has advanced since the seminal study of Allen & Gale (2000) on the con-
tainment of systemic risk in complete versus incomplete networks, by incorporating a
range of articial networks through which contagion is studied. Representative exam-
ples are Leitner (2005), Gale & Kariv (2007), Babus (2006)5, Cohen-Cole, Patacchini
& Zenou (2011). In Acemoglu, Ozdaglar & Tahbaz-Salehi (2013), Cabrales, Gottardi
& Vega-Redondo (2013), Elliott, Golub & Jackson (2013), segmentation, variation in
shock size, integration and diversication respectively may lead to the formation of
robust-yet-fragile networks inter alia.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data
and procedures for constructing the international network of nancial exposures and
null models. Section 4.3 addresses the ability of the network to attenuate the impacts
of a defaulting country via the pattern of interconnectedness. Section 4.4 introduces
the model of contagion and illustrates the potential for default cascades stemming from
defaults of key countries in the network or combinations thereof. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Description and construction of the dataset
We construct the international nancial network utilising the IMF Coordinated portfolio
investment survey (2013) (CPIS). The Survey reports bilateral annual nancial ows
aggregated at the country level. Each country reports year end cross-border holdings of
portfolio investment6 assets, valued at market prices. These holdings are recorded in a
two dimensional matrix. An entry sij represents the year end value of portfolio assets
held by residents of a country i, the reporter, which have been issued by residents of
country j, the partner. We will say that an entry indicates a value of nancial exposure
of country i for assets purchased by country j. There are at most 73 reporters and 237
partners within a given year.
We consider only holdings of assets in the CPIS that are valued in excess of 500,000 US
dollars for the period 2001{2009. We restrict the dataset to reporting countries which
also have available GDP data for each year. This results in a subset of between 64
and 73 reporting countries per year. We then further restrict our attention to those
countries which are both reporters and asset holders, so that we obtain a square matrix
5A comprehensive survey of the application of networks in nance is Allen & Babus (2009).
6Portfolio investment is dened as cross-border transactions and positions involving debt or equity
securities, other than those included in direct investment or reserve assets (see the notes section of the
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of exposures for each year. Diagonal elements are zero i since the CPIS reports only
cross-border holdings of assets. Across the 2001{2009 time period, the resulting matrices
cover at least 97.4 percent of the total cross-border holdings of assets reported in the
CPIS, as shown in Table 4.1. The studied countries are presented in appendix C.1,
accompanied by summary statistics of their portfolio investments. GDP data come
from both the IMF World Economic Outlook databases (2013) and the World Bank
World Development Indicators (2013).
Table 4.1: Data coverage of square matrices per year
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Coverage 98.0% 98.2% 98.4% 98.8% 98.4% 97.9% 97.5% 97.8% 97.4%
Values indicate the percentage of observations in the CPIS that are present in each square matrix per
year.
Similarly to Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer & Alentorn (2007) we conceptualise the CPIS as a
network of nodes. Each node represents a country and an edge represents a directional
exposure between any two nodes. We construct two empirical networks dened by adja-
cency matrices A and B. For a given year, an edge in matrix At, t 2 f2001;:::;2009g,
is dened as
(At)ij =
(
1 if sij >
Pn
k6=i
sik
n 1;
0 otherwise,
where n is the number of countries, ranging between 64 to 73 depending on the year.
Thus (At)ij 6= 0 if country i is exposed to country j by more than the average exposure
observed in the square matrix corresponding to a particular year. An edge in Bt, t 2
f2001;:::;2009g, is dened as
(Bt)ij =
(
1 if
sij
Yi > ;
0 otherwise
where Yi is income of country i and   0:0417 is the mean income weighted nancial
exposure observed in the square matrices across the time period. Matrix B is intended
to augment the analysis on matrix A by taking into account the variation of income-
weighted exposure amongst countries.
Each empirical network is supplemented by ve comparison networks, or null models,
constructed algorithmically to capture dierent network structures. The rst of ve
comparison networks is an Erd os-R enyi network G1
(n;p) consisting of n nodes with
probability of edge formation between country i and j being p =  d=(n   1), where  d is
the average out-degree7 of an empirical network  2 fAt;Btg.
Comparison network G2
(n;pi) comprising n nodes, is described by a probability of edge
formation depending on country i's empirical out-degree, pi = dout
i =(n 1). Comparison
7The out (in)-degree of a node is its number of outgoing (incoming) edges (Jackson 2008).Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network 93
network G3
(n;pj) is formed by n nodes and a probability that depends on the empirical
in-degree of country j, pj = din
j =(n 1). These networks are constructed by generating a
random graph where a node's probability of edge formation is the number of outgoing or
incoming edges over the maximum outgoing or incoming edges observed in the empirical
network .
The fourth comparison network G4
(n;[in]i;[out]i) with n nodes, uses a probability of
edge formation that jointly depends on the empirical in- and out-degree of country i
in the empirical network . To generate G4
(n;[in]i;[out]i), we implement a rewiring
methodology described in Maslov & Sneppen (2002).
The second, third and fourth comparison networks do not follow the Erd os-R enyi model
as the probability of edge formation is not equal across nodes. Hence we will state that
for these comparison networks there is variation in the probability of edge formation.
In this respect our approach extends that of Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer & Alentorn (2007)
since the number of nodes and the probability of edge formation are not randomly
assigned - we use statistics derived from the empirical networks.
The fth comparison network is constructed by taking into account the log-normal dis-
tribution of portfolio asset values s in the nn matrix for each year. We estimate using
maximum likelihood the log-linear model
ln(sij) = i + j + ij
where i and j are country xed eects and the errors ij are independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) following a normal distribution with zero mean and constant
variance. In addition the errors are assumed to be orthogonal to i, j. This is motivated
by the least squares approximation
(n   1)(i + j) 
X
k6=i
lnsik +
X
k6=j
lnskj +
1
N
X
k6=l
lnsk
which explains around 75% of the variance of lnsij. We also make the semi-parametric
assumption that
ij  N (0;f (i + j));
where we estimate f non-parametrically with a Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression on
the squared residuals (Nadaraya (1964); Watson (1964)). The additional exibility on
f is crucial since the variance estimates aect the expected arithmetic mean of sij: An
unconditional model would predict asset exposure magnitudes larger for the right end
of the distribution. Lastly, we account for the discreteness and the left-censoring of sij,
since sij is rounded to the nearest million, by simulating i:i:d: errors as vij  U ( 0:5;0:5)
and estimate the model 10,000 times for lnjsij + vijj averaging the results. Obtaining
predicted values of ,  and f we are able to construct G5
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4.3 Robustness
Motivated by recent concerns over the implications following the insolvency of South
European countries, we ask how robust is the international nancial network to a se-
quence of random or specic defaults. Robustness pertains to the ability of the network
structure to attenuate the impacts of a defaulting country via the pattern of intercon-
nectedness of its nodes: Ceteris paribus, if a country's partner exogenously defaults
the impact is mitigated when the reporter is highly interconnected. Holding constant
the total value of holdings, the burden suered from exposure is low compared to a
less interconnected country exposed to the same default (Allen & Gale (2000); Battis-
ton, Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald & Stiglitz (2012); Cabrales, Gottardi & Vega-Redondo
(2013)). To this end, we conduct simulations that measure and compare the change
in interconnectedness following random and non-random defaults in the empirical and
null networks. Thus we are able to analyse the robustness of the international nancial
network that is borne from its structure.
4.3.1 Methodology
We assume that country j's removal from a particular empirical or comparison network
is caused by its idiosyncratic default. This default is considered exogenous to the model
and can be regarded as the aggregate observable outcome following an unobservable
economic shock in the country's interior. It is also assumed that this default is not the
consequence of previous rounds of defaults in the network; therefore the model is static
and does not require the modelling of contagious eects. This assumption is relaxed in
the next section.
Following Albert, Jeong & Barab asi (2000) we measure the change in a network statistic
that captures interconnectedness, caused by successive removal of nodes. Nodes can
be removed either by random or preferential selection (termed an error and attack
respectively). The sequence of attacks is ordered by decreasing node importance, where
importance is expressed via a node's sum of in- and out-degrees.
Node removals alter a network's structure which aects its statistics. We measure the
change in the average shortest path length statistic -the average distance between all
pairs- as a function of errors or attacks via the following channel of causation: The aver-
age path length depends on the degree distribution of a network (Jackson 2008) and the
latter is governed by the variation in the probability of edge formation (Albert, Jeong &
Barab asi 2000). And so one expects to observe dierent impacts on the average short-
est path length depending on the structure of the respective empirical and comparison
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The average shortest path length serves in our study as a proxy for the diversication of
nancial claims in the network. Similarly to Elliott, Golub & Jackson (2013) diversi-
cation is dened as how spread out are the cross-border holdings of each country in the
network.8 A low shortest path length indicates high diversication of countries as each
is exposed to many others and vice versa. In the aforementioned paper the additional
dimension of integration is introduced, referring to the level of exposure of one node to
another. In our set-up for identifying robustness the level of exposure, in other words
the level of integration, is held constant above the empirical networks' mean thresholds.
Our simulations consist of the following steps.
a. For the error part, choose an empirical network  2 fAt;Btg:
i) For a particular year t 2 [2001;:::;2009], remove successively 25 nodes at
random without replacement. Measure the average shortest path length of
the network after each removal. Conduct 2000 independent trials of this
process.
ii) Repeat step i) for all years.
iii) Calculate the mean and standard deviation of the 2000  9 average shortest
path length observations for every node removal.
iv) Repeat steps i), ii) and iii) for each comparison network Gz
;z 2 [1;:::;5].
b. For the attack part, choose an empirical network  2 fAt;Btg:
i) For a particular year t 2 [2001;:::;2009], remove successively the most im-
portant 25 nodes by descending order without replacement. Measure the
average shortest path length of the network after each removal.
ii) Repeat step i) for all years.
iii) Repeat steps i) and ii) for each comparison network Gz
;z 2 [1;:::;5].
In our simulations as the average shortest path length statistic grows following removals
of nodes, its interpretation becomes more adverse. In addition not all pairs of nodes have
paths between them. We thus create a modied average shortest path length (mASPL)
by placing an upper bound on the shortest path length: We replace observations with
path length greater than three as having path length four. We also tracked the evolution
of simpler statistics. The fraction of shortest path lengths equal to or less than two
yielded qualitatively similar results. Utilising the harmonic mean path length without
applying any censoring on the path lengths validated the ndings presented below.
8Similar notions are described in Allen & Gale (2000), von Peter (2007), Allen & Babus (2009) and
Weistroer & Jochen (2010).96 Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network
Figure 4.1: Evolution of average shortest path length for empirical networks of
the A type
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4.3.2 Results
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 exhibit the evolution of the mASPL as a function of errors and
attacks. The rst panels in both gures correspond to empirical networks A and B
respectively. These depict the mASPL attributed to errors in blue by plotting the mean
and standard deviation of the 9 years  2000 independent observations. The mASPL
observations caused by attacks are plotted in red, where each curve corresponds to a
sampled year. Subsequent panels superimpose the mASPL under errors in yellow and
attacks in black for each null model by plotting the mean and standard deviations.
Two main results emerge from our simulations. First the empirical networks exhibit
characteristics associated with the robust-yet-fragile class of networks. Second we are
able to identify the presence of nancial centres in the international nancial network
due to variation in the sum of in- and out-degrees which determine node importance.
For the sequence of errors we observe across the empirical and comparison networks in
Figure 4.1 that the mASPL is monotonically weakly increasing on average. Concerning
the Erd os-R enyi model in the second panel, this result is explained by the constant prob-
ability of edge formation which is a function of the average out-degree of the empirical
network. As nodes have approximately the same out-degree there is equal contribution
to the network's mASPL (Albert, Jeong & Barab asi 2000). Due to the lack of variationChapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network 97
Figure 4.2: Evolution of average shortest path length for empirical networks of
the B type
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in the probability of edge formation we expect that this result would also hold when
we proceed to successive attacks. Preferentially removing nodes by order of importance
indeed does not have a signicantly more adverse impact than the random removal of a
node. Only after removing about 15 percent of the network's nodes the impact becomes
signicantly more pronounced.
Focusing on the empirical network, errors do not noticeably aect the mASPL. Yet
attacks have a starkly dierent impact. Removing the most important node increases the
path length sharply; subsequent attacks increase the path length with an ever decreasing
rate implying also variation in importance. This nding can be explained by a tiered
organisation of the nancial network: Under errors, there is increased probability that a
defaulting country is characterised by relatively low connectivity which has little eect on
the mASPL. On the contrary when a highly connected country defaults, the implications
can be substantial. The nancial network becomes increasingly disconnected since the
mASPL increases, yet this will occur with low probability unless there is a preferential
removal.
The default of an important country due to an attack aects other countries via the
direction of exposure. If its importance is driven by its in-degree then most countries in
the network are exposed to its default and vice versa. The third and fourth panels of98 Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network
Figure 4.1 support this case. The empirical network is better approximated by a random
graph with variation in the probability of edge formation that is associated with j's in-
degree rather than i's out-degree. The implication is that most countries in the network
are exposed to an important partner. It then depends on whether these countries are
suciently diversied and/or less integrated with j in order to mitigate the impact of
the latter's potential default. The third panel indicates that the diversication level
of the empirical network's majority is low compared to the null model. Therefore the
magnitude of the impact following a default depends on the level of integration which
we explore in the next section.
We conclude that the international nancial network is robust in the sense that it exhibits
a tolerance against a random default of a country. In expectation this country is one with
low diversication of exposures mainly directed to the network's important countries.
But it is also fragile because of the network's inherent variation in importance which
induces the tier structure (Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer & Alentorn 2007). The default of an
important country can generate widespread impacts across the network, because of the
relatively low diversication of countries in the periphery.
Figure 4.2 further conrms the robust-yet-fragile nature of the international nancial
network. The empirical network of the rst panel depicts error and attack characteristics
similar to those of Figure 4.1. The random and preferential removals of nodes in the
Erd os-R enyi model of the second panel are signicantly dierent at a much smaller
fraction however, at about 7 percent of removed nodes. The remaining null models
show results that lie in between the empirical and the Erd os-R enyi counterparts.
The third and fourth panels of Figure 4.1 provided evidence that the degree distribution
of the empirical network can be approximated better by the variation in countries' in-
degree rather than their out-degree. Regarding the simulation outcomes of Figure 4.2
this result cannot be veried due to the very close performance of the second and third
null models which replicate the empirical network reasonably well. These experiments
indicate that most countries are exposed to an important partner as is the case with
Figure 4.1. In addition, when employing income-weighted exposures, we document that
importance is also governed by the out-degree implying that important reporters are
exposed to peripheral partner countries. The joint inuence of both out- and in-degree
variation becomes evident in the fth panel of Figure 4.2 were the null model replicates
the empirical network most accurately.
The characteristics of the two empirical nancial networks A and B as well as the null
models that are governed by variation in the probability of edge formation are consistent
with those of the broad class of robust-yet-fragile networks as detailed by Albert, Jeong
& Barab asi (2000), Newman (2003) and Doyle, Alderson, Li, Low, Roughan, Shalunov,
Tanaka & Willinger (2005). On the contrary, networks which have a constant probabil-
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from the underlying scale-free degree distribution of a network, the reverse is not always
true (Foti, Pauls & Rockmore 2013). Scale free networks incorporate two key compo-
nents of self-organisation: growth and preferential attachment. Growth is achieved by
new nodes connecting to already existing nodes because of the latter's degree of connec-
tivity (Albert, Jeong & Barab asi 2000, Wang & Chen 2003). Our experiments abstain
from modelling preferential attachments as edges are encoded based on exogenous arti-
cial thresholds of the (weighted) value of exposures. We do not document connectivity
distributions that conform to a power law.9 But a sucient condition associated with
observing a robust-yet-fragile network, the presence of heavy tails in the degree distri-
bution (Caccioli, Farmer, Foti & Rockmore 2013), is upheld. Thus our results introduce
a novelty as we are able to classify an empirical non scale-free directed network using
error and attack simulations, in the class of robust-yet-fragile networks that are most
commonly associated with, but not restricted to, scale-free networks.
A corollary of our ndings, similar to Boss, Elsinger, Summer & Thurner (2004), is
that we are able to identify the existence of nancial centres in the empirical network.
A targeted node removal induces higher mASPL's because of the existence of nancial
centres, otherwise targeted and random removals would have no statistically signicant
dierence unless the fraction of nodes already removed is very large. This is particularly
reected in the fourth panel of Figure 4.1 as the null model with variation in proba-
bility of edge formation that depends on the in-degree of country j approximates the
behaviour of the empirical network. Hence countries with low diversication are more
likely to be exposed to a few partners in the network. These few on the contrary have
high diversication of exposure since assets are purchased from similar countries and/or
partners with low diversication, which can be justied by the underlying dierences in
the size and income distributions among countries (Boss, Elsinger, Summer & Thurner
2004).
4.3.3 Discussion
Our approach builds on the empirical section of Gai & Kapadia (2010) who consider only
random selection of defaulting banks, corresponding to the error part of our methodol-
ogy. We are also able to deduce the impact on network resilience when highly intercon-
nected countries are removed by descending order.10 By allowing for variation in the
probability of edge formation we are also extending the work of Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer
& Alentorn (2007) on the impact of network structure on the likelihood of contagious
events. The null networks we examine encompass the random graph and are allowed to
9This statement is supported with evidence provided in Appendix C.2.
10Their robust-yet-fragile denition of a nancial system however, diers to ours as it arises from
changes in a bank's in-degree which govern its solvency condition. Subsequently changes in the average
degree of the network determine the probability and extent of contagion which is found to be non-
monotonic. Thus a priori indistinguishable shocks to the network may create varying realisations of
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be inhomogeneous that is, the (minority) majority of nodes have a (large) small number
of edges. Craig & von Peter (2010) yield an equivalent outcome to ours, as the German
interbank network exhibits a tiered structure which is however formed by a set of core
banks acting as intermediaries.11 Structurally our results coincide since central nodes
may transact with other central nodes and/or with peripheral institutions but rarely
are peripheral institutions suciently diversied. Yet due to the nature of our data
we are not in the position to identify whether the observed tiering, and subsequently
the robust-yet-fragile behaviour of the network, is induced by intermediation or other
factors.
The adherence of the international network of exposures to the tiered network structure
neither implies nor motivates a remedial approach of proposing topologically denser,
relatively complete networks as a means to diversify systemic risk. The network we doc-
ument departs from the stylised articial depictions of complete/incomplete and money
centre networks featured in the strand of the literature with representative contributions
by Allen & Gale (2000), Leitner (2005) and Gale & Kariv (2007). Craig & von Peter
(2010) state that there must be economic reasons behind the self-formation of such real
world networks into tiered network structures. They propose amongst others that indi-
vidual bank balance sheet variables explain the network positioning of banks. Battiston,
Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald & Stiglitz (2012) put forward that the degree of heterogene-
ity in robustness for nancial institutions as measured through their respective equity
ratios, results in higher systemic risk with increased connectivity. Schweitzer, Fagiolo,
Sornette, Vega-Redondo, Vespignani & White (2009) warn of unpredictable implica-
tions following the simultaneous removal of more than one nodes in relatively complete
networks.
Our ndings motivate an empirical study of nancial contagion embedding a robust-
yet-fragile network. The aim is to signify the importance of considering the underlying
network structure when studying contagion eects rather than adopting ex ante homoge-
neous network structures (Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer & Alentorn 2007) or rigid topologies
whose insights may not generalise well as mentioned in Gai & Kapadia (2010) and Upper
(2011).
We conclude our identication of robustness in the international nancial network by
providing formal tests on whether the modied average path length as well as ve ad-
ditional network statistics for the empirical networks behave as outliers within the null
model families. For each empirical network A, B we generated 10,000 networks of the
null model Gz
;z 2 [1;:::;5] across the time period. Then for each A, B we construct
95% condence intervals for the mASPL, the fraction of shortest path lengths less than
or equal to 2 and 3, network assortativity and the average clustering coecient. Table
4.2 summarises how often the empirical networks produced measures below (negative)
11That is, acting both as a lender and borrower in the interbank market (Craig & von Peter 2010).Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network 101
Table 4.2: 95% condence interval for network measures
Erd os-R enyi Out-Degree In-Degree Rewiring Log-Normal
Network Measure A B A B A B A B A B
Fraction of SP2 -1 -1 -1 0 -0.79 -0.33 -1 -0.56 0 -0.11
Fraction of SP3 -1 -1 -1 -0.33 -1 -0.78 -1 -0.56 -0.11 -0.67
Modied ASPL 1 1 1 0.33 0.89 0.78 1 0.67 0 0.44
Assortativity -1 -1 -1 -0.89 1 -0.89 1 0.78 0.11 0
Avg. Clustering Coecient 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -0.22 1 0
Pr(i ! kji ! j ^ j ! k) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fraction of number of years in which the respective empirical network measure was below (negative) or above (positive)
the 95% condence interval for each comparison network. The Modied ASPL indicates the average shortest path length
censored at path length four. Assortativity and the average clustering coecient measures were derived following the
Matlab algorithms of the Brain connectivity toolbox (2013).
or above (positive) these condence intervals. The results support several of our conjec-
tures presented above. We nd that the average path length of the empirical network
family B is indeed best matched using the fourth null model. Yet none of the compar-
ison networks can account for all the listed statistics. Notably and implicitly seeking
the presence of intermediation discussed above, the last measure being the probability
that country i has a path to k conditional on i having a path to j and j having a path
to k is above the condence intervals of all null models for all years and specications.
Hence the null models' rst-order statistics appear unable to account for several relevant
characteristics of the empirical network structure.
4.4 Contagion
Our approach so far considered a static environment where, under varying network
topologies, nodes were removed randomly or selectively in order to identify the robust-
ness of the international nancial network. The analysis focused on measuring the
change in the level of diversication of countries holding constant their level of integra-
tion above two particular thresholds. In this section we study how the level of exposure
of a reporter to a specic partner could trigger a default cascade following the latter's
default, by taking each node's diversication pattern as given. Modelling a dynamic in-
terdependence between countries via the level of integration allows us to document the
network's robustness to contagion, or contagion potential, following both idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks, given the robust-yet-fragile topology.
4.4.1 Methodology
We adopt the methodology described in Furne (2003) and Upper (2007) for modelling
contagion in the banking system following an initial shock which is propagated by the102 Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network
level of interbank exposures. Our simulations consist of the following steps.
a. A specic country j in the international nancial network, or combination thereof,
is added exogenously to a set D, which is initially empty. Elements of this set
represent countries which have defaulted on their obligations against claims issued
by reporter country i = 2 D.
b. Any country exposed to the failed node will also default if its exposure exceeds some
fraction of i) its total exposure to partners and ii) its national income. Formally,
Defaulti =
(
1 if
P
j2D sij > LGD1 
PN
j=1 sij and
P
j2D sij > LGD2  Yi
0 otherwise
where 0  LGDl  1, l = f1;2g, is an exogenous constant inverse loss-given-
default,12 or inverse loss rate (Upper & Worms 2004), reecting a country's ability
to absorb losses relative to its portfolio (l = 1) and national income (l = 2).
c. The set D is updated to incorporate the identity of defaulted countries and the
process repeats from step b until no additional countries fail the threshold.
We then recover the sequence of defaults in each round thus identifying how the pattern
of interconnectedness of the network contributes to the default cascade for specic loss-
given-default rates.
4.4.2 Results
Our simulations show, using a combination of loss absorbing threshold scenarios, that the
network exhibits increased fragility over time with respect to the failure of key countries
and combinations thereof. We are able to rank such countries and combinations by their
frequency of participation in a worst case default cascade.
Setting both the inverse loss rates to 10% and choosing an initial default of any South
European country for year 2007 results in a single default in the next round and the
process terminates. However using the same loss rates and assuming the initial aggregate
default of Greece and Ireland triggers six rounds of default sequences - a default cascade.
Figure 4.3 exhibits the contagion and ensuing default cascade in the international -
nancial network for this particular example. The eight panels in this gure show the
defaulting countries in each round stemming from the initial assumption. The default-
ing countries are displayed in black before being removed in the subsequent panel. For
graphical clarity only edges with asset exposure above 5.81% of the reporter's GDP are
displayed in the gure, where 5.81% is average exposure in the network for 2007.
12There is some abuse of notation here imposed for clarity.Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network 103
Western European countries are rst aected and therefore default as they fail both
thresholds, followed by the United States. Since the in-degree of the latter is high,
once the United States are aected, contagion spreads to the rest of the world. In
the nal round corresponding to the last panel of the gure, one observes only a set of
developing countries emerging unscathed from the cascade as their exposure is relatively
small relative to their respective GDP. The transition from the fourth to the fth panel
illustrates the consequences of the network's robust-yet-fragile nature. The spread of
defaults is initially conned to peripheral countries or territories. Yet once a node having
a high degree such as France is reached and fails the threshold then the supported cluster
comprising most Western European countries collapses in the next round.
Thus the network proves to be robust to contagion when failures of countries which
have relatively low diversication occur in the sense that contagion is contained in the
periphery because of the structure. The presence of a cluster of countries which is
relatively more diversied increases the likelihood of contagion. If a country in this
cluster fails the threshold, the results tend to be severe depending on the size of the
cluster itself (Gai & Kapadia 2010).104 Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network
Figure 4.3: Exogenous default of Greece and Ireland in 2007Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network 105
Nodes are colour coded by geographical region according to the United Nations composition of macro geographical
(continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings (2013).106 Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network
We run a set of simulations using a range of values for the inverse loss rates and pooling
the data across years. We consider all possible model specications with LGD1 and
LGD2 2 f0;0:1;0:25;0:5;0:75g whilst we exclude the trivial case of LGD1 = LGD2 = 0.
For each inverse loss rate value and year, all possible combinations of one, two and three
countries are examined. We then calculate the mean, the mean of the worst 5% and
the worst case default cascades in the international nancial network, measured as the
fraction of countries that eventually default after each simulation.
Figure 4.4 summarises these ndings. Each row of panels corresponds to the number
of assumed initial defaults with columns representing the average contagion, the mean
of the worst 5% and the worst case defaults respectively. For a given year the vertical
axis of each plot indicates the severity of a default cascade, ranked from high to low, as
measured by the fraction of countries that default.13
The experiments reveal an increase in fragility, as the severity of worst case default
cascades increases from 2001 until 2007. Most notably the combinations of LGD1 and
LGD2 that produce a worst case default cascade aecting more than 55% of the network
doubles in 2006 and 2007. This result could be attributed to the fact that securitisation
was reaching its peak during the period (Acharya, Philippon, Richardson & Roubini
2009, Brunnermeier 2009) and by extrapolation diversication and integration levels
increased. Not surprisingly, the ndings document the subsequent decline in the number
and level of exposures following the summer of 2007. We observe lower frequencies of
default cascades since the simulations do not account for already incurred losses. Our
model is static in its time dimension by not including incurred losses originating from the
previous period. Incorporating such losses in the dynamic process provides an interesting
extension as the inverse loss rates would be endogenised.
The average contagion level remains very limited in its extent across years pointing
to the characteristic robustness of this particular network. Combined with the worst
case contagion cases depicted in panels of the second and third columns, our ndings
suggest that the likelihood of contagion may be indeed low, due to robustness, but with
widespread impacts if diversication in the periphery and/or integration levels increase
or when a nancial centre defaults.
We recover the individual countries and combinations of two and three thereof which
participate in the worst case default cascades after each simulation in Table 4.3. The
prevalence of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany are evident due to
their increased degree, acting as nancial centres. Yet the prominence of the Cayman
Islands and Luxembourg as well as IMF classied emerging economies such as Brazil
in joint failures with the United States reveal the intricacy of asset transfers oshore14
13This implies that the loss rates are not constant across the horizontal axis.
14We use the IMF Classication of oshore nancial centres (2000).Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network 107
Figure 4.4: Summary of default cascades across years
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and the improved net foreign position of emerging economies.15 The implication is that
such countries, given an initial exogenous default of a third country, have the ability to
amplify the default cascade due to their relatively high degrees. This takes place within
their own cluster of inuence which encompasses geographically proximal countries.
15See Rose & Spiegel (2007) for a comprehensive study of oshore nancial centres and Lane & Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) for a treatise on the positions of emerging economies, both employing (but not limited
to) the IMF Coordinated portfolio investment survey (2013)108 Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network
Table 4.3: Top 10 most contagious countries
One Initial Default Instances Two Initial Defaults Instances Three Initial Defaults Instances
United States 0.938 United Kingdom United States 0.523 Germany United Kingdom United States 0.347
United Kingdom 0.288 Brazil United States 0.486 Brazil United Kingdom United States 0.309
Cayman Islands 0.276 Germany United States 0.344 Brazil Germany United States 0.283
Germany 0.247 Turkey United States 0.307 Brazil Turkey United States 0.271
Luxembourg 0.247 Indonesia United States 0.302 France United Kingdom United States 0.267
France 0.226 France United States 0.29 Brazil Russia United States 0.266
Brazil 0.214 Russia United States 0.271 Brazil Poland United States 0.257
Italy 0.205 Italy United States 0.269 Brazil Indonesia United States 0.255
Netherlands 0.205 South Korea United States 0.266 Brazil Colombia United States 0.255
Japan 0.2 Australia United States 0.266 Germany Italy United States 0.253
The countries and combinations thereof are ranked by the percentage of times they appeared in the worst cases of contagion in the network amongst the
576 simulation attempts.
4.4.3 Discussion
Our methodology proposes a way of identifying the consequences of a particular pattern
of interconnectedness based on a real world complex network. In agreement to Boss,
Elsinger, Summer & Thurner (2004), we advocate the use of a more realistic class of
networks when modelling interbank or inter-institutional relationships, relying less on
abstract structures. Our simulations revealing the contagion potential in a robust-yet-
fragile network has yielded meaningful answers concerning the dissipation of shocks, a
topic which is assuming centre-stage in policy debate as highlited in Gai & Kapadia
(2010) and Haldane (2009). While we did not set out to address specic policy recom-
mendations, a corollary of our results is that proposed incentives designed to safeguard
nancial stability and reduce systemic risk may be further rened by assimilating the
inherent resilience of the underlying network architecture (Elliott, Golub & Jackson
2013).
The systemic risk observed in our results is the macroscopic outcome of a system gov-
erned by interactions at the micro-level (Lorenz, Battiston & Schweitzer 2009). In this
regard, our experiments may not immediately make clear how the spread of contagion
and subsequent default sequences could generalise when modelling an international sys-
tem of transactions. Intuitively one should expect an amplication or a dampening of
the spread depending on the respective model's structural parameters taking the par-
ticular network as given, which constitutes an avenue for future research. For example
Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer & Alentorn (2007) consider the ceteris paribus impacts of cap-
italisation, the size of interbank exposures, concentration and connectivity. Mart nez-
Jaramillo, P erez, Embriz & Dey (2010) mention that topology is indeed a necessary but
not sucient condition to prove that any system is more robust or fragile as a whole
compared to alternatives. It would further depend on the probability distribution of
shocks, the size of the losses, the probability of joint failures which dene the distribu-
tion of losses in the system. Once this distribution is obtained, then one would be able
to comment on the specic benets of particular topologies.Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network 109
Figure 4.5: Summary of default cascades stemming from Ireland and south
European Countries
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4.4.4 A Thought Experiment
The recent concerns relayed by media over the solvency of Ireland and the South Euro-
pean countries motivate a restrictive study of the implications following their idiosyn-
cratic or aggregate defaults. Using the 2007 network of exposures we carry out a set of
simulations assuming initial defaults of an individual country and combinations of two
and three thereof. We set the inverse loss rates to LGD1 2 [0;0:2] with increments of
0.004 and LGD2 2 [0;0:5] with increments of 0.01.
The heat graph in Figure 4.5 illustrates the results, where each panel corresponds to an
initial default permutation. For each panel, the vertical and horizontal axes represent
the magnitudes of LGD1 and LGD2 respectively. Across loss rates, a default by Spain
yields the highest fraction of defaulting countries in the network compared to Ireland,110 Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network
Portugal and Greece which follow in ranking. Ireland and Spain's joint default induces
the highest frequency of default cascades among any two combinations whilst we observe
an equivalent outcome after the inclusion of Greece. Holding constant LGD2, there is
a unique LGD1 threshold above which a defaulting cascade aecting over 80 percent of
countries in the network is generally the norm. Controlling LGD1, our ndings show a
graduated behaviour in terms of number of defaults, steadily decreasing as the threshold
increases.
4.5 Conclusion
Our paper contributes to the identication of repercussions stemming from defaults in
a particular network topology in two ways.
We rst show that the international network of nancial exposures aggregated at the
country level exhibits a robust-yet-fragile tendency, a natural occurrence arising in many
real world complex networks. This is achieved by comparing the empirical network with
a set of comparison networks each modelled assuming a specic probability of link for-
mation. All networks are subjected to the (non) random removals of nodes without
replacement in each network. Robustness is observed in the event of a random default
and fragility following the non-random default of countries, because of the underlying
variation in diversication, which tends to be low on average. Consequently, the ex-
istence of nancial centres in the network is conrmed. We do not nd evidence that
the robust-yet-fragile classication of the nancial network arises because the network
is scale free, expanding the types of networks that can be admitted to such a class.
Our ndings motivate, in accordance with Boss, Elsinger, Summer & Thurner (2004),
a reduction in the size of candidate networks for theoretical modelling of interbank or
nancial interdependencies in the presence of other structural parameters.
Second, we investigate the spread of contagious defaults given the robust-yet-fragile
empirical network, using the level of integration of countries. Constructing default
scenarios that are motivated by the recent sovereign debt crises of South European
countries and Ireland, our simulations document a mitigated impact isolated in the
periphery. If a highly connected country fails the exogenous exposure threshold, the
cluster it supports defaults in the next round. Models that assume low thresholds
for the spread of contagion predict that default of a combination of South European
countries may be similarly severe. Importantly we nd that from 2001 until the eve of
the nancial crisis the fragility of the empirical network increased as there is a wider
range of thresholds that result in a worst case default cascade, but decreased from 2008
onwards. Throughout the period average contagion levels remain low indicating the
network's robustness.Chapter 4 Robustness and Contagion in the International Financial Network 111
The dierent analytical tools all highlight the key importance of the United States
and the centrality of European countries. The only countries relatively unaected by
such global nancial crises seem to be middle income countries, whose external nancial
assets are relatively small as a share of their GDP. A more rened understanding of these
results and the further study of systemic risk in the global economy could be achieved by
modelling a system of transactions and endogenising the particular network structure.
We leave this as a suggestion for future advances in the area.Chapter 5
Conclusion
This Thesis contributes to the international trade literature by merging the body of work
concerning transport costs with that of general equilibrium models of trade in order to
identify the causal eects behind two empirically observed phenomena.
First, what are the reasons underpinning transport hub formations in international
trade? It is deduced that a trade o between increasing marginal and decreasing xed
costs -implying the existence of increasing returns to scale in transportation- together
with geographical centrality of particular areas are sucient determinants for a hub
port to emerge. Therefore concentration of production, created by historical incidence,
although reinforces the hub eect, is not found to be a primary determinant thus ex-
plaining why some less developed regions of the world obtain hub status. The theory
is conrmed empirically by innovatively introducing an origin-destination travelled dis-
tance variable which is interacted with a hub area variable and benchmarked against
the classic measure of exogenous trade costs, great circle distance. It is found that the
former has a lower marginal eect than the latter.
Second, it is asked whether the enormous trade growth is commensurate with only a small
(11 per cent) decrease in taris over the period. Taking into consideration the prevailing
views documented in the literature, it is proposed that there exists a complementarity
between trade liberating policies and shipping prices due to the introduction of transport
technology. The increased range and quantity of goods transported because of a decline
in an articial barrier, reduce the shipping price to the destination. Yet this reduction
might be alleviated by increasing markups or insurance/packaging costs that aect in
the opposite way the shipping price, reconciling the theory with the published facts on
the non-reduction of shipping prices over the previous 5 decades. Empirical evidence
provided herein supports the proposition.
In a distinct chapter, a simulation engine is developed to infer the topology of the
international network of nancial exposures at the country level. Uniquely, the robust-
yet-fragile classication of the nancial network does not arise because the network is
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scale free, broadening the types of networks that can be admitted to this classication.
Given the structure, it is illustrated how defaults of peripheral countries can create con-
tagion events that are contained in the periphery of the network but failure of a nancial
centre can amplify the spread of contagion in the network. Such ndings warrant a more
realistic representation of real world networks relative to abstract articial topologies
in order to examine the impact of structural parameters such as capitalisation, concen-
tration, the size of interbank exposures and associated losses in propagating nancial
contagion. A way forward becomes the embedding of such parameters that determine
the default of a nancial institution in a robust-yet-fragile network in order to infer their
individual contribution to contagion cascades in the presence of an inherent resilience
to contagion emanating from the network itself.
Promising avenues for future research that stem from the ndings and conclusions of
the Thesis, are concerned with a structural representation of transport costs in models
of international trade either in a multiplicative or additive formulation. Specically
Hendricks, Piccione & Tan (1995) document how economies of density form as marginal
costs of transport decline in the volume of passengers travelling on a route which could
also be hypothesised, after empirical corroboration, for the carriage of goods. Additional
analysis is required to be conducted on the functional form of a hub indicator and its
correlation with the level of marginal and xed costs of transport, where data paucity
becomes the primary hurdle.
The proposition of complementarity between tari and shipping price reductions leads
naturally to a re-examination of the contribution of determinants that explain trade
growth. Baier & Bergstrand (2001) do not consider adjustments in transportation tech-
nology or correlation between shipping prices with taris, reporting that the former has
had small impact on the growth of world trade, relative to other determinants including
tari reductions. Endogenising the proposed complementarity in their model could yield
alternative observations on the contribution of trade growth determinants which could
then support the views of Bernhofen, El-Sahli & Kneller (2013) who attribute a very
large portion of trade growth to adjustments in transport technology.Appendix A
A.1 Proof of eciency and pairwise stability of network
formations
A.1.1 Eciency
Based on the denitions of Jackson & Wolinsky (1996), each graph g has a value y :
fgjg  gNg ! R, where y 2 Y is the set of functions. The value is an aggregate of
individual exporting rm values yj(g) =
P
i:ij2g vij(g), where vij : fgjg  gNg ! R is a
net benet value. The graph g  gN is ecient if yj(g)  yj(g0) for all g0  gN.
Case 1, Direct Trading vs Autarky: G = fgij = f12;21g;g0
ij = f;gg| The
simplest case shows how forming a direct link is more ecient than not forming a link.
Firm prots and utility increases as long as the benet of forming a link exceeds its cost
for countries 1 and 2. Due to symmetry, global utility and rm prots (until the trade
equilibrium restores prots to zero) increase:
y1(g) = (   c12) = (   c21) > 0;when  > cij
Case 2, Direct Trading vs Indirect Trading: G = fgij = f12;21;13;31;23;32g;
g0
ij = f13;31;23;32gg| In the case of the direct links network with three countries
trading, direct connections are more ecient than indirect connections and no trading
at all. Denote the graphs originating from direct trading between any integer pair
fi;jg 2 [1;3] as gD. For pairs that are indirectly trading denote their graph as gI.
Therefore in case (i) of the Proposition, country 1 obtains from trading to 2 and 3:
y1(gD) = (   c13) + (   c12) >    c13 + 2 = y1(gI)
Country 3 similarly yields:
y3(gD) = (   c31) + (   c32) = (   c31) + (   c32) = y3(gI)
115116 Appendix A
because in the two alternate formations country 3, being in the middle, must always
form direct connections. The symmetric case for country 1 applies for country 2.
Hence, total prots (or utilities in the receiving countries) have increased by
y = 6(   c) > 0.
Case 3: Indirect Trading vs Direct trading: G = fgij = f13;31;23;32g;g0
ij =
f12;21;13;31;23;32gg| Countries 1 and 2 are symmetric, therefore the following is
obtained also for country 2.
y1(gI) = (2 +    c13) > (   c13) + (   c12) = y1(gD)
For country 3:
y3(gD) = (   c31) + (   c32) = (   c31) + (   c32) = y3(gI)
Hence, total prots (or utilities in the receiving countries) have increased by y = 22 +
4(   c) > 0.
A.1.2 Pairwise stability
There exists an allocation rule K : fgjg  gNgY ! RN and Kj(g;yj) is the distribution
of each network value to individual rms or representative agents. The graph is pairwise
stable w.r.t. y and K if:
a. For all ij 2 g;Kj(g;yj)  Kj(g   ij;yj) and Ki(g;yi)  Ki(g   ij;yi).
b. For all ij 62 g;Kj(g;yj) < Kj(g + ij;yj) then Ki(g;yi) > Ki(g + ij;yi).
The implication is that if j strictly prefers to form link ij and i is indierent, the link is
formed.
Case 1, Direct Trading c <    2: |
a. For fijg 2 [1;3]: If any one link is severed, utility (prots) decrease for the trading
pair:    cij > 0 as long as  > cij.
b. For fijg; i;j 2 f1;3g and country 2 remaining autarkic: utility (prots) of 2
connecting to 1 or 3 are lowered:    c2j < 0. But if    c2j > 0, then utility
(prots) increase and all links are formed.Appendix A 117
Case 2, Indirect Trading    2 < c: |
a. For fijg 2 [1;3]: If any one link is severed, utility (prots) decrease for the trading
pair: 2 +    cij >    cij > 0 for countries, 1 and 2. For country 3 connected to
1 and 2, 2(   c3j) > (   c3j) > 0 as long as  > c3j.
b. For fijg; i;j 2 f1;3g trading directly and country 2 trading directly to 3. It
considers connecting directly or indirectly to 1. Utility (prots) of 2 connecting
directly to 1 are lowered: 2( c2j) < 0 < ( c23)+2. But if it actually connected
to 1 directly, country 1 has utility (prots) decreased: 2( c1j) < 0 < ( c12)+2
and therefore country 1 will break the link to country 3 and start trading indirectly.
It is deduced that when costs are low, c <    2, the direct links network is uniquely
ecient and pairwise stable. When costs are consistent with the range    2 < c, the
indirect links network is uniquely ecient. It is also pairwise stable but not necessarily
unique as the system can rotate between partners.
A.2 A model of increasing returns to scale in transporta-
tion and hub formations
A three country model with increasing returns in each country's transportation sector
is constructed in order to prove the existence of a trade o between an increase in
distance due to indirect trading and the necessary reduction of xed costs associated
with transportation when the transport sector operates under increasing returns. This
theoretical nding has qualitatively the same eects as the theoretical exposition of the
paper and yields the same conclusions that lead to the empirical prediction.
A.2.1 Theoretical Framework
The model opens directly in costly trade. Instead of a network, it will suce to consider
a set of countries K = f1;2;3g that exist in a world where there is symmetry to and
from country 3 and an asymmetry between countries 1 and 2. Country 3 shall be in the
middle in order to be consistent with the main theoretical model. The asymmetry is
measured in terms of distance and therefore: d13 = d23 = d < d12 = d0.
All countries are identical technologically and in size. The latter assumption is imposed
as in Krugman (1993) in order to set aside the home market eect. An arbitrary coun-
try has population L and three sectors, Agriculture, Manufacturing and Transport. The
agricultural good is homogeneous and produced under constant returns that will be de-
ned as a numeraire good. The manufacturing good is produced under monopolistic118 Appendix A
competition and some quantity of the good produced is exported to the other two coun-
tries using domestically produced transport services. Transport services are produced
under monopolistic competition and are utilised solely for transporting the exporting
volume to the importer. As in Krugman (1993) we can allow for mobility of labour
between the constant returns and increasing returns sectors but need to impose a xed
labour share in transportation. As such labour is exhausted in employment in the three
sectors.
Demand: | Agents in country i 2 K notwithstanding their sector of occupation,
consume dierentiated varieties of agricultural and manufacturing goods under the same
utility function,
U = q
1 
0
Z
!2

qij(!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
where q0 is consumption of the aggregate agricultural, 1    is the share of income
expenditure on 0,  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between pairs of varieties ! and

 is the mass of available goods. Maximising utility subject to exhausting her labour
income share, the representative consumer in country j has demand for dierentiated
goods:
qij =
Ljp 
ij
PN
j;i=1
R

 p1 
ij (!)d!
;j 2 K
It will be notationally convenient to dene  =  1
 , 0 <  < 1 as the intensity of the
preference and when  approaches 1 varieties become almost perfect substitutes. As 
approaches zero an increased number of varieties results in higher utilities.
The demand function can then be rewritten as qij =
Ljp
1
 1
ij
P ;j 2 K, where P will
represent the price index.
Manufacturing Production and Trade Costs | Good 0, the agricultural good, is
the numeraire homogeneous good. One unit of labour produces w and the price of the
numeraire is normalised to 1. The wage rate is then equal to the price of the good. In
this respect the wage rate is equal to 1 across countries due to free trade, and across the
three sectors within each country.
One manufacturing rm can produce one variety of the dierentiated good using labour
and transportation as an intermediate input only for exporting. Labour costs for dif-
ferentiated goods are split between a marginal and a xed cost and thus the sector is
characterised by increasing returns.
To produce and sell a variety ! either domestically or abroad, the rm in country i
employs labour input:
Lm(q) = qij + Fi; j 2 K;;Fm
i > 0Appendix A 119
There is full employment in manufacturing so that the sum of labour used in manufac-
turing production constitutes the labour share in manufacturing. Lastly all rms must
produce goods that are consumed domestically and abroad after exporting.
Pricing Regime: | cif prices of imported goods consist of a multiplicative iceberg
cost ij  1 and an additive transport price fij that is the optimal price set by the
transportation rm (Hummels & Skiba 2004, Irarrazabal et al. 2014):
p
cif
ij = p
fob
ij ij + fij (A.1)
Transportation Production: | Equivalently to manufacturing, the transport sector
produces a continuum of dierentiated transport varieties that are used as an interme-
diate input in manufacturing in order to facilitate exports. One transport variety is
utilised to transport the output of one exporting variety1. Each country uses transport
services produced domestically. Each specic variety is produced by a single transporta-
tion rm using labour as its input. All rms have the same cost function, can freely enter
or exit production and each worker is endowed with one unit of labour. The production
function is
Lt(q) = dijqij + Ft
i ; i 6= j;d;Ft
i > 0
where Ft
i > 0 is a variable overhead/xed cost, dij > 0 is a constant marginal cost of
transport production that will be associated with distance to the trading partners. qij
denotes the quantity of output that each transport rm can carry and comprises the
quantity produced by one manufacturing rm.
A.2.2 Partial equilibrium in manufacturing
Manufacturing rms in country i maximise prots subject to feasible output. Provided
i 6= j 2 K, their prot function is dened as
m
i = p
fob
ii qii +
3 X
i;j=1
p
cif
ij qij   wqii  
3 X
i;j=1
wijqij  
3 X
i;j=1
fijqij   wFm
i
where the transport revenue obtained from exporting to country j is passed directly to
the transport rm. Maximising prots subject to the demand for a domestic good, the
prot maximising price becomes
pfob
w =

 as marginal revenues (MR) equal marginal
costs (MC). Free entry and exit of rms results in zero long term prots for each
manufacturing rm and fullls the equality between price (P) and average cost (AC),
pfob
w =  +
Fm
i
xi , where xi is the total output produced by each rm.
1This assumption could be too strong. I have shown elsewhere, but omit to prove herein, that if
one permits homogeneity of degree greater or less than 1, then transport services can be used to carry
more than or less than the exporting output produced by one manufacturing rm. Nevertheless the
qualitative results would remain unchanged. This proof can be provided upon request.120 Appendix A
Equilibrium is achieved when simultaneously marginal revenue equals marginal cost and
price equals average cost. The equilibrium manufacturing output is constant amounting
to:
xi =
3 X
i;j=1
qijtij =
Fm
i


1   
(A.2)
The number of rms can then be derived due to full employment in the manufacturing
sector:
nm
i =
Lm
i
Fm
i
(1   )
A.2.3 Partial equilibrium in transportation
Transport rms, simultaneously to manufacturing rms, maximise prots subject to
feasible export output produced by manufacturing rms. They obtain their revenue
through the cif price of the manufacturing good and the intermediate input assumption.
Provided i 6= j 2 K, their prot function is
t
i =
3 X
i;j=1
fijqij  
3 X
i;j=1
wdijqij   wFt
i
It is required to assume simultaneous pricing and output determining behaviours of
manufacturing and transport rms. Equivalently the manufacturing rm would observe
the equilibrium value of f as both entities play simultaneously and have no reason
to deviate from their optimal decisions, since labour shares are xed and the wage is
equalised across sectors.
Given this assumption, transport rms proceed to prot maximisation and yield trans-
port prices that are a function of the fob price and a markup over transport marginal
cost due to the transport elasticity of import demand:2
fij
w
=
dij

+
ij

1   

Free entry and exit of rms result in zero long term prots. However the imposed
asymmetry between countries 1 and 2 will prevent the export shares being equal for all
countries in K. Crucially this fact may give rise to a hub formation.
The characterisation of the transport price allows us then to characterise the cif price,
reminding that w = 1 for all countries:
p
cif
ij =
1

(p
fob
ii ij + dij) =
1

(


ij + dij)
2f =  
@qij
@fij
fij
qij = 
fij
p
fob
ii ij+fijAppendix A 121
A.2.4 Hub formations driven by the zero prot condition in trans-
portation
Consumption Ratios: | It will be useful at this point to dene consumption ratios as
viewed by the exporting rm in order to express exports across all countries in common
units. Dene hence the ratio of consumption for exports to country j relative to domestic
consumption (which is identical in all countries due to similar technology):
qij
qii
=
 
p
cif
ij
p
fob
ii
! 1
 1
For simplicity let us assume that other trade costs ij =  are symmetric and the
distortion is only created by the asymmetry d13 = d23 = d < d12 = d0. Consumption
ratios that exporting rms of country 3 have to face are:
q31
q33
=
q32
q33
=
 
 + d

 1
 1
For countries 1 and 2 equivalently we have for trading between them:
q12
q11
=
q21
q22
=
 
 + d0

 1
 1
and for trading with country 3 being the most proximal to both:
q13
q11
=
q23
q22
=
 
 + d

 1
 1
Prior to deriving the result, let us make one last normalisation since the symmetry of
the iceberg trade cost  and the common marginal cost  are identical across countries.
Hence, impose  =  = 1.
Country 3, Zero Prot Condition in transportation: | Free entry and exit of
transport rms results in zero long term prots satisfying the P=AC condition:
f31 = f32 = d + Ft
3(q31 + q32) 1 =) q31 =
1
2
Ft
3
1
 + d

1   
(A.3)
It is straightforward to see that due to symmetry, the total exports of country 3 are split
equally between countries 1 and 2.
Country 1, Zero Prot Condition in transportation: | Free entry and exit of
transport rms results in zero long term prots:
f12q12 + f13q13 = d0q12 + dq13 + Ft
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Using the consumption ratios we can express q12 in units of q13 and replacing the trans-
port price. The relationship can be rearranged to write:
q13 = q31 =
Ft
1
1
 + d +
 1
 + d0 
 1  1
 + d
 1
1 

1   
(A.4)
Exports from country 1 (and 2 by symmetry) are clearly less than what country 3 can
achieve due to its benecial location.
Hub formations: | The left hand sides of equations (A.3) and (A.4) are necessarily
the same as it is the expression of the common unit of exports. We have assumed that
the overhead costs of transportation Ft
i in any country can be variable. Equating the
two terms then yields a ratio of the xed cost of transport in the two countries:
Ft
3
Ft
1
=
2
 1
 + d

1
 + d +
 1
 + d0 
 1  1
 + d
 1
1 
(A.5)
The ratio of xed costs of transport and the assumption of their variability are crucial in
identifying the type of formation between the trading countries. The term is increasing
in d0 since
@
Ft
3
Ft
1
@d0 > 0. It is decreasing in d since
@
Ft
3
Ft
1
@d < 0.
Proof. Expression (A.5) has
@
Ft
3
Ft
1
@d0 > 0:
@
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Ft
1
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 
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Since both fractions are positive. (A.5) has also
@
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3
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1
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rst term with
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The nominator of the second fraction in brackets is greater than the denominator since
products are scaled by 1
1  > 1 hence the term in brackets is negative.
These properties allow the following statements:
1. If country 1 decides to trade using country 3 as a hub, it will have to increase its
trading distance to d00 = 2d > d0. This will necessitate an increase in the ratio of
the xed costs of transportation between the hub country 3 and country 1. Hence
there will either need to be an increase in the xed costs of transport of the hub
country or a decrease in the xed costs of transport for the connecting country or
any increasing combination of both.
2. If country 3, the hub country, is ever more distant from the connecting country 1,
the ratio of xed costs needs to be decreased. This implies either a decrease in the
xed costs of the hub country or an increase in the xed costs of the connecting
country or any decreasing combination of both.
A change in country 1's trading decisions will however not enforce a change in country
3's level of xed costs as the prot functions of transport rms are independent of each
other. Hence all the changes in the ratio are driven by adjustments in the xed costs of
transportation for the connecting country 1. By symmetry of the distance d0 the same
observations hold for country 2.
The above two statements are equivalent with the operation of replacing the unmeasur-
able benet of forming a link with a change in the xed costs associated with the network,124 Appendix A
subsequently leading to the empirical prediction. By assuming existence of increasing
returns to scale in the transport sector and variable xed costs in transportation, the
benet of forming a link can be represented by changes in xed costs stemming from the
decision of the rm to trade directly or indirectly. This alternative setting conrms qual-
itatively the main theoretical exposition where the presence of a transportation sector
can be avoided by assuming the existence of benets and costs associated with links.
A.2.5 The number of transport rms
For completeness, I close the model by characterising the number of transport rms.
For country 3, the partial equilibrium price and output can then be utilised to extract
the number of rms. The former satises the full employment condition and is shown
to be:
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3 =
Lt
Ft
3
(1   )
d + 1
d + 1   
For country 1, expressing output in common units of q31 we have:
nt
1 =
Lt
Ft
1
(1   ) 

(1   ) + K
1
2
Ft
3
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1
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(A.8)
where K(d;d0)3 is a function of the distances between trading partners. The term K is
increasing in d and decreasing in d0. The number of transport rms as shown below is
decreasing in d which is what one should expect since by virtue of the second statement
more labour is required to be allocated to accommodate an increase in Ft
1. The change
in the number of transport rms is ambiguous wrt to changes in d0. It will be determined
by the level of the ratio of xed costs. If the ratio of xed costs is substantially large
implying the level of xed costs of the connecting country is small then the number of
transport rms is decreasing in d0. If the level of xed costs of the connecting country is
large then the ratio becomes small implying an increase in the number of transport rms.
This arises because there is an increase in labour input due to the increase occurring in d0
and a decrease in labour input as a result of a reduction of xed costs of the connecting
country. Hence the number of rms will crucially depend on the level of the ratio of
xed costs.
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@nt
1
@d
=  
Lt
Ft
1
(1   )

(1   ) + K
1
2
Ft
3
Ft
1
 2 1
2
0
@@K
@d
Ft
3
Ft
1
+ K
@
Ft
3
Ft
1
@d
1
A
3K =
(d+d0)(
1
 +d0)
1
 1
(
1
 +d)

 1
;
@K
@d = 
"
(
1
 +d0)
1
 1
(
1
 +d)

 1
+
1
1 
(d+d0)(
1
 +d0)
1
 1
(
1
 +d)
1 2
1 
#
> 0;
@K
@d0 =
(
1
 +d0)
1
 1
(
1
 +d)

 1

1  
1
1 (d + d
0)
  1
 + d
0 1+
1 

< 0Appendix A 125
The last term in brackets can be rearranged to write:
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since the fraction is clearly less than unity.
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The last term in brackets can be rewritten as:
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Expanding the partial derivative of xed costs wrt d0 and grouping terms, the expression
in large brackets becomes:
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where the magnitude of the ratio of xed costs will determine whether the term in
brackets is positive or negative since all other terms are less than unity. The ratio of
xed costs is greater than unity since d0 > d:
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= 2 (
1
+d)
1
+d+(
1
+d0)

 1(
1
+d)
1
1 
 1 ,
1
 + d 
 1
 + d0 
 1  1
 + d
 1
1  ,
 1
 + d
  
1  
 1
 + d0  
1  which can only hold if d0  d, which is true.
Therefore if the magnitude is such that 0 < 0 then M0 > 0 and hence
@nt
1
@d0 < 0: the
number of transport rms are decreasing in d0. If the magnitude of the ratio of xed
costs is such that 0 > 0 then M0 < 0 and the number of transport rms are increasing
in d0.126 Appendix A
A.3 Comparison of distance variables
A.3.1 1 digit level
Table A.1: Exports: Impact of direct capital distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Direct Distance -0.783*** -1.336*** -0.723*** -1.295*** -1.091*** -1.402***
(0.203) (0.177) (0.178) (0.157) (0.204) (0.184)
Common Language 0.793** 0.534*** 1.173*** 0.692*** 1.185*** 1.088***
(0.316) (0.197) (0.220) (0.170) (0.301) (0.247)
Contiguity 0.346 -0.359 0.0861 -0.337 0.188 -0.942
(0.789) (0.574) (0.779) (0.578) (0.801) (0.921)
Exporter's GDP 1.027*** 1.082*** 1.242***
(0.0517) (0.0405) (0.0614)
Importer's GDP 1.067*** 1.069*** 0.809***
(0.0412) (0.0367) (0.0736)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,595 1,606 1,522 1,522 977 977
R-squared 0.680 0.909 0.787 0.932 0.701 0.915
Pooled OLS estimation for years 2003   2007, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS1. Standard
errors are allowed to be correlated within country pair clusters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of the non-robust sample.
Columns (3);(4) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6) display outcomes
of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed and exclude the US and the EU 15 area.Appendix A 127
Table A.2: Exports: Impact of indirect capital distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Indirect Distance -1.036*** -1.325*** -0.796*** -1.312*** -1.304*** -1.473***
(0.269) (0.235) (0.231) (0.201) (0.227) (0.161)
Common Language 0.716** 0.556*** 1.162*** 0.725*** 1.187*** 1.129***
(0.321) (0.213) (0.229) (0.188) (0.308) (0.258)
Contiguity 0.827 0.641 0.632 0.604 0.732** -0.362
(0.684) (0.395) (0.670) (0.415) (0.358) (0.402)
Exporter's GDP 1.055*** 1.101*** 1.249***
(0.0517) (0.0418) (0.0605)
Importer's GDP 1.112*** 1.106*** 0.815***
(0.0423) (0.0370) (0.0731)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,595 1,606 1,522 1,522 977 977
R-squared 0.682 0.903 0.785 0.927 0.704 0.913
P-values Ho: See A 0.34 0.96 0.75 0.93 0.34 0.65
Pooled OLS estimation for years 2003   2007, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS1. Standard
errors are allowed to be correlated within country pair clusters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of the non-robust sample.
Columns (3);(4) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6) display outcomes
of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed and exclude the US and the EU 15 area. Null Hypothesis A:
Coecient of direct distance=Coecient of indirect distance.128 Appendix A
A.3.2 2 digit level
Table A.3: Exports: Impact of direct capital distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Direct Distance -0.822*** -1.340*** -0.856*** -1.291*** -0.973*** -1.481***
(0.136) (0.134) (0.114) (0.125) (0.166) (0.147)
Common Language 0.769*** 0.853*** 0.767*** 0.851*** 0.869*** 1.158***
(0.162) (0.137) (0.126) (0.120) (0.173) (0.151)
Contiguity 0.974** 0.625 0.892** 0.619 0.616 0.133
(0.442) (0.535) (0.356) (0.464) (0.397) (0.378)
Exporter's GDP 0.917*** 0.904*** 0.736***
(0.0321) (0.0261) (0.0550)
Importer's GDP 0.742*** 0.741*** 0.684***
(0.0322) (0.0257) (0.0560)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer-Sector No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72,844 73,139 69,306 69,306 34,514 34,514
R-squared 0.348 0.610 0.424 0.644 0.226 0.492
Pooled OLS estimation for years 2003 2007, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS2. Standard errors are
allowed to be correlated within country pair clusters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Constants included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of the non-robust sample. Columns (3);(4) display
outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised
residuals removed and exclude the US and the EU 15 area.
Table A.4: Exports: Impact of indirect capital distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Indirect Distance -0.965*** -1.537*** -0.991*** -1.502*** -1.144*** -1.520***
(0.177) (0.167) (0.148) (0.154) (0.192) (0.146)
Common Language 0.711*** 0.819*** 0.711*** 0.816*** 0.850*** 1.121***
(0.166) (0.146) (0.132) (0.128) (0.173) (0.158)
Contiguity 1.533*** 1.460*** 1.491*** 1.425*** 0.807** 0.158
(0.416) (0.510) (0.339) (0.440) (0.327) (0.281)
Exporter's GDP 0.942*** 0.930*** 0.743***
(0.0329) (0.0272) (0.0541)
Importer's GDP 0.795*** 0.796*** 0.695***
(0.0306) (0.0249) (0.0540)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer-Sector No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72,844 73,139 69,306 69,306 34,514 34,514
R-squared 0.347 0.608 0.422 0.642 0.228 0.491
P-values Ho: See A 0.42 0.24 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.79
Pooled OLS estimation for years 2003 2007, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS2. Standard errors are
allowed to be correlated within country pair clusters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Constants included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of the non-robust sample. Columns (3);(4) display
outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised
residuals removed and exclude the US and the EU 15 area. Null Hypothesis A: Coecient of direct distance=Coecient of
indirect distance.Appendix A 129
A.3.3 6 digit level
Table A.5: Exports: Impact of direct capital distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Direct Distance -0.432*** -0.897*** -0.439*** -0.863*** -0.592*** -0.816***
(0.120) (0.147) (0.108) (0.128) (0.152) (0.102)
Common Language 0.276* 0.539*** 0.217 0.436*** -0.0620 0.398***
(0.154) (0.189) (0.132) (0.153) (0.187) (0.119)
Contiguity 0.516 0.477 0.580 0.417 -0.0495 0.0205
(0.514) (0.612) (0.408) (0.490) (0.317) (0.197)
Exporter's GDP 0.529*** 0.495*** 0.393***
(0.0329) (0.0288) (0.0493)
Importer's GDP 0.537*** 0.545*** 0.484***
(0.0305) (0.0265) (0.0501)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer-Sector No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97,711 97,711 93,277 93,277 46,764 46,764
R-squared 0.168 0.376 0.213 0.399 0.101 0.352
OLS estimation for year 2006, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS6. Standard errors are allowed to
be correlated within country pair clusters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants
included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of the non-robust sample. Columns (3);(4) display outcomes of
the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals
removed and exclude the US and the EU 15 area.
Table A.6: Exports: Impact of indirect capital distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Indirect Distance -0.514*** -0.866*** -0.505*** -0.847*** -0.659*** -0.759***
(0.132) (0.186) (0.120) (0.168) (0.150) (0.106)
Common Language 0.238 0.473** 0.183 0.371** -0.110 0.391***
(0.160) (0.217) (0.137) (0.181) (0.176) (0.112)
Contiguity 0.741 1.046 0.819* 0.957* 0.200 -0.0450
(0.542) (0.637) (0.447) (0.530) (0.322) (0.279)
Exporter's GDP 0.543*** 0.507*** 0.402***
(0.0310) (0.0273) (0.0496)
Importer's GDP 0.561*** 0.567*** 0.507***
(0.0300) (0.0261) (0.0486)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer-Sector No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97,711 97,711 93,277 93,277 46,764 46,764
R-squared 0.168 0.372 0.212 0.394 0.101 0.350
P-values Ho: See A 0.53 0.86 0.58 0.92 0.65 0.59
OLS estimation for year 2006, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS6. Standard errors are allowed to
be correlated within country pair clusters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants
included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of the non-robust sample. Columns (3);(4) display outcomes of
the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals
removed and exclude the US and the EU 15 area. Null Hypothesis A: Coecient of direct distance=Coecient of indirect
distance.130 Appendix A
A.4 Indirect distance with hub interaction term
A.4.1 1 digit level
Table A.7: Exports: Indirect with interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Indirect Distance -1.387*** -1.729*** -1.035*** -1.630*** -1.757*** -1.695***
(0.354) (0.273) (0.306) (0.226) (0.298) (0.187)
Indirect*Hub 1.005* 1.217*** 0.699 0.962*** 1.156** 0.683**
(0.559) (0.397) (0.485) (0.351) (0.491) (0.323)
Common Language 0.714** 0.534** 1.164*** 0.708*** 1.140*** 1.105***
(0.322) (0.212) (0.228) (0.185) (0.300) (0.250)
Contiguity 0.685 0.481 0.537 0.479 0.498 -0.475
(0.682) (0.401) (0.666) (0.417) (0.346) (0.387)
Exporter's GDP 1.057*** 1.100*** 1.242***
(0.0519) (0.0422) (0.0610)
Importer's GDP 1.111*** 1.105*** 0.803***
(0.0421) (0.0367) (0.0712)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,595 1,606 1,522 1,522 977 977
R-squared 0.685 0.906 0.786 0.929 0.712 0.915
P-values Ho: See B 0 0 0 0 0 0
P-values Ho: See C 0.35 0.01 0.30 0.03 0.21 0.14
Pooled OLS estimation for years 2003   2007, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS1. Standard
errors are allowed to be correlated within country pair clusters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of the non-robust sample.
Columns (3);(4) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6) display outcomes
of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed and exclude the US and the EU 15 area. Null Hypothesis B:
Coecient of indirect distance=Coecient of interaction=0. Null Hypothesis C: Coecient of direct capital distance
(Table A.1)=Coecient of indirect capital distance plus coecient of interaction.Appendix A 131
A.4.2 2 digit level
Table A.8: Exports: Indirect distance with interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Indirect Distance -1.168*** -1.794*** -1.164*** -1.725*** -1.286*** -1.676***
(0.217) (0.181) (0.180) (0.169) (0.239) (0.158)
Indirect*Hub 0.715* 0.929*** 0.607* 0.811*** 0.449 0.540***
(0.383) (0.275) (0.323) (0.260) (0.342) (0.185)
Common Language 0.730*** 0.804*** 0.728*** 0.804*** 0.854*** 1.108***
(0.165) (0.142) (0.131) (0.126) (0.172) (0.154)
Contiguity 1.464*** 1.355*** 1.431*** 1.328*** 0.741** -0.0132
(0.426) (0.516) (0.352) (0.449) (0.363) (0.334)
Exporter's GDP 0.943*** 0.931*** 0.737***
(0.0326) (0.0268) (0.0538)
Importer's GDP 0.799*** 0.799*** 0.691***
(0.0304) (0.0248) (0.0523)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer-Sector No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72,844 73,139 69,306 69,306 34,514 34,514
R-squared 0.348 0.610 0.423 0.643 0.230 0.493
P-values Ho: See B 0 0 0 0 0 0
P-values Ho: See C 0.22 0.03 0.24 0.06 0.60 0.04
Pooled OLS estimation for years 2003 2007, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS2. Standard errors are
allowed to be correlated within country pair clusters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Constants included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of the non-robust sample. Columns (3);(4) display
outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised
residuals removed and exclude the US and the EU 15 area. Null Hypothesis B: Coecient of indirect distance=Coecient of
interaction=0. Null Hypothesis C: Coecient of direct capital distance (Table A.3)=Coecient of indirect capital distance
plus coecient of interaction.132 Appendix A
A.4.3 6 digit level
Table A.9: Exports: Indirect distance with interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Indirect Distance -0.466*** -0.991*** -0.462*** -0.949*** -0.774*** -0.902***
(0.170) (0.197) (0.153) (0.181) (0.156) (0.120)
Indirect*Hub -0.204 0.559** -0.177 0.457** 0.393 0.391***
(0.260) (0.263) (0.237) (0.228) (0.242) (0.115)
Common Language 0.242 0.426** 0.186 0.332* -0.116 0.360***
(0.158) (0.215) (0.136) (0.179) (0.166) (0.107)
Contiguity 0.741 1.047* 0.820* 0.961* 0.207 -0.302
(0.549) (0.617) (0.451) (0.514) (0.338) (0.332)
Exporter's GDP 0.540*** 0.505*** 0.392***
(0.0306) (0.0268) (0.0474)
Importer's GDP 0.557*** 0.565*** 0.500***
(0.0302) (0.0261) (0.0456)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer-Sector No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97,711 97,711 93,277 93,277 46,764 46,764
R-squared 0.168 0.372 0.212 0.395 0.102 0.351
P-values Ho: See B 0.02 0 0 0 0 0
P-values Ho: See C 0.22 0.05 0.27 0.06 0.30 0.01
OLS estimation for year 2006, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS6. Standard errors are allowed to
be correlated within country pair clusters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants
included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of the non-robust sample. Columns (3);(4) display outcomes of the
sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed
and exclude the US and the EU 15 area. Null Hypothesis B: Coecient of indirect distance=Coecient of interaction=0.
Null Hypothesis C: Coecient of direct capital distance (Table A.5)=Coecient of indirect capital distance plus coecient of
interaction.Appendix A 133
A.5 Results for endogenous interaction term
A.5.1 1 digit level
Table A.10: Exports: Indirect distance with interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Indirect Distance -1.774*** -1.954*** -1.553*** -1.908*** -1.993*** -1.824***
(0.253) (0.149) (0.219) (0.108) (0.205) (0.0957)
Indirect*Hub 2.113*** 1.721*** 2.217*** 1.487*** 1.757*** 0.886***
(0.557) (0.250) (0.442) (0.205) (0.413) (0.184)
Common Language 0.712*** 0.607*** 1.170*** 0.791*** 1.116*** 1.156***
(0.171) (0.129) (0.118) (0.107) (0.155) (0.140)
Contiguity 0.529 0.247 0.329 0.226 0.376 -0.626***
(0.332) (0.296) (0.323) (0.291) (0.243) (0.217)
Exporter's GDP 1.059*** 1.099*** 1.239***
(0.0264) (0.0217) (0.0310)
Importer's GDP 1.109*** 1.103*** 0.797***
(0.0208) (0.0179) (0.0352)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer-Sector No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,595 1,029 1,522 978 977 511
R-squared 0.681 0.894 0.779 0.927 0.710 0.913
P-values Ho: See B 0 0 0 0 0 0
P-values Ho: See C 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hausman P-value 0.0366 0 0 0 0.8 0
2SLS estimation for years 2003   2007, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of
the non-robust sample. Columns (3);(4) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6)
display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed and exclude the US and the EU 15 area. Null Hypothesis
B: Coecient of indirect distance=Coecient of interaction=0. Null Hypothesis C: Coecient of direct capital distance
(Table A.5)=Coecient of indirect capital distance plus coecient of interaction. Hausman Test Null Hypothesis: The
specied endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous.134 Appendix A
A.5.2 2 digit level
Table A.11: Exports: Indirect distance with interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports
Indirect Distance -1.417*** -1.966*** -1.405*** -1.875*** -1.342*** -1.729***
(0.0390) (0.0331) (0.0335) (0.0297) (0.0419) (0.0410)
Indirect*Hub 1.591*** 1.450*** 1.457*** 1.282*** 0.625*** 0.677***
(0.101) (0.0613) (0.0871) (0.0544) (0.0946) (0.0685)
Common Language 0.754*** 0.899*** 0.750*** 0.899*** 0.855*** 1.225***
(0.0267) (0.0331) (0.0232) (0.0300) (0.0347) (0.0484)
Contiguity 1.378*** 0.774*** 1.347*** 0.863*** 0.715*** -0.130
(0.0651) (0.0725) (0.0570) (0.0643) (0.0837) (0.102)
Exporter's GDP 0.944*** 0.932*** 0.735***
(0.00561) (0.00498) (0.0107)
Importer's GDP 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.689***
(0.00520) (0.00454) (0.0109)
Fixed Eects
Exporter-Importer-Sector No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72,844 56,338 69,306 53,702 34,514 23,026
R-squared 0.346 0.623 0.421 0.649 0.229 0.494
P-values Ho: See B 0 0 0 0 0 0
P-values Ho: See C 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hausman P-value 0 0 0 0 0.0146 0
2SLS estimation for years 2003   2007, monetary units are real US Dollars, aggregation level is HS2. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants included but not reported. Columns (1);(2) display outcomes of
the non-robust sample. Columns (3);(4) display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed. Columns (5);(6)
display outcomes of the sample with 2 studentised residuals removed and exclude the US and the EU 15 area. Null Hypothesis
B: Coecient of indirect distance=Coecient of interaction=0. Null Hypothesis C: Coecient of direct capital distance
(Table A.5)=Coecient of indirect capital distance plus coecient of interaction. Hausman Test Null Hypothesis: The
specied endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous.Appendix A 135
A.6 Additional data details
Table A.12: Trade partnerships with nite port distance
Exporter Importer Exporter Importer Exporter Importer Exporter Importer Exporter Importer Exporter Importer
ARE AUS CAN MYS ECU USA ISL ARG MYS USA THA USA
ARE EU15 CAN NZL EGY AUS ISL AUS NGA AUS TUN AUS
ARE IND CAN PAK EGY USA ISL BRA NZL ARG TUN USA
ARE NZL CAN PER EU15 ARE ISL COL NZL AUS TUR ARG
ARE USA CAN RUS EU15 ARG ISL ECU NZL BRA TUR AUS
ARG AUS CAN SAU EU15 AUS ISL NZL NZL COL TUR BRA
ARG COL CAN TUN EU15 BGD ISL PER NZL ECU TUR COL
ARG ECU CAN TWN EU15 BRA ISL URY NZL PER TUR ECU
ARG EU15 CAN URY EU15 CHN ISL USA NZL URY TUR NZL
ARG MEX CAN VEN EU15 COL ISR ARG NZL USA TUR PER
ARG NZL CAN ZAF EU15 ECU ISR AUS PER AUS TUR URY
ARG PER CHE ARG EU15 EGY ISR BRA PER NZL TUR USA
ARG USA CHE AUS EU15 IDN ISR COL PER USA TWN AUS
AUS ARG CHE BRA EU15 IND ISR ECU PHL AUS UKR AUS
AUS BGD CHE COL EU15 JOR ISR NZL PHL EU15 UKR USA
AUS BRA CHE ECU EU15 JPN ISR PER PHL USA URY AUS
AUS CHN CHE NZL EU15 KOR ISR URY POL ARG URY NZL
AUS COL CHE PER EU15 LBY ISR USA POL AUS URY USA
AUS ECU CHE URY EU15 MAR JPN ARG POL BRA USA ARG
AUS EGY CHE USA EU15 MYS JPN AUS POL COL USA AUS
AUS IDN CHL AUS EU15 NZL JPN BRA POL ECU USA BRA
AUS JPN CHL BRA EU15 PER JPN COL POL NZL USA CHN
AUS KOR CHL COL EU15 PHL JPN ECU POL PER USA COL
AUS LKA CHL ECU EU15 SAU JPN EU15 POL URY USA ECU
AUS NZL CHL NZL EU15 SDN JPN NZL POL USA USA EGY
AUS PAK CHL URY EU15 SGP JPN PER RUS AUS USA EU15
AUS PER CHL USA EU15 THA JPN URY RUS USA USA IDN
AUS SAU CHN ARG EU15 TUN JPN USA SAU AUS USA IND
AUS TWN CHN AUS EU15 URY KAZ AUS SAU EU15 USA JPN
AUS URY CHN BRA EU15 USA KOR ARG SAU USA USA KOR
AUS USA CHN COL EU15 VNM KOR AUS SGP AUS USA LKA
AUS ZAF CHN ECU EU15 YEM KOR BRA SGP EU15 USA MAR
BGD AUS CHN EU15 GHA AUS KOR COL SGP NZL USA MYS
BGD USA CHN IND HUN ARG KOR ECU SGP USA USA NZL
BGR USA CHN NZL HUN AUS KOR NZL SVK ARG USA PAK
BHR AUS CHN PER HUN BRA KOR PER SVK AUS USA PER
BOL AUS CHN URY HUN COL KOR URY SVK BRA USA PHL
BOL NZL CHN USA HUN ECU KOR USA SVK COL USA RUS
BOL USA COL AUS HUN NZL KWT AUS SVK ECU USA SAU
BRA EU15 COL NZL HUN PER LBN AUS SVK NZL USA SGP
CAN ARG COL USA HUN URY LKA AUS SVK PER USA THA
CAN AUS CRI AUS HUN USA LKA USA SVK URY USA TUN
CAN BRA CRI COL IDN AUS LTU AUS SVK USA USA URY
CAN CHN CRI ECU IDN EU15 MAR AUS SVN ARG USA VEN
CAN COL CZE ARG IDN USA MAR USA SVN AUS USA VNM
CAN DZA CZE AUS IND AUS MEX ARG SVN BRA USA YEM
CAN ECU CZE BRA IND BRA MEX AUS SVN COL USA ZAF
CAN EGY CZE COL IND CHN MEX BRA SVN ECU VEN AUS
CAN EU15 CZE ECU IND COL MEX COL SVN NZL VEN USA
CAN IDN CZE NZL IND ECU MEX ECU SVN PER VNM AUS
CAN IRN CZE PER IND EU15 MEX NZL SVN URY VNM EU15
CAN JOR CZE URY IND NZL MEX PER SVN USA VNM USA
CAN JPN CZE USA IND PER MEX URY THA ARG YEM USA
CAN KOR DOM USA IND SAU MYS AUS THA AUS ZAF ARG
CAN LKA DZA USA IND URY MYS BRA THA BRA ZAF AUS
CAN MAR ECU AUS IND USA MYS EU15 THA EU15 ZAF NZL
CAN MEX ECU NZL IRN AUS MYS NZL THA NZL ZAF USA136 Appendix A
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B.1 Derivation of the intensive and extensive margin elas-
ticities
By applying the Leibniz rule to relationship (3.8) for a particular sector h, the elas-
ticity of aggregate exports with respect to variable trade costs bij and xed costs FM
ij
respectively, is decomposed into the intensive and extensive margin elasticities:
 
@Xij
@bij
bij
Xij
=  
bij
Xij
2
6
4Li
1 Z

ij
@xij()
@bij
g()d
3
7
5
| {z }
Intensive Margin Elasticity
+
bij
Xij

Lix(
ij)g(
ij)
@
ij
@bij

| {z }
Extensive Margin Elasticity
 
@Xij
@FM
ij
FM
ij
Xij
=  
FM
ij
Xij
2
6
4Li
1 Z

ij
@xij()
@FM
ij
g()d
3
7
5
| {z }
Intensive Margin Elasticity
+
FM
ij
Xij
"
Lix(
ij)g(
ij)
@
ij
@FM
ij
#
| {z }
Extensive Margin Elasticity
For rst of two equations given that
@xij()
@bij =    1
1+(+1)( 1)
xij()
bij , the intensive margin
elasticity with respect to bij is:
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Where IMEbij =    1 denotes the impact of the specic trade cost which is identical
to the Chaney (2008) model of trade as opposed to the constant across trade costs
augmented shipping price eects 1
1+(+1)( 1).
Concerning the extensive margin elasticity, since
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
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Following the same procedure for the second of two equations and using the fact that
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Similarly, given that
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B.2 Trading countries considered in the empirical estima-
tion
Table B.1: Sample of the trading countries
Exporter Importer
ARG ARG
AUS AUS
BRA BGD
CAN BRA
CHL CHL
JPN CHN
KOR COL
NZL DZA
USA ECU
EGY
HKG
IDN
IND
IRN
JOR
JPN
KOR
LKA
MAR
MEX
MYS
NZL
PAK
PER
PHL
RUS
SAU
SGP
THA
TUN
URY
USA
VEN
VNM
YEM
ZAF
B.3 Alternative Specication
This section provides preliminary evidence of complementarities between tari changes
and shipping prices across two periods. The rst step uses a specication similar to
Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009) to assess during year 2005, the impact of volume
shipped, the factory price of the good and the degree of market power on the additive
freight rate. Market power is measured using the elasticity of substitution  as a proxy,
derived using a specication adopted from Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009) which
is presented in the appendix that follows.
The second step estimates how per unit shipping prices aect the quantity transported
in the following year in the presence of taris. In this simple exposition we can track140 Appendix B
the perennial impact of scale eects on transportation which can be induced by trade
liberalisation, transportation itself or other exogenous factors.
For the rst step the estimating equation is:
lnfijkm = 0 + 1 ln(piih) + 2 ln(dij) + 3 ln ^ h + 4 lnqijhm
+
X
i
i +
X
i
j +
X
m
m + eijhm for year 2005:
Where ^  is a sector specic estimate of the elasticity of import demand that is used as a
proxy for the identifying the presence of market power in transportation. The exporter
xed eect, as in Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009), captures the origin specic
number of transport rms and controls for country size and infrastructure as does the
importer xed eect. Errors are allowed to be correlated within country pair clusters.
Using the same dataset described in section 3.5 the results are presented in table B.2.Appendix B 141
Table B.2: Impacts on per unit ship-
ping prices
(OLS)
Variable Per unit
shipping prices
F.O.B. price 0.14***
(0.014)
Distance 0.27***
(0.045)
Quantity transported -0.15***
(0.008)
^  -0.06**
(0.015)
Fixed Eects
Importer Y
Exporter Y
Sector N
Mode Y
Observations 2,338
R-squared 0.637
Cross sectional OLS estimates for year 2005,
monetary units are constant U.S. Dollars. Errors
are allowed to be correlated within country pair
clusters. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants in-
cluded but not reported.
All coecients are signicant at the 1 and 5% levels and have the same signs as Hummels,
Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009). A 1% exogenous increase in the quantity transported reduces
per unit shipping prices by 0.15% reecting the presence of scale economies in maritime
transportation. Should manufacturing rms become more competitive the markup of
transport rms is reduced. Increases in the factory prices of goods raise per unit prices
as the marginal cost of shipping increases.
In the subsequent step we can thus assess the impact of the predicted per unit shipping
price on next year's quantity transported in the presence of same year taris. The
estimable equation is:
lnqijkmt = 0 + 1d lnfijhm(t 1) + 2 lndij + 3 lnbijht +
X
i
i +
X
j
j +
X
m
m + ~ eijhmt
Where t = 2006 and the same error structure is assumed as in the previous step. The
results are shown in table B.3.
We cannot draw safe conclusions regarding the generalisation of results due to the sub-
stantial loss of information during the two step process. We can preliminary state that
increases in the quantity transported in year 2005, possibly accrued through a tari142 Appendix B
Table B.3: Impacts on quantity trans-
ported
(OLS)
Variable Quantity
transported
Shipping price (predicted) -3.84***
(0.19)
Tari 0.073
(0.15)
Fixed Eects
Importer Y
Exporter Y
Sector N
Mode Y
Observations 499
R-squared 0.754
Cross sectional OLS estimates for year 2005, mon-
etary units are constant U.S. Dollars. Errors are
allowed to be correlated within country pair clus-
ters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants included
but not reported.
reduction or a trade cost reduction in that year (yet the tari variable is insignicant
in year 2006) lowered the per unit shipping price. This decrease raises the quantity
transported in the following period further and thus there is a perennial feedback across
time.
B.4 An estimate of the elasticity of import demand
Using specication (23) of Hummels, Lugovskyy & Skiba (2009) and a methodology
described in Hummels (2001), we estimate the slope of the import demand curve using
variation in trade costs for each sector h, resulting in a distribution of elasticities ^ h.
The estimating relationship is:
lnqijh =  0 + h lndij +
X
i
i +
X
j
j +  eijh for each h 2 H (B.1)
Where  is identied only from the ij-specic variation of trade cost dij. The exporter
xed eects control for infrastructure, country size, the number of varieties and unob-
served variation in product quality, whilst importer xed eects control for size and the
price index.
There are 3,226 observed sectors at the six digit level, out of which 2,569 regressions
yielded a nite estimate of . 765 outcomes survive since the p-value of the F-statisticAppendix B 143
is greater than 5% in the complement cases. The number of observations in the 765
estimations averages 23.55 (standard deviation 8.59) within each sector h.
The 765 observations of ^  have average coecient size -0.96 (standard deviation 4.15).
Dropping all coecients which have a p-value of the t-statistic greater than 5%, results
in only 134 observations of ^ , with mean -3.87 (standard deviation 3.70), all of which
are strictly negative. The same procedure is applied for year 2006 where the mean value
of  is documented at -3.55 (standard deviation 4.74).Appendix C
C.1 Countries represented in the network
Table C.1: Countries in the network in 2006
Country Exposure Country Exposure Country Exposure
High income OECD 860,880 High income nonOECD 114,672 Upper middle income 15,775
Australia -70% Aruba -100% Argentina 21%
Austria -61% Bahamas, The -82% Brazil -31%
Belgium -23% Bahrain -71% Bulgaria -93%
Canada -28% Barbados -82% Chile 255%
Czech Republic -97% Bermuda 283% Colombia -47%
Denmark -72% Cayman Islands -26% Costa Rica -92%
Estonia -99% Channel Islands 80% Kazakhstan 22%
Finland -75% Cyprus -79% Latvia -99%
France 180% Hong Kong SAR, China 303% Lebanon -86%
Germany 159% Isle of Man -61% Malaysia -56%
Greece -92% Kuwait -86% Mauritius 366%
Hungary -99% Macao SAR, China -92% Mexico -23%
Iceland -98% Malta -89% Panama -66%
Ireland 83% Singapore 101% Romania -91%
Israel -97% Russian Federation -26%
Italy 24% Lower middle income 1,802 South Africa 333%
Japan 157% Egypt, Arab Rep. -8% Thailand -71%
Luxembourg 173% India -82% Turkey -80%
Netherlands 50% Indonesia -7% Uruguay -85%
New Zealand -97% Pakistan -99% Venezuela, RB -50%
Norway -52% Philippines 293%
Poland -99% Ukraine -97% Unclassied
Portugal -82% Gibraltar
Slovak Republic -100% Netherlands Antilles (pre 2009)
Slovenia -100%
Korea, Rep. -89%
Spain -31%
Sweden -55%
Switzerland -11%
United Kingdom 235%
United States 566%
The table presents a cross-section of nancial exposures for countries in the network at the end of 2006. Countries are
categorised by income group using the World Bank Country classication table (2013). Financial exposures are denoted
as the percentage dierence from their income group arithmetic mean.
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Figure C.1: Exposures by country as percentage dierences from their income group arithmetic mean, 2001-2009 -20246
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Figure C.2: Exposures by country as percentage dierences from their income group arithmetic mean, 2001-2009 -101234
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Figure C.4: Exposures by country as percentage dierences from their income group arithmetic mean, 2001-2009 -10123
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C.2 Degree Distributions
In Figure C.5 we show three dierent cumulative degree distributions for cross border
holdings at both linear and logarithmic scaling. The various icons represent the years
2001{2008 (see caption for the key). The rst two plots are derived from the full 237 
237 CPIS matrix of exposures. The rst row comes from symmetrising the network,
connecting two countries by an undirected edge if the investment of either country in
the other exceeds 500;000 US dollars. The directed network underlying the plots in
the second row keeps the same threshold but introduces the directed nature of the
edges. In the rst we measure simple degree distribution and in the second, out-degree
distribution. The plots show no evidence of a power law. The data underlying the third
row is derived from the CPIS network of the core 64 countries. Once again, there is no
evidence for a power law in the degree distribution. Similar results were obtained with
a number of dierent thresholds.
Figure C.5: Cumulative degree distributions for network of exposures
10
0
10
1
10
2 10
ï3
10
ï2
10
ï1
10
0 logïlog plot
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
linear plot
10
1
10
2
10
ï2
10
ï1
logïlog plot
P
(
k
)
 
ï
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
linear plot
10
0
10
1
10
2 10
ï2
10
ï1
10
0 logïlog plot
k ï (out) degree
0 20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
linear plot
ïï 237x237 Network, symmetrized ïï
ïï 237x237 Network, directed ïï
ïï 64x64 Network, directed ïï
The graphs show the probability of a node having degree k or greater. Dierent colors represent correspond to
dierent years, +2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; }2007; 42008. 67 reporters vis- a-vis 231 partners.References
Abe, K. & Wilson, J. (2008), Weathering the storm: Investing in port infrastructure to lower trade costs in East
Asia. Policy Research Working Paper, No. 4911.
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A. & Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2013), Systemic risk and stability in nancial networks, NBER
Working Papers 18727, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Acharya, V., Philippon, T., Richardson, M. & Roubini, N. (2009), `The nancial crisis of 2007{2009: Causes and
remedies', Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 18(2), 89{137.
Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Barab asi, A. L. (2000), `Error and attack tolerance of complex networks', Nature
406(378), 378{382.
Allen, F. & Babus, A. (2009), Networks in nance, in `The Network Challenge', Wharton School Publishing,
Philadelphia, pp. 367{382.
Allen, F. & Gale, D. (2000), `Financial contagion', Journal of Political Economy 108(1), 1{33.
Amjadi, A., Reinke, U. & Yeats, A. (1996), Did external barriers cause the marginalisation of Sub-Saharan Africa
in world trade? Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank, No. 1586.
Anderson, J. E. (1979), `A theoretical foundation for the gravity equation', The American Economic Review
69(1), pp. 106{116.
Anderson, J. E. (2010), The gravity model, NBER Working Papers 16576, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Anderson, J. E. & van Wincoop, E. (2003), `Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the border puzzle', American
Economic Review 93(1), 170{192.
Anderson, J. E. & van Wincoop, E. (2004), `Trade costs', Journal of Economic Literature 42(3), 691{751.
Anderson, J. E. & Yotov, Y. V. (2010), `The changing incidence of geography', American Economic Review
100(5).
Arkolakis, C. (2010), `Market penetration costs and the new consumers margin in international trade', Journal
of Political Economy 118(6), pp. 1151{1199.
Arkolakis, C. (2011), A unied theory of rm selection and growth, CESifo Working Paper Series 2679, CESifo
Group Munich.
Arkolakis, C., Costinot, A. & Rodriguez-Clare, A. (2012), `New trade models, same old gains?', American Eco-
nomic Review 102(1), 94{130.
Babus, A. (2006), The formation of nancial networks, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-093/2, Tinbergen
Institute.
Baier, S. & Bergstrand, J. (2001), `The growth of world trade: Taris, transport costs, and income similarity.',
The Journal of International Economics 53, 1{27.
Barab asi, A.-L. & Albert, R. (1999), `Emergence of scaling in random networks', Science 286(5439), 509{512.
151152 REFERENCES
Battiston, S., Gatti, D. D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B. & Stiglitz, J. E. (2012), `Default cascades: When does
risk diversication increase stability?', Journal of Financial Stability 8(3), 138 {149.
Behar, A. (2009), De 'Bonus Vetus OLS': approximating the international trade-cost eects of export documen-
tation. FREIT Working Paper, No. 37.
Behar, A. & Venables, A. (2010), Transport costs and international trade. Oxford University Department of
Economics Discussion Paper, No. 488.
Bernard, A. B. & Jensen, J. B. (1999), `Exceptional exporter performance: cause, eect, or both?', Journal of
International Economics 47(1), 1 { 25.
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B. & Lawrence, R. Z. (1995), `Exporters, jobs, and wages in U.S. manufacturing:
1976-1987', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics 1995, pp. 67{119.
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B., Redding, S. J. & Schott, P. K. (2007), `Firms in international trade', Journal of
Economic Perspectives 21(3), 105{130.
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B., Redding, S. J. & Schott, P. K. (2012), `The empirics of rm heterogeneity and
international trade', Annual Review of Economics 4(1), 283{313.
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B. & Schott, P. K. (2006), `Survival of the best t: Exposure to low-wage countries
and the (uneven) growth of U.S. manufacturing plants', Journal of International Economics 68(1), 219{237.
Bernard, A., Eaton, J., Jensen, J. & Kortum, S. (2003), `Plants and productivity in international trade', American
Economic Review 93(4), 1268{1290.
Bernhofen, D. M., El-Sahli, Z. & Kneller, R. (2013), Estimating the eects of the container revolution on world
trade, CESifo Working Paper Series 4136, CESifo Group Munich.
Blauwens, G., De Baere, P. & Van de Voorde, E. (2006), Transport Economics, second edn, De Boek, Antwerp.
Boss, M., Elsinger, H., Summer, M. & Thurner, S. (2004), `Network topology of the interbank market', Quanti-
tative Finance 4(6), 677{684.
Brain connectivity toolbox (2013).
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/bctnet/Home
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009), `Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007{2008', Journal of Economic
Perspectives 23(1), 77{100.
Cabrales, A., Gottardi, P. & Vega-Redondo, F. (2013), Risk-sharing and contagion in networks, Economics
working papers, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Econom a.
Caccioli, F., Farmer, J. D., Foti, N. & Rockmore, D. N. (2013), How interbank lending amplies overlapping
portfolio contagion: A case study of the Austrian banking network, Working paper, arXiv:1306.3704.
Chaney, T. (2005), Distorted gravity: Heterogeneous rms, market structure and the geography of international
trade. Job Market Paper.
Chaney, T. (2008), `Distorted gravity: The intensive and extensive margins of international trade', American
Economic Review 98(4), 1707{1721.
Chaney, T. (2013a), The gravity equation in international trade: An explanation, NBER Working Papers 19285,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Chaney, T. (2013b), The network structure of international trade. American Economic Review [forthcoming].
Charbonneau, K. B. (2012), Multiple xed eects in nonlinear panel data models - Theory and evidence, Working
papers, Princeton University Working Paper.
Clark, X., Dollar, D. & Micco, A. (2004), `Port eciency, maritime transport costs, and bilateral trade', Journal
of Development Economics 75(2), 417 { 450.REFERENCES 153
Clausing, K. A. (2001), `Trade creation and trade diversion in the Canada - United States Free Trade Agreement',
Canadian Journal of Economics 34(3), 677{696.
Clerides, S. K., Lach, S. & Tybout, J. R. (1998), `Is learning by exporting important? Micro-dynamic evidence
from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco', The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(3), pp. 903{947.
Cohen-Cole, E., Patacchini, E. & Zenou, Y. (2011), Systemic risk and network formation in the interbank market,
Research Papers in Economics 2011:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
Cole, S. (2005), Applied Transport Economics, Policy, Management and Decision Making, third edn, The Char-
tered Institute for Logistics and Transport, London.
Costinot, A. & Rodr guez-Clare, A. (2013), Trade theory with numbers: Quantifying the consequences of global-
ization, NBER Working Papers 18896, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Craig, B. & von Peter, G. (2010), Interbank tiering and money center banks, BIS Working Papers 322, Bank for
International Settlements.
Crozet, M. & Koenig, P. (2007), Structural gravity equation with intensive and extensive margins. Universit e
Paris X - Nanterre Working Paper.
Crozet, M. & Koenig, P. (2010), `Structural gravity equation with intensive and extensive margins', Canadian
Journal of Economics 43(1), 41{62.
De Palma, A. & Quinet, E. (2011), A Handbook of Transport Economics, Elgar Original Reference Series, Edward
Elgar.
Degryse, H. & Nguyen, G. (2004), Interbank exposures: An empirical examination of systemic risk in the Belgian
banking system, Working Paper Research 43, National Bank of Belgium.
Disdier, A.-C. & Head, K. (2008), `The puzzling persistence of the distance eect on bilateral trade', The Review
of Economics and Statistics 90(1), 37{48.
Dixit, A. K. & Stiglitz, J. E. (1977), `Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity', American
Economic Review 67(3), 297{308.
Djankov, S., Freund, C. & Pham, C. S. (2010), `Trading on time', The Review of Economics and Statistics
92(1), 166{173.
Doyle, J. C., Alderson, D. L., Li, L., Low, S., Roughan, M., Shalunov, S., Tanaka, R. & Willinger, W. (2005), `The
\robust yet fragile" nature of the internet', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America 102(41), 14497{14502.
Dunne, J. A. (2006), The network structure of food webs, in `Ecological Networks, Linking Structure to Dynamics
in Food Webs', Oxford University Press, pp. 27{86.
Eaton, J. & Kortum, S. (2002), `Technology, geography, and trade', Econometrica 70(5), 1741{1779.
Eaton, J., Kortum, S. & Kramarz, F. (2011), `An anatomy of international trade: Evidence from French rms',
Econometrica 79(5), 1453{1498.
Elliott, M., Golub, B. & Jackson, M. O. (2013), Financial networks and contagion. Working Paper.
Feenstra, R. C. (2004), Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, 1st edn, Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
Foti, N., Pauls, S. & Rockmore, D. N. (2013), `Stability of the world trade web over time - an extinction analysis',
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37(9), 1889{1910.
Fujita, M., Krugman, P. & Venables, A. (1999), The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions and International Trade,
1st edn, The MIT Press, London.
Fujita, M. & Mori, T. (1996), `The role of ports in the making of major cities: Self-agglomeration and hub-eect',
Journal of Development Economics 49(1), 93{120.154 REFERENCES
Furne, C. H. (2003), `Interbank exposures: Quantifying the risk of contagion', Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 35(1), 111{128.
Gai, P. & Kapadia, S. (2010), `Contagion in nancial networks', Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical,
Physical and Engineering Science 466(2120), 2401{2423.
Gale, D. M. & Kariv, S. (2007), `Financial networks', The American Economic Review 97(2), 99{103.
Georg, C.-P. (2013), `The eect of the interbank network structure on contagion and common shocks', Journal
of Banking & Finance 37(7), 2216 { 2228.
Gouri eroux, C., H eam, J.-C. & Monfort, A. (2012), `Bilateral exposures and systemic solvency risk', Canadian
Journal of Economics 45(4), 1273{1309.
Greene, W. (2002), The behavior of the xed eects estimator in nonlinear models. New York University,
Department of Economics Working Paper No. 02-05.
Greene, W. H. (2008), Econometric Analysis, 6th edn, Pearson Education, New Jersey.
Grigoriou, C. (2007), Landlockedness, infrastructure and trade. Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank,
No. 4335.
Haldane, A. G. (2009), Rethinking the nancial network, Speech presented at the Financial Student Association
in Amsterdam, April, Bank of England.
Harrigan, J. (2010), `Airplanes and comparative advantage', Journal of International Economics 82(2), 181{194.
Head, K. & Mayer, T. (2002), Illusory border eects: Distance mismeasurement inates estimates of home bias
in trade. Working Paper, CEPII Research Center, No. 2002 01.
Helpman, E. & Krugman, P. (1987), Market structure and foreign trade: Increasing returns, imperfect competi-
tion, and the international economy, Vol. 1 of MIT Press Books, The MIT Press.
Helpman, E., Melitz, M. & Rubinstein, Y. (2008), `Estimating trade ows: Trading partners and trading volumes',
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(2), 441{487.
Hendricks, K., Piccione, M. & Tan, G. (1995), `The economics of hubs: The case of monopoly', The Review of
Economic Studies 62(No. 1), 83{99.
Hoyle, B. & Knowles, R. (1998), Modern Transport Geography, rst edn, Wiley, UK.
Hummels, D. (2001), Toward a geography of trade costs. Purdue University, [Mimeographed Document].
Hummels, D. (2007), `Transportation costs and international trade in the second era of globalization', Journal of
Economic Perspectives 21(3), 131{154.
Hummels, D., Lugovskyy, V. & Skiba, A. (2009), `The trade reducing eects of market power in international
shipping', Journal of Development Economics 89(1), 84{97.
Hummels, D. & Skiba, A. (2004), `Shipping the good apples out? an empirical conrmation of the Alchian-Allen
conjecture', Journal of Political Economy 112(6), 1384{1402.
IMF Classication of oshore nancial centres (2000).
URL: http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm#table1
IMF Coordinated portfolio investment survey (2013).
URL: http://cpis.imf.org/
IMF Coordinated portfolio investment survey guide (2002), second edn, International Monetary Fund.
IMF World Economic Outlook databases (2013).
URL: http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28
Irarrazabal, A., Moxnes, A. & Opromolla, L. (2014), The tip of the iceberg: A quantitative framework for
estimating trade costs. Working Paper.REFERENCES 155
Jackson, M. O. (2003), A survey of models of network formation: Stability and eciency, Game theory and
information, EconWPA.
Jackson, M. O. (2008), Social and Economic Networks, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
Jackson, M. O. & Wolinsky, A. (1996), `A strategic model of social and economic networks', Journal of Economic
Theory 71(1), 44{74.
Jeong, H., Mason, S. P., Barab asi, A.-L. & Oltvai, Z. N. (2001), `Lethality and centrality in protein networks'.
Kalouptsidi, M. (2011), Time to build and uctuations in bulk shipping. American Economic Review [forthcom-
ing].
Krautheim, S. (2012), `Heterogeneous rms, exporter networks and the eect of distance on international trade',
Journal of International Economics 87(1), 27 { 35.
Krugman, P. (1979), `Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade', Journal of Interna-
tional Economics 9(4), 469{479.
Krugman, P. (1980), `Scale economies, product dierentiation and the pattern of trade', The American Economic
Review 70(5), 950{959.
Krugman, P. (1991), `Increasing returns and economic geography', Journal of Political Economy 99(3), 483{499.
Krugman, P. (1993), The hub eect: or, threeness in interregional trade, in `Theory, Policy and Dynamics in
International Trade', Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 29{37.
Krugman, P. (2009), `The increasing returns revolution in trade and geography', American Economic Review
99(3).
Krugman, P. & Venables, A. J. (1995a), `Globalization and the inequality of nations', The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 110(4), 857{880.
Krugman, P. & Venables, A. J. (1995b), The seamless world: A spatial model of international specialization,
CEPR Discussion Papers 1230, CEPR Discussion Papers.
Lancaster, T. (2000), `The incidental parameter problem since 1948', Journal of Econometrics 95(2), 391{413.
Lane, P. R. & Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2007), `The external wealth of nations mark ii: Revised and extended
estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970-2004', Journal of International Economics 73(2), 223 { 250.
Leitner, Y. (2005), `Financial networks: Contagion, commitment, and private sector bailouts', The Journal of
Finance 60(6), 2925{2953.
Levinson, M. (2008), The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy
Bigger, Princeton University Press.
Limao, N. & Venables, A. (2001), `Infrastructure, geographical disadvantage and transport costs.', The World
Bank Economic Review 15, 451{479.
Lorenz, J., Battiston, S. & Schweitzer, F. (2009), `Systemic risk in a unifying framework for cascading processes
on networks', European Physical Journal B 71, 441{460.
Lugovskyy, V. & Skiba, A. (2010), Transport cost and endogenous quality choice. Competitive Advantage in the
Global Economy (CAGE) Working Paper, No. 17.
Lugovskyy, V. & Skiba, A. (2011), How geography aects quality. Working Paper.
Lux, M. (2011), Defying gravity: The substitutability of transportation in international trade, MPRA working
paper, University Library of Munich, Germany.
MacKellar, L., Worgotter, A. & Worz, J. (2000), `Economic development problems of landlocked countries',
Transition Economics Series (14), 1{21.156 REFERENCES
Mallard, G. & Glaister, S. (2008), Transport Economics, Theory, Application and Policy, rst edn, Palgrave
Macmillan, New York.
Mart nez-Jaramillo, S., P erez, O. P., Embriz, F. A. & Dey, F. L. G. (2010), `Systemic risk, nancial contagion
and nancial fragility', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34(11), 2358 {2374.
Martinez-Zarzoso, I. & Suarez-Burguet, C. (2005), `Transport costs and trade: Empirical evidence for Latin
American imports from the European Union', Journal of International Trade and Economic Development
14(3), 353{371.
Maslov, S. & Sneppen, K. (2002), `Specicity and stability in topology of protein networks', Science
296(5569), 910{913.
Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011), Notes on cepiis distances measures: The geodist database, Working Papers
2011-25, CEPII research center.
McCallum, J. (1995), `National borders matter: Canada-U.S. regional trade patterns', The American Economic
Review 85(3), pp. 615{623.
Melitz, M. (2003), `The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity',
Econometrica 71(6), 1695{1725.
Melitz, M. J. & Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2008), `Market size, trade, and productivity', Review of Economic Studies
75(1), 295{316.
Melitz, M. J. & Redding, S. J. (2012), Heterogeneous rms and trade, NBER Working Papers 18652, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Melitz, M. J. & Redding, S. J. (2013), Firm heterogeneity and aggregate welfare, NBER Working Papers 18919,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Melitz, M. J. & Treer, D. (2012), `Gains from trade when rms matter', The Journal of Economic Perspectives
26(2), pp. 91{118.
Micco, A. & Perez, N. (2002), Determinants of maritime transport costs. Research Department Working Paper,
Inter-American Development Bank, No. 441.
Nadaraya, E. (1964), `On estimating regression', Theory of Probability & Its Applications 9(1), 141{142.
Newman, M. E. J. (2000), `Models of the small world', Journal of Statistical Physics 101(3{4), 819{841.
Newman, M. E. J. (2003), `The structure and function of complex networks', SIAM Review 45, 167{256.
Newman, M. E. J., Forrest, S. & Balthrop, J. (2002), `Email networks and the spread of computer viruses',
Physical Review E 66(3), 035101.
Neyman, J. & Scott, E. L. (1948), `Consistent estimates based on partially consistent observations', Econometrica
16(1), 1{32.
Nier, E., Yang, J., Yorulmazer, T. & Alentorn, A. (2007), `Network models and nancial stability', Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 31(6), 2033{2060.
OECD (2008), Clarifying trade costs in maritime transport. OECD Trade Committee Working Paper.
OECD, Maritime Transport Costs Database (2010).
Oum, T., Dodgson, J., Hensher, D., Morisson, S., Nash, C., Small, K. & Waters, W. (1997), Transport Economics,
Selected Readings, rst edn, Routledge, London.
Oum, T. H., Zhang, A. & Zhang, Y. (1995), `Airline network rivalry', The Canadian Journal of Economics
28(4a), pp. 836{857.
Oum, T., Waters, W. & Song, J. (1990), `A survey of recent estimates of price elasticities of demand for transport',
Policy, Planning and Research Working Paper, World Bank (No. 359).REFERENCES 157
Overman, H. G., Redding, S. J. & Venables, A. J. (2001), The economic geography of trade production and
income: A survey of empirics. Discussion Paper, CEPR, No. 2978.
Pavcnik, N. (2002), `Trade liberalization, exit, and productivity improvement: Evidence from Chilean plants',
Review of Economic Studies 69(1), 245{76.
Puhr, C., Seliger, R. & Sigmund, M. (2013), How interbank lending amplies overlapping portfolio contagion: A
case study of the Austrian banking network, Financial stability report 24, Oesterreichische Nationalbank.
Radelet, S. & Sachs, J. (1998), Shipping costs, manufactured exports and economic growth. Harvard University,
Harvard Institute for International Development, [Mimeographed document].
Redding, S. J. (2010), Theories of heterogeneous rms and trade, NBER Working Papers 16562, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc.
Redding, S. & Venables, A. (2004), `Economic geography and international inequality', Journal of International
Economics 62, 53{82.
Roberts, M. J. & Tybout, J. R. (1991), Size rationalization and trade exposure in developing countries, in
`Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy', NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc,
pp. 169{200.
Roberts, M. J. & Tybout, J. R. (1997), `The decision to export in Colombia: An empirical model of entry with
sunk costs', The American Economic Review 87(4), pp. 545{564.
Rodrigue, J.-P. (2010), Maritime transportation: Drivers for the shipping and port industries. International
Transport Forum Working Paper No.2.
Romalis, J. (2007), `NAFTA's and CUSFTA's impact on international trade', The Review of Economics and
Statistics 89(3), 416{435.
Rose, A. K. & Spiegel, M. M. (2007), `Oshore nancial centres: Parasites or symbionts?', The Economic Journal
117(523), 1310{1335.
Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2005), `A spatial theory of trade', American Economic Review 95(5), 1464{1491.
Rua, G. (2012), Fixed costs, network eects, and the international diusion of containerization. Working Paper.
Ruhl, K. J. (2008), The international elasticity puzzle. New York University, Department of Economics Working
Paper No. 08-30.
Samuelson, P. A. (1952), `The transfer problem and transport costs: The terms of trade when impediments are
absent', The Economic Journal 62(246), pp. 278{304.
Samuelson, P. A. (1954), `The transfer problem and transport costs, ii: Analysis of eects of trade impediments',
The Economic Journal 64(254), pp. 264{289.
Schweitzer, F., Fagiolo, G., Sornette, D., Vega-Redondo, F., Vespignani, A. & White, D. R. (2009), `Economic
networks: The new challenges', Science 325(5939), 422{425.
Soram aki, K., Bech, M. L., Arnold, J., Glass, R. J. & Beyeler, W. E. (2007), `The topology of interbank payment
ows', Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 379(1), 317 { 333.
Starr, R. & Stinchcombe, M. (1992), Ecient transportation routing and natural monopoly in the airline industry:
An economic analysis of hub-spoke and related systems. Discussion paper, University of California, San Diego,
No. 92-25.
Stopford, M. (2009), Maritime Economics, third edn, Routledge, London.
UNCTAD (2011), `Review of maritime transport'.
United Nations composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected
economic and other groupings (2013).
URL: http://http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm158 REFERENCES
Upper, C. (2007), Using counterfactual simulations to assess the danger of contagion in interbank markets, BIS
Working Papers 234, Bank for International Settlements.
Upper, C. (2011), `Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in interbank markets', Journal of
Financial Stability 7(3), 111{125.
Upper, C. & Worms, A. (2004), `Estimating bilateral exposures in the german interbank market: Is there a danger
of contagion?', European Economic Review 48(4), 827{849.
van Lelyveld, I. & Liedorp, F. (2006), `Interbank contagion in the Dutch banking sector: A sensitivity analysis',
International Journal of Central Banking 2(2).
Vega-Redondo, F. (2007), Complex Social Networks, Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge University
Press.
von Peter, G. (2007), International banking centres: A network perspective, Technical report. Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements Quarterly Review.
Wang, X. F. & Chen, G. (2003), `Complex networks: Small-world, scale-free and beyond', Circuits and Systems
Magazine, IEEE 3(1), 6{20.
Watson, G. S. (1964), `Smooth regression analysis', Sankhy a: The Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A
26(4), 359{372.
Weistroer, C. & Jochen, M. (2010), Monitoring cross-border exposure. Deutsche Bank Research Working Paper.
Winters, L. A. (2004), `Trade liberalisation and economic performance: An overview', Economic Journal
114(493), F4{F21.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 1st edn, The MIT Press,
London.
World Bank Country classication table (2013).
URL: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classications/country-and-lending-groups
World Bank World Development Indicators (2013).
URL: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators
World Bank, Doing Business Data (2010).
Yi, K.-M. (2003), `Can vertical specialization explain the growth of world trade?', Journal of Political Economy
111(1), 52{102.